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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT HISTORY
Lawyers use history, mostly legal precedents, to help guide their
clients in their lives and businesses. But not all legal history gets collect-
ed and published in appellate opinions, or even in news accounts.
History is often scattered in ways that are difficult to follow, and facts are
frequently obscured by the fogs of memory.
As lawyers, though, we should keep track of the people, politics, and
developments that shaped our judicial system, particularly our North
Dakota Supreme Court. Whether good, bad, or indifferent, the current
conditions of the Court and of the judicial system it governs certainly
affect how we lawyers practice our profession. Consider these glimpses
of how our Court and judicial system came to where they are today.
I. LEAVING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
A. THE TERRITORIAL COURTS
Before statehood, written appellate review in this region began when
the 1861 federal act for Dakota Territory created a three-judge supreme
court. President Abraham Lincoln appointed the first three justices of
the Territorial Supreme Court: Chief Justice Philemon Bliss of Ohio;
George P. Williston of Pennsylvania; and Joseph L. Williams of
Tennessee.' In the next twenty-eight years, later presidents appointed
five successor chief justices and twenty-one successor associate justices.2
An additional justice was authorized in 1879, two more in 1884, and
another two were authorized in 1888.3
1. See I COLONEL CLEMENT A. LOUNSBERRY, NORTH DAKOTA HISTORY AND PEOPLE 271 (1917).
"The town of Williston, N.D. was named in honor of Judge Williston, who was greatly admired by Mr.
James J. Hill, the great railroad builder." Id. at 274. There is confusion over Judge Williston's first
name. Colonel Clement A. Lounsberry, founder of the Bismarck Tribune, called him "Lorenzo
Parsons," but I DAKOTA REP. III listed him as "Geo. P.," while the STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 72 (1897) listed him as "S.P. Williston." Should we wonder why Williston moved
west?
2. See A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DAKOTA TERRITORY AND NORTH
DAKOTA SUPREME COURT 1889-1989, at 1-2 (compiled by Marcella Kramer, partly from material as-
sembled by law clerk David L. Peterson in 1969, and with editorial assistance from Penny (Barry)
Miller, then Chief Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court) (North Dakota Supreme Court 1988) [herein-
after SKETCH]. Ara Bartlett was appointed twice, as an associate justice in 1864 and as chief justice in
1865. See id. Jefferson Kidder was appointed and served twice. See id. Additionally, Allan A. Bur-
ton declined his nomination and did not serve and Frank Sperry had his nomination withdrawn. See II
BERNARD FLOYD HYATT, A LEGAL LEGACY FOR STATEHOOD: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN DAKOTA TERRITORY, 1861-1889, at 680, 683 (1987). The thesis is divided into two
volumes: volume one includes pages 1-372 and volume two includes pages 373-707. Hyatt also wrote
his Master's thesis, The Frontier Judicial System of Dakota Territory, 1861-1873, (Thesis at University
of North Dakota for M.A., 1976) looking at the early days of the Dakota Territory courts.
3. See Act of June 19, 1878, 45th Cong., ch. 329, 20 Stat. 194 (enacted); Act of July 4, 1884, 48th
Cong., ch. 182, 23 Stat. 101 (enacted); 25 Stat. 823 (1888).
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The first three Territorial Justices "were also judges of the United
States District Court for the Territory and acted as trial judges. within the
various judicial districts; hence there was the anomalous situation of the
judges sitting in review of their own decisions." 4
In the case of People v. Wintermute, 1 Dak. 60 [1875], an
appeal in a manslaughter case, Shannon, Chief Justice, was the
trial judge. An opinion reversing his decision was written by
Kidder Associate Justice, and Chief Justice Shannon dissented.
Not to be outdone, the other Associate Justice, Justice Barnes,
wrote a separate opinion attacking the dissent of Chief Justice
Shannon. 5
Eventually, a 1888 federal enactment "prohibited a judge from sitting as
a member of the appellate court in a matter wherein he had an interest or
had presided as trial judge." 6
The first three justices "were all men learned in the law, and of
excellent character." 7 But, according to other research, later "territorial
judges were political appointees from the eastern states, unfamiliar with
local conditions," were often called "political hacks," and one chief
justice "had no prior judicial or legal experience when appointed." 8
Statehood brought some improvements.
B. A CAPITOL RAILROAD JOB
Amid much legal and political maneuvering, one historically
significant decision of the Supreme Court of Dakota Territory approved
relocating the territorial capitol from Yankton to Bismarck.
4. J.H. Newton, Appellate Practice and Procedure in North Dakota, 27 N.D. L. REV. 155 (1951)
[hereinafter Newton, Appellate Practice]. A footnote explains: "This article is a digest of a series of
three lectures delivered at the University of North Dakota Law School to the class of 1950." Id. The
authors of this history fortuitously received apparent carbon copies of the actual lectures from Minot
lawyer Roger 0. Herigstad, who found them among papers preserved by his father, longtime Minot
lawyer 0. B. Herigstad, who died in 1951. The law review article abridged the actual lectures, which
contain more extensive explanations of some details. Quoted material from Mr. Newton's lectures, as
distinct from his law review article, are here identified as Newton Lecture number 1, 2, or 3, followed
by the page number of that lecture. These lecture notes are now held by the North Dakota Supreme
Court Law Library.
5. J.H. Newton, Lecture No. I at the University of North Dakota School of Law, at 2 (1950)
(lecture notes available in the North Dakota Supreme Court Law Library).
6. Newton, Appellate Practice, supra note 4, at 155; 25 Stat. 823 (1888).
7. LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 274.
8. Hon. Robert Vogel, Looking Back on a Century of Complete Codification of the Law, 53 N.D.
L. REV. 225, 228 (1976). Justice Vogel (1973-1978), after a career as a practitioner at Garrison,
McLean County states attorney, seven years as United States Attorney for North Dakota, and 12 more
years of practice at Mandan, was appointed to the Court in 1973 by Governor Art Link to succeed
Justice Alvin C. Strutz, who died in office on June 16, 1973. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 53, 58.
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The 1883 Dakota Territory Assembly acted to remove the capitol
from Yankton by authorizing a named commission to select its new site.9
Governor Nehemiah G. Ordway signed the act into law on March 8,
1883.10 The act directed the commission to "select a suitable site for the
seat of government of the Territory of Dakota, due regard being had to
its accessibility from all portions of the Territory, and its general fitness
for a capital, when at least ... $100,000 ... shall be paid or guaranteed
in money" by the town selected, and it had also conveyed at least 160
acres of land for the "capital buildings" and for other development.11
Each member of the relocation commission had to file a $40,000
bond approved by a justice of the Supreme Court.12 The commissioners
had to qualify and to meet at Yankton to organize within thirty days
after the enactment, and they had to select the new location by July 1,
1883.13
A Yankton group soon challenged the legality of the act in court in
an apparent attempt to delay action by the commission until after the
July 1 deadline for its decision.' 4 Acting in his district court capacity,
Chief Justice Alonzo J. Edgerton granted a temporary restraining order
against the commission. 15 But the commissioners all somehow evaded
service of process long enough to qualify before Justice Jefferson P.
Kidder and to file their bonds with the territorial Treasurer at Yankton. 16
The commissioners then discreetly boarded a special train at Sioux City,
and organized on it while stopped in Yankton. 17 The commission thus
timely began its work.
9. See LAWS OF DAKOTA ch. 104, at 217 (1883). Among the nine members named to the
commission was Alexander McKenzie. See id. § 2.
Although McKenzie could scarcely write his own name, the Northern Pacific chose him
as its political agent in northern Dakota, and he came to represent the powerful interests
of Minneapolis and St. Paul, which held the region as a colony. McKenzie was to be
Republican national committeeman for North Dakota until 1908; he was to become
"Alexander the Great, Boss of North Dakota"; he was to die a millionaire and, even
though he never held a state office, to be given a funeral in the state capitol at Bismarck.
ELWYN B. ROBINSON, HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA 200 (1966) (quoting Kenneth J. Carey, Alexander
McKenzie, Boss of North Dakota, 1883-1906 (1949) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North
Dakota)).
10. See LAWS OF DAKOTA ch. 104, at 222 (1883).
11. Id. § 4, at 218. The act was "decided by nearly a two-thirds vote to change the seat of
government to some more central and accessible locality." LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 374. GEORGE
W. KINGSBUtY, II HISTORY OF DAKOTA TERRITORY 1301-08 (1915) has a detailed account of the
enactment of this measure and the proceedings of the relocation commission.
12. See LAWS OF DAKOTA ch. 104, § 3, at 218 (1883).
13. See id. §§ 3, 4.
14. See Hyatt, supra note 2, at 533.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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At the request of Yankton forces, Chief Justice Edgerton issued a
quo warranto writ near April 3, 1883, to determine whether the capitol-
relocation commission law was valid.18 Then, too, a territorial grand jury
began probing allegations of bribery and corruption of the legislators
who passed the capitol-relocation law. 19 After the commissioners ap-
peared before Chief Justice Edgerton on May 2, he set their civil case for
trial during a special court term at Yankton scheduled to begin July 2,
the day after the commission had to complete its work.20 Also, May 8,
the grand jury indicted many legislators for bribery and corruption on
the capitol-relocation act.21 "No warrants, however, were ever issued for
their arrest." 22
"Before making its choice, the commission visited many aspiring
towns. It was entertained extravagantly at Bismarck." 23 The comnis-
sion met at St. Paul, Minnesota, during the last days of May to make its
decision, and then traveled to Fargo in Dakota Territory. 24 There, on
June 2, they announced their selection of Bismarck for the new capitol.25
"The Northern Pacific [Railroad] furnished the required 160-acre
tract, . . . [and i]n September, 1883, Henry Villard, president of the
Northern Pacific, laid the cornerstone of the new capitol." 26
Meanwhile, on July 25, Chief Justice Edgerton began hearing the
quo warranto case against the commissioners. 27 He finished the trial on
July 28 and, on August 27, decided against the commission. 28 He ruled
the commission members were appointed illegally, and ousted them
from office.29 He did not file a written opinion then, gave no reasons,
and really said nothing about the legality of relocating the capitol.30
18. See Territory ex rel Smith v. Scott, 3 Dakota 357, 20 N.W. 401 (1884).
19. See HYATT, supra note 2, at 533.
20. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 533-34.
21. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 534. "To discredit Governor Ordway, Yankton parties caused
his arrest and fixed his bond at $50,000. McKenzie furnished that amount of currency for his bail,
which was reduced to a reasonable sum and nothing every came of the prosecution." LOUNSBERRY,
supra note 1, at 377.
22. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 534
23. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 201.
24. See HYATT supra note 2, at 534.
25. See HYATr supra note 2, at 534. The vote was five to four. See RoBINSON, supra note 9, at
201.
26. See RoBINSON, supra note 9, at 201.
27. See HYATT, supra note 2, at 534.
28. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 534, Territory ex rel Smith v. Scott, 3 Dakota 357, 388, 20 N.W.
401, 402 (1884). "Edgerton's decision was made public on September 15 .... " HYATrT, spra note 2,
at 534.
29. See Scott, 3 Dakota at 388, 20 N.W. at 402.
30. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 534-35.
At a later day, Judge Edgerton filed his opinion in the case, a lengthy document, covering
the numerous points in the case completely, which was highly commended by the bar and
press as one of the ablest decisions rendered from the Dakota bench.
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The commission appealed Chief Justice Edgerton's ouster decision
to the Supreme Court of Dakota Territory, which heard it on May 15,
1884.31 'The case was fought primarily on ... [whether] the Territory
Assembly had ...authority to delegate its power to the capital com-
mission." 32 Barely a week later, on May 23, 1884, a three-justice
majority of the Dakota Supreme Court reversed Chief Justice Edgerton's
judgment and directed the trial court to enter judgment on the pleadings
upholding the commissioners. 33
The opinion by Justice Church for the majority was filed nearly
four months later on September 20, 1884.34 The majority ruled that the
relocation act was a lawful delegation and exercise of legislative
authority that had properly designated the commissioners by name. 35
The decision meant that the capitol of Dakota Territory had been
lawfully moved to Bismarck. 36 "The Dakota Supreme Court, however,
continued to meet at Yankton as required by Territory statutory law." 37
Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Edgerton, in reviewing his own deci-
sion, wanted to affirm it and so dissented. 38 The majority included two
justices appointed after the enactment of the relocation law, Justices Wil-
liam E. Church and Cornelius S. Palmer, along with Justice Sanford H.
Hudson. 39 "Governor Ordway ... appears to have had a hand in the
KINGSBURY, supra note 11, at 1323.
31. See Hyatt, supra note 2, at 535.
32. See Hyatt, supra note 2, at 535.
33. See Scott, 3 Dakota at 417, 20 N.W. at 415.
34. See id. at 357, 20 N.W. at 401.
35. See id. at 391-417, 20 N.W. at 403-15.
36. During a debate in the second of the three constitutional conventions held in South Dakota
before statehood, on a proposed clause to require the state Supreme Court's sessions "to be held at the
seat of government," delegate Moody complained: ".... our Capitol was stolen from us." I DAKOTA
CONSTITTONAL CONVENnON 258 (Huron, S.D., Huronite Printing Co. 1907). South Dakota held three
constitutional conventions; in 1883, 1885, and 1889. See id. at 6, 46; II South DAKOrA CONsrrmuroNAL
CONVENTION 1258 (Huron, S.D. Huronite Printing Co. 1907). Additionally, a territorial convention for
statehood, including delegates from all parts of Dakota Territory, met in 1887 to request Congress for
"enabling legislation" permitting Dakota to enter the Union as a state. See STATEHOOD FOR DAKOrA:
PROCEEDINGS OF TIM TERRITORtAL CONVENTION HELD AT THE CrrY OF ABERDEEN, BROWN CoUNTY, DAKOTA
TERRITORY, DECEMBER 15, A.D. 1887 (Gibson Bros. Printers 1888), reprinted in XXI SoUTH DAKOTA
HiORicAL COLLECTIONS (South Dakota State Historical Society compiler, Hipple Printing Co. Pierre,
S.D. 1942).
37. Hyatt, supra note 2, at 383. The Dakota Supreme Court did, however, begin holding some
sessions at Bismarck in 1884. See Hyatt, supra note 2, at 383. The 1885 Assembly attempted to
transfer the Supreme Court from Yankton to Bismarck, but "John R. Gamble of Yankton, ...
Chairman of the Council's Judicary Committee .... was able to defeat the attempt." Hyatt, supra note
2, at 383. The 1885 Assembly did enact a law directing three separate annual sessions of the Supreme
Court in Bismarck, Deadwood, and Yankton. See Hyatt, supra note 2, at 383. Yet, "confusion as far
as Supreme Court sessions would remain throughout the Pre-Statehood Era." Hyatt, supra note 2, at
383.
In the 1887 Assembly, a bill "moving [the] Yankton[ ] term to Redfield passed both houses of
the Assembly; it, however, was [physically] lost. A duplicate of it was again [passed] by the Council,
but it was allowed to die in the House. No further session tampering occurred." Hyatt, supra note 2,
at 384.
38. See Scott, 3 Dakota at 417-44, 20 N.W. at 425-28 (Edgerton, C.J., dissenting).
39. See HYATT, supra note 2, at 683.
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appointment of W.E. Church .... Ordway and Alexander McKenzie
led the successful fight for the Governor's land speculating and county
organizing partner-C.S. Palmer-to replace [deceased Justice]
Kidder." 40
Accusations against Territory Governor Ordway, Alexander
McKenzie, and others allied with the Northern Pacific Railroad, for
improper tampering with the legislative and judicial processes, haunted
the proceedings. 41 Among the accusations were that Northern Pacific
operatives had directly contacted individual justices in the short time
after the Supreme Court had heard the appeal and before it quickly
ruled. 42 "At least eight newspapers agreed that [Justices] W.E. Church,
Palmer, and Hudson's votes in this case were controlled by the Northern
Pacific Railroad's Ordway-McKenzie political machine." 43
The Yankton forces quickly appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, but their efforts to advance the case on that docket were futile. 44
Their appeal inexplicably languished at the U.S. Supreme Court for five
years without being heard or decided.4 5 Statehood in 1889 eventually
mooted and ended the litigation. 46
40. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 536.
41. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 531-32, 535-37. Yankton forces
broadcast accounts of Ordways' corrupt dealings (he had, they said, offered positions as
county commissioners for sale to the highest bidder); they charged that he had received
thirty thousand dollars in cash for his part in moving the capital to Bismarck. President
Chester Arthur finally removed Ordway as territorial governor in June, 1884, but the
capital remained in Bismarck.
ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 201.
"During the 1885 Assembly, an attempt was made to remove the Territory capital from Bismarck
to Pierre. The Assembly enacted a bill making the move; Governor Gilbert A. Pierce, however,
vetoed it and the Assembly was unable to override the veto." Hyatt, supra note 2, at 383.
42. HYATT, supra note 2, at 536-37. Compare today's standard of judicial responsibility: "A
judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communication, or consider other communication
made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding,"
except in a few specifically defined circumstances. NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Can-
on 3 (B)(7) (2000); see also NORTH DAKOTA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5 (2000) ("A law-
yer shall not: (a) seek to influence a judge ... or other official by means prohibited by law including
ex pane communications concerning pending or impending proceedings.").
43. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 537.
One of the harsh realities of North Dakota life was the power of the railroads.
... The federal government had given [the Northern Pacific Railroad] 10,700,000 acres
of land in what was to become North Dakota. The land grant, 24 percent of the state's
area, gave the Northern Pacific a huge economic stake in the government.
ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 198 (citing Robert S. Henry, The Railroad Land Grant Legend in American
History Texts, XXXI MISS. VALLEY HIsT. REV., Sept. 1945, at 194).
44. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 537
45. See HYATT, supra note 2, at 537.
46. See HYATT, supra note 2, at 537.
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This "politically charged" litigation was "among the most impor-
tant ever to have been considered by Dakota courts," Hyatt declared. 47
As he concluded, this decision of the Dakota Territory Supreme Court
loomed large "became the removal of the capital from Yankton and the
selection of Bismarck along the right way of the Northern Pacific
Railroad... was one of the primary reasons for the division of Dakota at
statehood." 48 The separate statehood of North Dakota thus may well be
attributable to the political impact of the Northern Pacific Railroad and
its allies upon the composition and conduct of the Supreme Court of
Dakota Territory.49
C. THE 1889 JUDICIAL ARTICLE
When our new state needed a Supreme Court, the 1889 Constitu-
tional Convention shaped it like the three-judge Territorial Court, but the
justices were to be "elected by the qualified electors of the state at
large," rather than appointed. 50 The 1889 Constitution also set basic
qualifications for election to the Court: A U.S. citizen learned in the law,
47. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 531.
48. See HYATr, supra note 2, at 538-39.
49. Lounsberry effusively credited Ordway with a great deal of influence in Congress on bring-
ing about statehood for North Dakota. Lounsberry noted Ordway's prior 12 years as sergeant-at-arms
and paymaster in the United Stated House of Representatives, and says Ordway used this "Long and
intimate acquaintance with the older and controlling members in both Houses of Congress" to bring "in
the two Dakotas as the same time... " See LouNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 371, 375. Lounserry also
credits McKenzie, "even more than ... Governor Ordway," with "the successful efforts in Congress
to secure the division of Dakota and the admission of North Dakota as a state." LOUNSBERRY, supra
note 1, at 377.
Yet, Robinson believed the railroads generally opposed statehood:
They preferred the lenient territorial railroad laws, and could influence or control
territorial appointments from Washington. After his removal, the Northern Pacific sent
Nehemiah G. Ordway to Washington as a lobbyist against statehood.... McKenzie and
the Bismarck leaders opposed statehood, preferring that Bismarck remain the capital of a
large territory.
ROBINsoN, supra note 9, at 202.
However, after the 1888 presidential campaign when the national Republican Party platform had
called for admission of two states, "Ordway and the Dakota Democrats finally dropped their
single-state bill. Both Republicans and Democrats voted for the Omnibus [Statehood] Bill of February
22, 1889, authorizing the framing of constitutions in North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and
Washington." RoBINSON, supra note 9, at 203.
Were McKenzie and Ordway good lobbyists, or what?
50. N.D. CONST. art. IV., § 90 (repealed 1976).
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at least thirty years old,51 and three-years residency in the state or
territory. 52
The 1889 judicial article vested the judicial power of the state in the
Supreme Court, district courts, county courts, justices of the peace, and
other courts that the legislature might create for municipalities. 53 The
judicial article gave the Supreme Court power to issue original and
remedial writs, to hear appeals "co-extensive with the state," and to
exercise superintending control over all other courts "under such
regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law." 54
51. [T]he original draft of the constitution was changed so as to make the
minimum age limit thirty, rather than thirty-five, in order that Judge Corliss
might qualify if elected. At least that is the reason generally given for the
change in age requirements, and Judge Corliss was only slightly over thirty
years of age when he qualified.
Newton, supra note 5, at 4-5.
52. See N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 94 (repealed 1976). The length of the residency requirement was
debated in the Convention.
The [Convention] committee on the judiciary department .. .submitted majority and
minority reports. The majority report recommended the establishment of a Supreme
Court, to consist of three members, and prescribed that no one unless learned in the law,
of thirty years of age, and a resident of the territory for five years next preceding his
election, should be eligible to the office. Guy C.H. Cortiss, of Grand Forks, who aspired
to the Supreme Court, was ineligible, by reason of his residence qualification. He came
to Bismarck, together with John M. Cochrane, a notable lawyer of Grand Forks, and they
jointly persuaded the delegates to limit the residency qualification to three years. Mr.
Corliss was elected to the Supreme bench.
LouNsBERv, supra note 1, at 396-97. John M. Cochrane (1903-1904), too, was later elected to the
Court, after serving as Reporter for the Supreme Court from 1894 through 1902. See NORTH DAKOTA
CENTENNIAL BLUE BOOK 1889-1989, at 465 (1989); SKETCH, supra note 2, at 27.
In the Convention debates on the residency requirement, one delegate blamed the change from
five years to three on lobbying by an unnamed "gentleman here who desired the change for his own
benefit, and not for the good of the State." OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
FIRST CoNsrrLToNAL CoNvEmrON OF NORTH DAKOTA 223-24 (1889). The purpose of the residency
requirement was to block "any carpet baggers in our Supreme Court." Id. at 222. After another
delegate argued, "What we desire on the Supreme Bench is as much ability as possible," a floor
amendment to fix the requirement at three years, instead of five, was adopted by a vote of 30 to 19.
Id. at 224-25. After another delegate questioned any need to distinguish between the length of
residency for voting and eligibility for the Court, a motion to delete the residency requirement
altogether was indefinitely postponed. See id. at 226-27.
53. See N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 85 (repealed 1976).
54. See id. §§ 86, 87 (repealed 1976). Section 86, as well as other sections in the 1889 judicial
article, may have been drawn from ones proposed by convention delegate Erastus A. Williams in his
model draft, File 106, prepared from models secretly supplied to him by persons acting for the
Northern Pacific Railroad. See Herbert L. Meschke & Larry Spears, Model Constitution (Peddrick
Draft #2, 1889), 65 N.D. L. REV. 415, art. XIII, §§ 8, 9 at 455, 486 annots. (suggesting that the
statement of the Court's powers may have been derived from the proposed Montana Constitution:
"Mon., VI.2" and "Mon., VI.3"). See generally Herbert L. Meschke & Lawrence D. Spears, Digging
for Roots: The North Dakota Constitution and The Thayer Correspondence, 65 N.D. L. REV. 343
(1989). "The constitution finally adopted by the convention followed the phrasing of [Harvard
Professor] Thayer's draft in many places." ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 209.
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D. OUR FIRST SUPREME COURT
The statewide election on October 1, 1889,. to adopt the first state
constitution also chose the first three justices who took office on Novem-
ber 4, 1889: Alfred Wallin of Fargo, Guy C.H. Corliss of Grand Forks,
and Joseph M. Bartholomew of LaMoure.55
Justice Bartholomew had a primary part in starting the machinery of
state government. When the newly elected state officials gathered in
Bismarck on November 4, 1889, they were briefly baffled about how to
begin their offices.
After the October election results were certified to President
Benjamin Harrison, a formal presidential proclamation of statehood was
needed. President Harrison signed the proclamations for both North and
South Dakota at 3:40 p.m. on Saturday afternoon, November 2.
Secretary of State James G. Blaine immediately telegraphed the news of
the signing of the proclamation to Bismarck, advising that "North and
South Dakota entered the Union at the same moment." 56
The official copy of the proclamation reached Bismarck on Mon-
day, November 4, 1889, where the elected state officials waited. Then:
They were confronted by a dilemma as to how they were to be
sworn in. The territorial officials had been put out of office by
the proclamation creating the state, whereas there were as yet
no state officials. Justice Bartholomew solved the problem by
sending for a notary public. W.T. Perkins was brought in and
administered the oath to Justice Bartholomew.5 7
A newspaper account continued:
Justice Bartholomew . . . then went to the assembly room,
where the officers and a number of citizens were in waiting.
[Territorial] Governor [and Governor-elect of South Dakota]
Mellette here introduced Justice Bartholomew stating that but
one act remained to set the state machinery of North Dakota in
motion, and that Secretary Richardson would now read the list
of officials who would be sworn in.5 8
Justice Bartholomew then swore in the other first officials of the State of
North Dakota.59
55. See LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 445. Appendix A lists all the Justices and the years they
served the North Dakota Supreme Court.
56. W.B. HEr'NmSsy, HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA 93 (1910).
57. 1l at 93-94.
58. They Swear, BISMARCK TRm., Nov. 5, 1889, at 3.
59. See HEm~usy, supra note 56, at 94.
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After taking the oath and "having cast lots for length of term of
office as prescribed by the Constitution of the State," the first official
action of the Court was to appoint R.D. Hoskins as clerk of the Court,60
as the new Constitution authorized. 6 1 Their second official action set
their first term of court to be held on the second Tuesday of January
1890 at Fargo.6 2
E. THE FIRST JUSTICES
Chief Justice Corliss (1889-1898) was born in New York state in
1858, studied law there in a lawyer's office, and joined the New York bar
in 1879.63 At age thirty-one, he became North Dakota's youngest
justice ever. Justice Bartholomew (1889-1900) was born in Illinois in
1843, studied law with a lawyer in Iowa after service in the Union army
in the Civil War, and began practice in Iowa in 1869.64 Justice Wallin
(1889-1902) was born in New York state in 1836, obtained his legal
education at the University of Michigan, and joined the Illinois and
Michigan bars in 1862.65 All three first justices came to northern
Dakota Territory in 1883.66
The first three justices were apparently scholars.67 Their Court was
described as "one of great ability" by Lounsberry. 68 He declared:
60. See Minutes of the Supreme Court of North Dakota vol. A (Nov. 4, 1889) (on file with the
clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court) [hereinafter Supreme Court Minutes].
61. See N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 93 (repealed 1976) ("There shall be a clerk ... who shall hold...
office[] during the pleasure of said judges, and whose duties and emoluments shall be prescribed by
law and by rules of the supreme court not inconsistent with law."). The judicial article, as amended
and revised in 1976 (see chapter 599 of 1977 North Dakota Laws), no longer mentions a clerk of the
Supreme Court, but the statutes still direct appointment of one and specify the duties of the office. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-03-01 (1991). The revised judicial article now directs appointment of a court
administrator, and says "the powers, duties, qualifications, and terms of office of the court
administrator, and other court officials, shall be as provided by rules of court," "[u]nless otherwise
provided by law." N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
62. See Supreme Court Minutes, supra note 60.
63. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 22.
64. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 23. Justice David Morgan (1901-1911), a former Devils Lake
practitioner and I-year district judge, was elected in 1900 to succeed Justice Bartholomew. See
SKETCH, supra note 2, at 26. I11 health caused Justice Morgan to retire. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at
26.
65. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 24. Mr. Newton asserted "none of the first three judges elected
was a law school graduate, and while all were learned men, their formal education was not
extensive." Newton, supra note 5, at 5.
66. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 22-24. There may be some question whether Chief Justice
Corliss resided in northern Dakota Territory continuously from 1883. See LouNSBERY, supra note 1,
at 396-97. Or did Lounsberry confuse the effect of the residency requirement on Corliss,.with that of
the age requirement? See Newton, supra, note 5, at 4-5.
67. "Although these three were learned men, none of them was a law school graduate."
Newton, Appellate Practice, supra note 4, at 156.
68. LouNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 449. Mr. Newton adds: "Judge Corliss ... was a great student
of Shakespeare and many of the first graduates of the University of North Dakota tell of his
Shakespearian Lectures and portrayal of the characters in Shakespeare's plays." Newton, supra note
5, at 5.
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"Perhaps it would not be extravagant or beyond the bounds of truth to
say it was one of superior ability," reasoning that the "frequent refer-
ence to their decisions, as clear interpretations of the law, found in the
reports of other states is proof of this."69
Justice Corliss drew a three-year term, the shortest of the staggered
terms, when the justices "cast lots for length of term of office as pre-
scribed by the Constitution" after they took office. 70 "By a unique
[1889 constitutional] provision [Section 93]-and one peculiar to North
Dakota-no chief justice was to be elected by the people," Lounsberry
explained, "but the judge having the shortest term to serve, not holding
his office by appointment or election to fill a vacancy, should be" the
Chief Justice. 71
Thus, the comparatively young Justice Corliss became the first Chief
Justice by sheer chance. The mechanical method of designating the
justice with the shortest term to be Chief Justice continued virtually
unchanged for over seventy-five years.
F. TERMS OF COURT
The first Supreme Court rode a circuit. Lounsberry described it as
"a 'migratory' court" that "had no legal home from its organization
until 1909."72 The 1889 judicial article directed three terms be held
annually, one each at Bismarck, Fargo, and Grand Forks unless otherwise
directed by law.73 The 1909 legislature directed otherwise by requiring
the Court to hold two general terms each year in April and in October at
the "seat of government" in Bismarck. 74
Later, the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 directed the Court to
hold "general terms" monthly at the state capitol, except in July and
August. 75 In recent times, the Supreme Court has heard appellate
arguments nearly continuously from the first of September through the
end of June each year at its courtroom in the state capitol. In the last two
decades, the Court has sometimes scheduled additional one-day terms
elsewhere at schools and colleges for educational purposes, especially
69. LOUNSBERRY, supra note I, at 449.
70. See Supreme Court Minutes, supra note 60; see also N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 92 (repealed
1976).
71. LOuNSBERRY, supra note I, at 444.
72. LoUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 446.
73. See N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 88 (repealed 1976)
74. See LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 446; 1909 N.D. Laws ch. 72, at 64.
75. N.D. REV. CODE § 27-0206 (1943) (derived from N.D. Sup. Cr. PRAC, R. 2, and repealed by
1981 N.D. Laws ch. 316, § 2, at 854).
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some arguments each October at the Law School in Grand Forks. 76 The
Court should hold more educational terms around the state. 77
G. LEGAL EDUCATION
The first three justices were born and educated in the law elsewhere,
like their successors for over thirty years. 78 Not until 1923, when Justice
William Nuessle (1923-1950) took office, did any justice complete a
legal education in this state. While Justice Nuessle had been born in New
York state in 1878, he moved in childhood to Dakota Territory and
received his law degree from the University of North Dakota in 1901.79
Since 1922 more than two-thirds of the justices have been trained in a
law office in this state80 or educated at the UND Law School, although
there has never been a Court with all members educated in the law in
North Dakota. 81
Chief Justice Corliss in August 1898 became the first to leave the
Court, when he returned to Grand Forks to practice and to teach law. 82
With the encouragement of Webster Merrifield, then president of the
young University of North Dakota, ex-Justice Corliss organized the Law
School and became its Dean in October 1899.83
76. "[Dean W. Jeremy] Davis said the Supreme Court has been visiting UND during
Homecoming for at least 20 years [to hear two cases a year]. Previously, the court would make its
visit to the law school in the spring." Darrel Koehler, N.D. Supreme Court Hears Cases at UND,
GRAND FORKS HERALD, Oct. 15, 1999, at 4C.
77. Fully 61 percent of the people surveyed [by the ABA recently] said they
wanted to learn more about the justice system. Of that number, 75 percent
said that they wanted to learn directly from judges. These results show that
the public is aware of knowledge gaps and is willing to be educated,
preferably by the judges they are shown to hold in high esteem.
Philip S. Anderson, Time to Open the Electronic Eye, A.B.A. J., June 1999, at 8.
78. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 28-41.
79. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 42. "One member of the first class [at the Law School in 1899]
... was William Nuessle, who was later to become a prominent figure in the state's judicial history."
Charles L. Crum, The History of the University of North Dakota School of Law, 35 N.D. L. REV. 5, 6
(1959).
80. See SKErCH, supra note 2, at 11-13. For a brief account of how a Supreme Court Justice
occasionally acted as a mentor for someone "reading the law," see Hon. Gail Hagerty, Reading the
Law, GAVEL (Journal of N.D. State Bar Ass'n), June/July 1998, at 16-17. This account tells how
Justice James Morris (1935-1964) mentored Orville A. Schulz (later Judge Schulz) in the study of law.
81. See generally SKETCH, supra note 2.
82. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 22. Governor Devine appointed a Bathgate lawyer, Newton C.
Young (1898-1906), to replace Justice Corliss. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 25. Justice Young
resigned in 1906 to practice law in Fargo. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 25.
83. See Fifth Biennial Report of the President of the Board of Trustees of the University of North
Dakota (For the Fiscal Period Ending June 30, 1898), in PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OF THE STATE oFNoRTH
DAKOTA, Public Document No. 13, at 4 (1899). When Justice Corliss left the Court, he also joined the
executive committee that began the State Bar Association in 1899. Minutes of Executive Committee
Meeting (Dec. 28, 1899), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NORTH DAKOTA BAR ASSOCIATION (W.H. Thomas
compiler & ed., 1905).
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Corliss was a man of great professional ability, striking
appearance, and a personal charm reflected in the writings of
those who came in contact with him. He had served as the first
Chief Justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court, holding that
position from 1889 to 1898. However, his bid for re-election
failed-a great loss, since during his tenure on the bench he
had authored a series of opinions still notable for their clarity,
incisiveness, and grasp of legal principle-and he returned to
Grand Forks about the time the school opened to resume
private practice. The circumstance of his availability, plus his
distinguished background made him the logical and natural
choice for the deanship of the new school.
His tenure as dean was relatively brief, from 1899 to 1903.
Judge Corliss was engaged in private practice when he assumed
the deanship, and found it desirable to continue. This proved
to be a factor militating against his administrative effectiveness,
and most of the day-to-day work of running the school fell on
the youthful shoulders of John E. Blair.84
At first, graduation from the UND Law School "carried with it the
consequences of automatic admission to the bar-a concession designed
to encourage attendance at the school. .. *"85 But in 1905, upon
recommendation by Dean Bruce, "the diploma privilege, whereby every
graduate secured automatic admission to the bar, was abolished in place
of the far more appropriate system of independent examinations con-
ducted under the aegis of a State Bar Board."86
This was a reform of very considerable moment to the legal
profession of the state, for it applied not only to students of the
school but also to those who were taking the alternate route of
entering practice by the older method of office study. It meant
that former lax practices in regard to the admission of such
students could be gradually tightened.8 7
84. Crum, supra note 79, at 7-8.
Codiss... continued his association with the school for several years longer, alternating
between the classroom and a busy practice. He then moved to Oregon, able to look back
with satisfaction on a career which had given him the experience of being both the first
Chief Justice of the State of North Dakota and the first dean of the state's law school.
He had organized the school, he had seen it through the difficult opening years, he had
found a competent man [professor A.A. Bruce] to continue the work of development on
the full-time basis that was necessary; all in all, he had made no small contribution.
Cram, supra note 79, at 7-8.
85. Crum, supra note 79, at 7.
86. Crum, supra note 79, at 9-10.
87. Crum, supra note 79, at 10.
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Since 1895, applicants for admission to the bar had been examined
in open court or by a committee of not less than three members appoint-
ed by the Court. 88 The 1905 legislature established a Board of Bar
Examiners appointed by the Supreme Court. 89 "No appropriation was
made for [the] Board but per diems and expenses of the Board were paid
for out of the examination fees." 90
The Supreme Court, in 1905, appointed UND Law School Dean
Andrew A. Bruce of Grand Forks, practitioner John Burke of Devils
Lake, and practitioner Emerson H. Smith of Fargo to the Bar Board. 91
Except for the period from 1919 to 1923, when the governor of the state
was authorized to appoint Bar Board members, 92 the Supreme Court has
continued to appoint the Board.93
As the legal educations of at least two of the first three justices
illustrate, not all applicants for admission to the bar attended a law
school; some studied law with a judge or lawyer as a mentor. The last
justice to obtain his legal learning by "reading the law" was Thomas J.
Burke (1939-1966), who "received his legal training studying under
Usher L. Burdick and his father, John Burke." 94 "Reading the law" is
no longer allowed; since 1983, a juris doctor or equivalent degree from
an accredited law school has been required for admission to the bar. 95
H. USUALLY UNDERPAID
Justice Corliss's resignation in 1898 was the only change on the
Court before the turn of the century. Justice Corliss left the Court,
Lounsberry reported, "mainly because of the inadequacy of the com-
pensation allowed to the judges." 96 To begin, their annual pay was only
$4,000 each. 97 From the start, the justices have been usually underpaid.
The 1903 legislature increased a justice's pay to $5,000 annually, 98 but
that was hardly enough. When Justice Edward Engerud (1904-1907)
88. See J.H. Newton, The North Dakota Bar Board, 35 N.D. L. REV. 220, 220 (1959) ("No
examination fee seems to have been required but legend has it that it was the duty of the successful
candidates to entertain the examiners in a fitting manner.").
89. See 1905 N.D. Laws ch. 50, § 1, at 80.
90. Newton, supra note 88, at 220.
91. See Newton, supra note 88, at 220.
92. See Newton, supra note 88, at 220-21; see also 1923 N.D. Laws ch. 134, at 103; 1919 N.D.
Laws ch. 69, at 80.
93. See Newton, supra note 88, at 220-21.
94. SKETCH, supra note 2, at 49.
95. See ADMisISION TO PRAC. R. I(A)(4). See the 1984 edition of the North Dakota Court Rules
for commencement date of the requirement.
96. LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 449-50.
97. See SmCH, supra note 2, at 19; 1895 REV. CODE, § 379.
98. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 19; 1903 N.D. Laws ch. 194, § 2, at 267.
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resigned to return to practice, 99 Lounsberry again reported "he made
known the fact that financial considerations largely controlled," and
"[n]o doubt the meager remuneration paid by the state . . . contributed
also to the decision." 100
The legislature approved very few salary increments for justices
during the first half of the twentieth century.10I A 1917 increase to
$5,500 annually was repealed by a depression-era initiated measure in
1932 that put future judicial salaries back to $5,000 each.l 0 2 Litigation
took place in 1918 over an additional $500 annually appropriated for
unvouchered expenses, but it was constitutionally upheld as "additional
compensation."1 03 The practice of appropriating some form of addi-
tional compensation, besides the statutory salary for justices and judges,
persisted for a long time, but it did not help a great deal.l0 4
Not until 1944 was a justice's salary restored to $5,500.105 In 1949,
the legislature added a helpful retirement pension for judges and justices
who paid five percent of their salary into a special Judicial Retirement
Fund and who retired after age seventy with eighteen years of service. 10 6
Under that plan, a retiring judge who qualified was to receive a pension
"equal to one-half of the salary provided by law for his office at the
time of his retirement."10 7 In 1959, this retirement plan was amended to
qualify a judge retiring at age sixty-five with over twenty years of
service, or older and with fewer years of service, up to age seventy, with
99. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 28. Justice Engerud had been appointed to replace Justice
Cochrane (who died in office), and had been elected to serve the remainder of Justice Cochrane's
term. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 28. Justice Engerud was succeeded by Justice Burleigh F.
Spaulding (1907-1914), who was appointed by the governor, elected in 1908, but defeated in the 1914
general election. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 31.
100. LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 454. Not only poor pay but also poor working conditions may
have contributed to the early departure of justices from the Court in those years. In 1908, D.M.
Slattery, Superintendent of the State Capitol Building, in a "Memorandum of Needed Repairs" with his
Report "To The Honorable Board of Trustees of Public Property," complained about the condition of
the Law Library:
Judges' chambers need awnings over windows. Plate glass windows needed, as ordinary
windows will not stand the high winds. Several windows have been blown in and in two
instances judges were injured by the flying glass. The plaster is continually falling and
unless something is done the books are bound to be damaged-many already have been.
SEVENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA (1908). Fortunately, the
Court's working conditions have improved since 1908.
101. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 19.
102. See 1917 N.D. Laws ch. 224, § I, at 311; 1933 N.D. Laws, at 503.
103. North Dakota ex rel. Langer v. Kositzky, 166 N.W. 534, 537 (N.D. 1918).
104. See 1967 N.D. Laws ch. 52, § 1, at 68 (authorizing $500 each for January 1, 1967 to June
30, 1967, "for expenses... without the filing of any itemized voucher or statement"); 1969 N.D. Laws
ch. 276, § 1, at 534 (authorizing $2,000 annually); 1971 N.D. Laws ch. 295, § 1, at 684 (authorizing
"additional salary" of $4,000 annually).
105. See 1944 N.D. Laws ch. 33, § 1, at 37.
106. See 1949 N.D. Laws ch. 206, §§ 1-2, at 267 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 27-17-01, 27-17-02 (1991)).
107. Id.§4.
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ten years of service. The amendment also redefined the pension amount
with an escalator clause: "equal to fifty percent of the annual salary
payable from time to time to judges of the classification the retired judge
last had" before retirement. 108
Then, the 1973 legislature authorized $10,000 yearly "additional
salary" for each justice and district judge, but also tinkered with the
existing retirement plan.109 The judges and justices appreciated the long
overdue and much needed raise, but some worried about potential
cutbacks in their retirement pay.I10
The 1973 legislation moved all new judges to the Public Employee
Retirement System that still covers retirement of trial judges and
justices.Ill That legislation also re-worded the escalator clause of the
1949 pension plan to say that a vested incumbent judge reelected after
July 1, 1973, would receive a pension "equal to fifty percent of the
annual salary payable to judges of the classification the retired judge had
at the time he retired.. "112 As incumbent judges with over ten years
of service were reelected in elections after 1973, the changed wording in
the escalation clause cast doubt on escalation of their future pay during
retirement.
Eventually, five long-term district judges, and a widow of another,
all of whom had been reelected after 1973, brought a class action for all
judges similarly situated to resolve the uncertainty, to clarify the statute
still authorized post-retirement escalation of their retirement pay, and to
defend their promised retirement benefits from diminishment. 113 In
August 1979, these judges got a judgment, "for all judges of the
supreme court and of the district court ... similarly situated by reason
of commencement of service as judge prior to July 1, 1973, reelection as
judge after July 1, 1973, and subsequent retirement," that declared the
statute still authorized post-retirement escalation of their retirement
benefits. 114 Although not named as parties, two Supreme Court justices
were beneficiaries of this class judgment that preserved their future
108. 1957 N.D. Laws ch. 210, § 1, at 430.
109. 1973 N.D. Laws ch. 246, § 2, at 610 (authorizing "additional salary" of $10,000 annually);
§ 3 (redefining retirement rights); §§ 4-15, at 611-15 (additional amendments). For background, see
1973 REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 147-54.
110. See Judicial Council Minutes 216 (June 20, 1973) (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court
Administrator's Office).
111. See 1973 N.D. Laws ch. 246, §§ 1(2), 10, at 610, 613; N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-52-06.1 (1989
& Supp. 1999).
112. 1973 N.D. Laws ch. 246, § 3, at 610; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-17-01(3) (1991).
113. See Complaint, flvedson v. North Dakota (4th Jud. Dist. N.D. Aug. 14, 1979) (Civ. No.
28558) (on file with Burleigh County Clerk of District Court, Bismarck, N.D.).
114. See Judgment, lvedson (No. 28558) (on file with Burleigh County Clerk of District Court,
Bismarck, N.D.).
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retirement benefits, even though their regular salaries remained
abysmally low.115
The stingy attitude of the legislature toward its co-equal branch of
government is shown by this sorry trend of appropriations for judicial
compensation in this state. While some substantial salary increases have
been made in recent years,' 1 6 North Dakota justices and judges remain,
sadly, among the lowest paid in the nation. 117
I. OFTEN OVERWORKED
Despite poor pay, justices often have been among the
hardest-working lawyers in the state. In 1917, Lounsberry relied on an
unnamed "citizen of Bismarck who investigated the matter" to depict
the extraordinary efforts of the Court at that time: "Worked like horses
in harvest! They work unremittingly to keep up the calendar and avoid
the delay which is incident to appellate practice!" 118 '
The Supreme Court had written and published 221 opinions in
1915, and then 243 in 1919.119 Still, those demanding levels of effort
went unmatched for quite awhile. After 1919, the work of the Court
tapered off and became less burdensome for over half a century. As one
example, the 1947 Court wrote and published only thirty-eight
opinions.12o
The justices during part of the mid-century time, according to
Supreme Court lore, also displayed a different mien than do members of
the modem Court.
115. The outcome of the lawsuit also could affect retirement benefits for at least
two other judges now serving in the state, although neither is named as a
plaintiff in the case. They are Supreme Court Chief Justice Ralph Erickstad
and Supreme Court Justice William Paulson. Both began their judicial
service prior to 1973 and have been re-elected since 1973.
Hal Simons, N.D. Judges Sue Over Pension Cuts, FARGO FORUM, June 30, 1979, at 9. Before 1979, the
last pay increase had set a justice's annual salary at only $36,800 and a district judge's at only
$34,500. See 1977 N.D. Laws ch. 255, at 598. No judicial salary increase had been authorized by the
1979 legislative assembly.
116. 1999 North Dakota Laws chapter 2, section 7 increased a justice's salary to $83,807
annually beginning July 1, 1999, and to $85,483 beginning July 1, 2000. Currently, federal appellate
judges on the comparable United State Courts of Appeal receive $145,000 annually. See 5 U.S.C.A. §
5332, sch. 7 (West Supp. 2000). A North Dakota justice gets less than 60% of that corresponding level
of compensation.
117. See 25 SURVEY OFJUDICIAL SALARIES I (Spring 1999). The national average salary for a
state supreme court justice is $107,905 and the median is $109,842. See id.
118. LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 446.
119. Search of West's North Dakota Law on Disk (database containing only North Dakota
Supreme Court decisions) (search for records containing 1915 in DATE field).
120. Search of West's North Dakota Law on Disk (database containing only North Dakota
Supreme Court decisions) (search for records containing 1919 in DATE field); Search of West's
North Dakota Law on Disk (database containing only North Dakota Supreme Court decisions) (search
for records containing 1947 in DATE field).
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They filed in and took their seats. The Chief Justice nodded to
the appellant's attorney who made his argument without a
comment or question from the bench. When that attorney sat
down, the Chief Justice nodded to the appellee's attorney, who
also argued without interruption and sat down. After a nod
and an uninterrupted rebuttal, the Chief Justice announced the
case would be taken under advisement, the only words spoken
from the bench before they filed out.
Reportedly, too, one justice did not read the briefs before oral argument,
allegedly to avoid prejudging the case. 121
No doubt there have been some active and vigorous justices among
the members of nearly every Court. But it is evident that today's justices
typically have better habits of preparing thoroughly, probing extensively
at oral argument, and producing their opinions with more dispatch than
during some past times.
During the last two decades, the Court again has had a heavier
workload to decide the increasing number of appeals and to supervise a
judicial system with burgeoning caseloads. 122 Since 1981, the Court has
produced and published more than 200 opinions every year, peaking at
273 written opinions in 1994.123
Justices continue to be often overworked and usually underpaid.
J. CONTINUITY
The Supreme Court has been favored with superior service from its
personnel and members.
There have been only four clerks of the Supreme Court in over a
century: Robert D. Hoskins (1889-1917); John Henry Newton (March
1917 to October 1968); Luella Dunn (October 1968 to July 1992); and
Penny Miller (July 1992 to the present).124 All except Luella Dunn were
121. Compare today's standards. "Competent representation [by a lawyer] requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." NORTH
DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (2000) (emphasis added). A justice or judge, who is
but a lawyer placed in a position of public responsibility and power, has an equivalent obligation of
competence and diligence. See NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL. CONDUCT Canon 3 (1980) ("A judge
shall perform the duties of judicial office... diligently.").
122. Besides hearing appeals and writing opinions, the current Court holds a weekly conference
to deal with and determine numerous other matters, including procedural motions in pending appeals,
petitions for writs, petitions to supervise trial courts, recommendations for discipline of attorneys and
judges, petitions and recommendations for procedural changes, personnel and policy matters for the
judicial system, and similarly related and subsidiary work. Extensive reading, research, and review is
often required to prepare for this weekly conference.
123. Search of West's North Dakota Law on Disk (database containing only North Dakota
Supreme Court decisions) (search for records containing 1981 in DATE field and a separate search
for each year thereafter).
124. Records of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of North Dakota.
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lawyers. Including his prior time from April 1, 1913 as a deputy
clerk,125 Newton served fifty-five years in the clerk's office; and
including her time as a deputy from September 1947, Dunn served the
Court nearly forty-five years.126
Five justices served on the Court for more than a quarter century
each: Justice Adolph M. Christianson (1914-1954, thirty-nine years and
one month); Justice James Morris (1935-1964, thirty years); Justice
Ralph J. Erickstad (1963-1992, thirty years); Justice William Nuessle
(1922-1950, twenty-eight years); and Justice Thomas J. Burke
(1939-1966, twenty-seven years, three months). 127
This continuity by justices and staff has contributed to the
institutional stability of the Court and the judicial system, where
continuity and stability are valuable assets.128
K. OTHER PUBLIC SERVICE
Each long-serving justice had a noteworthy career. But some served
the public in ways besides direct service on the Court.
For one, Justice Christianson, while on the Court, played an
important role in administering the national relief program in North
Dakota during the Depression.
125. [Y]ours truly came to Bismarck in April 1913 to become deputy clerk
under Mr. Hoskins and served as such until March, 1917, when upon the
resignation of Mr. Hoskins I was appointed clerk and have served until the
present time. The clerk serves during the pleasure of the Court and in some
way or other I do not seem to have incurred their displeasure.
Newton, supra note 5, at 5-6.
126. Luella Dunn became a national leader in her field. She was a charter member of the
National Conference of Appellate Court Clerks, served on its Executive Committee (1973-74), and
served as its president (1982-83). See Lu Dunn to Retire, GAVEL (Journal of N.D. State. Bar Ass'n),
April/May 1992, at 24. She was a member of the National Conference of Bar Examiners and served
on its Executive Committee and as Treasurer in 1978. See id.
Penny Miller, Luella Dunn's successor, is similarly taking on a national leadership role with the
National Conference of Appellate Court Clerks, having been elected Vice-President in 1999, placing
her in position to become its president in 2001.
127. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 6-10, 18.
128. Until 1968, when the first deputy was added to the Clerk's office, the staff of the Court main-
ly consisted of the Clerk and the secretaries for each of the five justices. See Figures compiled by
North Dakota Supreme Court Administrator's Office (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court
Administrator). Since then five more positions have been added in the Clerk's office. See id. In
1971, the Court Administrator's office began, and 15 positions have been added there. See id. Among
the judicial secretaries and clerical staff for the Clerk and Administrator's office, there have been a
number who served the Court continuously for many years. See id. Those remembered with 25 years
or more of service include: Rosaleen Fortune began 1959 and retired 1990 as a judicial secretary;
Evaleen Klaudt began 1965 and retired 1995 as a judicial secretary; Mary Lee, Administrator's staff,
began 1972 and retired 1997, but still works part-time; and Mary Lou Splonskowski, Administrator's
staff, began 1974 and still there in 1999. See id. Two others still working at the court have nearly 25
years of service: Marla Laxdal began in the Clerk's office in 1975, and Marcella Kramer began in the
Library in 1976. See id. Elmer J. DeWald served as bailiff, librarian, and reporter from 1962 to April
1990. See id.
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By the end of 1932 the counties and private charity could no
longer carry the relief burden. In January, 1933, Governor
Langer appointed a state emergency relief committee with
Supreme Court Judge A.M. Christianson as chairman. The
1933 legislature appropriated no money for relief, but [Justice]
Christianson's committee, working feverishly in the crisis,
borrowed $492,000 from the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion and organized county relief committees to distribute the
funds. On June 1, 1933, the committee began to receive its
money from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
(F.E.R.A.), headed by Harry L. Hopkins.129
Justice Christianson "established a close personal relationship with
President Roosevelt's highest confidant, Mr. Harry Hopkins [and] ...
[flunds from the FERA were turned over to [Justice] Christianson to
administer . . . to assist North Dakota farm families .. "130 In late
1934, Justice Christianson's committee incorporated the North Dakota
Rural Rehabilitation Corporation to extend credit to farmers and ranch-
ers who could not get credit elsewhere, and the Corporation carried on
other rural rehabilitation projects.131 Justice Christianson served as
president of this Rural Rehabilitation Corporation while on the Court
from October 1934 until he passed away in February 1954.132
Luella Dunn became secretary, treasurer and a member of the board
of directors of the Rural Rehabilitation Corporation while serving as
Clerk of the Supreme Court and continues to hold this corporate posi-
tion after retirement. 133 Another Supreme Court Justice, Obert Teigen
(1959-1974), also served as a director of the Rural Rehabilitation Corpo-
ration while on the Court. 134 Justice Robert Vogel (1973-1978) became
a director shortly after he retired and currently continues in that
capacity. 135
129. RoBtNsoN, supra note 9, at 406.
130. G. LEONARD DALSTED, HISTORY OF THE NORTH DAKOTA RuRAL REHABILrTATON CORPORATION 2
(July 1996).
131. See id. at 3, 8.
132. See id. at 31.
133. See Lu Dunn To Retire, supra note 126, at 24.
134. See DAsTmD, supra note 130, at 36. Justice Teigen was appointed in January 1959 to re-
place Justice Gudmundur Grimson, who resigned. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 52. Justice Teigen had
been a Devils Lake practitioner, F.B.I. agent, states attorney, and a district judge for five years. See
SKETCH, supra note 2, at 52.
135. See DALSTED, supra note 130, at 37.
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Justice Christianson's welfare work and his Rural Rehabilitation
Corporation were unique in the Court's history.136
II. MEANDERING INTO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the institutional
character of the Supreme Court and the judicial system did not change
much, and the few important changes came randomly and slowly.
A. No-PARTY BALLOT
At first, candidates for election to the Supreme Court were
nominated by each political party's convention. Events changed this.
In August 1906, Governor E.Y. Sarles named Justice John Knauf
(1906) to the position137 opened by the resignation of Justice Newton C.
Young (1898-1906) to return to practice in Fargo. 138 Justice Knauf had
already been nominated by the Republican convention for election to
that position. The story of Justice Knauf's nomination seems best told
by former Congressman Usher L. Burdick in his 1956 biographical
summaries of Great Judges and Lawyers of Early North Dakota:139
The Republican Convention at Jamestown in 1906, was
largely controlled by Alex McKenzie and Judson LaMoure,
and John Knauf was not their choice for the Supreme Court
position. Both registered their opposition and it was because
John Knauf had had several cases against the N.P. Railroad and
was very successful in those cases.
The first choice of these two political leaders was Tracy
Bangs of Grand Forks, but the Republicans in the Convention
would not stand for Bangs, as he was too prominent in the
Democratic party, and, in fact, was all there was to the Demo-
cratic party. Several friends of Knauf canvassed the delegates
and Knauf was nominated against the opposition of these
political leaders.140
According to historian Lounsberry (however confusingly), Knauf
had been nominated over Charles J. Fisk, a Democrat and district judge
136. Query whether, today, this kind of extra-judicial public service might provoke questions of
proper judicial conduct and separation of powers. Compare today's standards. See NORTH DAKOTA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(c)(2) (2000); Judicial Conduct Comm'n v. Grenz, 534 N.W.2d 816
(N.D. 1995) (censuring former trial judge for uncompensated membership on board of municipal
airport authority and for legal services to it while holding judicial office).
137. See LOUNSEERRY, supra note 1, at 452.
138. See SIKEm, supra note 2, at 25.
139. See USHER L. BURDICK, GREAT JuDGEs AND LAWYERS OF EARLY NORTH DAKOTA (1956).
140. Id. at 4.
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at Grand Forks, despite efforts of the "bar in the northern part of the
state [who] clamor[ed] for the nomination of Fisk and to take the
judiciary out of politics."141 In any event, Justice Fisk (1907-1916)
defeated Knauf at the November 1906 election. 142
Knauf was defeated by false reports "that he was a boozer and a
libertine," Burdick's book submits, although he "did not then, nor has
not since, used intoxicating liquors of any character."1 43 "His personal
life was then, and always continued to be, exemplary .... Here is a case
where misstatements, intentional falsehoods and vicious political opposi-
tion, fanned into a state-wide hysteria, defeated one of the great men of
North Dakota." 144
After this nasty political contest, Lounsberry concluded, "[p]ublic
sentiment was then ripe for a non-partisan judiciary."1 45 A
non-partisan-judiciary law was enacted by the 1909 legislature to forbid
any references about party affiliation in petitions for nominating judges
and to formulate a separate "Judiciary Ballot" to list candidates without
party designation.146 Since 1910, all judges in the state have been placed
on the ballot without designation of party affiliation, and all judges have
been elected on a no-party ballot.' 4 7
Still, as we will see, election on a no-party ballot has not always
prevented political endorsements of justices. 4 8
B. FIVE-MEMBER COURT
The 1889 judicial article authorized the legislature to increase the
number of justices to five whenever the population of the state "shall
equal 600,000." 149 Before that happened, the legislature proposed a
constitutional amendment to increase the number of justices to five.150
In 1908, while rejecting a companion proposal to increase a justice's
term of office from six years to ten,151 the people approved expanding
the Court to five justices. 152
141. LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 452.
142. See SKErCH, supra note 2, at 30.
143. BURDICK, supra note 139, at 4.
144. BURDICK, supra note 139, at 6.
145. LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 452.
146. See 1909 N.D. Laws ch. 82, at 82; see also LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 447.
147. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16.1-06-08, 16.1-11-08 (1997 & Supp. 1999).
148. Except to campaign for their own election, judges today are also generally barred from any
political activity. See NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuCT Canon 5 (2000).
149. N.D. CONST. art IV, § 95 (repealed 1976).
150. See 1907 N.D. Laws, at 410; 1905 N.D. Laws, at 351.
151. See LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 447.
152. See N.D. CONST. art. IV § 89 (repealed 1976); 1907 N.D. Laws, at 410.
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To fill the two new positions thus created, Governor John Burke, the
first Democratic governor of the state, appointed John Carmody (1909-
1910) of Hillsboro, the second Democrat to serve on the court, and
Sidney E. Ellsworth (1909-1910) of Jamestown.1 53 In the November
1910 election, however, two sitting district judges, Edward T. Burke
(1910-1916) of Valley City and Evan B. Goss (1910-1916) of Minot,
were elected to replace the appointed ones. 154
C. GOVERNOR-JUSTICE BURKE
Governor John Burke himself, after an illustrious political career,
became a justice of the Supreme Court:
Burke's dream was to be judge of the state's supreme court,
but in 1906 he was selected by his brother Democrats to make
the race for governor, and his former ambition was sublimated.
The old-guard Republicans had overplayed their political
hands at the Jamestown convention where the minority Repub-
licans were ridden-over roughshod by the McKenzie machine,
and that was the main reason that, with the announcement of
"Honest John" for governor, the minority Republicans
flocked over to him in such large numbers that he was elected.
Burke's was a double triumph, because the state was over-
whelmingly Republican. Further triumphs were on the way,
because in 1908 and again in 1910 he was re-elected, thus
establishing a new record in America, at that time, of being a
Democratic governor for three successive terms in a strong
Republican state.
As Governor, John Burke gave the people an honest and able
administration, so when President Woodrow Wilson called him
to the office of United States Treasurer, the appointment met
with the universal approval of his many friends in North
Dakota.155
Burke later returned to North Dakota to practice law and, in 1924,
was elected to the position vacated by Justice Harrison A. Bronson
(1918-1924), who left at the end of his term to become Counsel for the
State Mill and Elevator. 156 Justice John Burke (1925-1937) died in
153. LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 455; SKETCH, supra note 2, at 32-33.
154. See LOIJNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 455; SKETCH, supra note 2, at 34-35.
155. BURDICK, supra note 139, at 14.
156. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 41, 44. Bronson also went to a private practice, lectured at the
University of North Dakota School of Law, and authored four books on property law. See SKETCH,
supra note 2, at 41.
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office on May 14, 1937,157 and P.O. Sathre was appointed to replace
him.158 Justice Sathre (1937-1938) was defeated for the position in the
1938 election by Justice John Burke's son, Justice Thomas J. Burke
(1939-1966).159
D. THE NPL ELECTS JUSTICES
Perhaps the most colorful (and political) chapter in the chronicles
of the Court came after "nonpartisan" elections to the expanded Court
began.
The rising Nonpartisan League's political convention in March
1916 at Fargo endorsed three candidates for the three Supreme Court
positions up for election:160
Luther Birdzell, professor in the law school of the state univer-
sity and a former member of the State Tax Commission, known
to be a "single-taxer"; Richard H. Grace, a lawyer of Mohall
having Socialist inclinations; [He was later to become a stanch
Harding man.] and James E. Robinson, Fargo law partner of
William Lemke, a League attorney and one of the inner circle
of League leaders. Robinson was an elderly gentleman [age
75] with a flowing gray beard, known to be rather eccentric,
though prominent as a crusader for judicial reforms.161
Historian Robert L. Morlan described the context of the election:
With Lynn Frazier and most of his associates on the [League's]
state ticket looking more and more like "sure things" in
November, the campaign during the fall months boiled down
for the most part to a single issue. The Good Government
League and the opposition press decided to concentrate their
efforts on keeping control of the state Supreme Court, and the
157. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 44. Also see ERLING NICoLAI ROLFSRUD, NOTABLE NORTH
DAKOTANS 46-50 (1987) ("Mister Clean"), for another biographical sketch of Justice John Burke.
Rolfsrud reported that a monument to Justice Burke was placed in Statuary Hall in the nation's Capitol
at Washington, D.C.
158. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 48.
159. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 49.
160. Our research of Bismarck Tribune newspaper microfilms for the period from January 1
through June 1916, turned up no reports that other political parties endorsed candidates for the state
Supeme Court. The Tribune reported a convention by the Progressive Republicans on January 18, the
Nonpartisan League on March 31, and the Democrats in April of 1916. Only the League was
reported to have endorsed Supreme Court candidates, but the May 28, 1916, Bismarck Tribune, in a
story, "More petitions have been filed," listed "E.B. Goss, Bismarck, Supreme Court Justice" under the
heading of "Republicans" who had filed their nominating petitions, and listed "C.J. Fisk, Bismarck,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court" under the heading of "Democrats" who had filed. BiRMARc
TRm., May 28, 1916, at 13.
161. ROBERT L. MORLAN, POLITICAL PRAIRIE FIRE 52-53 (1955) (recounting the ascent of the
Nonpartisan League between 1915 and 1922 as a political force in this state).
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three League candidates were subjected to both abuse and
ridicule. . . . Since the judges were elected on a separate
nonpartisan judicial ballot, the chances were good that it would
be neglected by many voters. The other three candidates for
the positions on the five-man court were incumbents and on
the basis of past decisions the League was certain that they
would be counted upon to join with their old colleagues to
strike down any "radical" acts of a League legislature.
Throughout the fall months almost the entire political
emphasis of the [Nonpartisan League] Leader was upon the
absolute necessity of electing the League judicial candidates if
the work of the legislature was not to be thwarted.162
On September 11, 1916, the Supreme Court decided a challenge to
an initiated constitutional measure after a 1914 constitutional amend-
ment authorized popularly initiated amendments. The Court ruled the
new amending procedure was not intended to be self-executing and
needed to be implemented by the legislature, particularly to set the
number of legal voters above twenty-five percent needed to initiate a
proposed amendment.' 63 Because the decision "dealt a body blow to
League hopes for speedy constitutional amendments regarding public
ownership after the fall elections[,] . . .the net result was probably at
least a further stimulus to the campaign for the election of the League
candidates for the court." 164 "New judges could reverse the decision;
the election of League candidates would remove both judicial and
constitutional obstacles to the League program. The Nonpartisan
Leader said: 'We've got to have a Supreme Court that will hold constitu-
tional the laws we pass in the legislature."' 165
The ensuing campaign focused almost entirely on the League's
endorsed judicial candidates.
[T]he three League candidates were given the opportunity in
the Leader to air their views on the function of the judiciary,
and the result was a highly unusual exposition of juris-
prudential thinking for the times. Birdzell viewed the courts as
political bodies which must of necessity keep pace with modern
thought and human progress, Robinson discussed his favorite
theme of preference for the substance of justice over legal
technicalities, and Grace propounded a doctrine of the equality
162. Id. at 83.
163. See North Dakota ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 159 N.W. 281, 289 (N.D. 1916).
164. MoRLAN, supra note 161, at 84.
165. RomNsoN, supra note 9, at 337.
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of the branches of government as opposed to a superiority of
the courts. 166
In November, candidates Birdzell, Grace, and Robinson handily defeated
Justices C.J. Fisk, E.T. Burke, and E.B. Goss. 167 But the election brought
discord to the Court. 168
E. THE NPL AND COURT DISCORD
The three new justices asserted their terms began on December 4,
1916, apparently because "[s]everal important cases were to be decided
during the month of December, and it was generally assumed that the
League was eager to utilize its new majority."1 69 The attorney general
quickly petitioned the Supreme Court for an "orderly determination ...
of the rights of the respective contenders."1 70 The three defeated
justices disqualified themselves from the case, and the remaining justices
called three district judges to sit for those disqualified. 171 On December
9, 1916, that temporary Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion
explaining the Court had taken jurisdiction, the remaining two justices
had also decided to step aside, and two more district judges had been
summoned to participate in the case. 172
After a hearing on December 7, with four of the selected district
judges present, the temporary Court also issued its decision on December
11, 1916. The Court held the term of an elected justice begins the first
Monday in January of the year after they are elected.1 73 The "old"
Court continued to decide cases throughout December,174 but in January
1917 the "new" Court received several petitions for rehearing those
decisions. The petitions were denied.175 One denial drew a harsh dissent
from Justice Robinson, the only "new" justice to participate in the
rehearings: "The case is a travesty on the administration of justice."176
166. MORLAN, supra note 161, at 84.
167. See MORLAN, supra note 161, at 87.
168. See ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 339 ("[E]ven members of the state supreme court were not
all on speaking terms with each other."). Ex-Justice Vogel believes Justice A.M. Christianson was the
only justice of this era who remained on speaking terms with each of his colleagues. See Hon. Robert
Vogel, Highlights of North Dakota Legal History, Faculty Lecture Series 1981-82 (Video copy held by
Hon. Robert Vogel, Grand Forks, N.D.).
169. MoRLAN, supra note 158, at 94.
170. North Dakota ex rel Linde v. Robinson, 160 N.W. 512, 512 (N.D. 1916).
171. See id. at 512.
172. See id. at 514.
173. See id. at 520.
174. See MORLAN, supra note 161, at 94.
175. See MoRLAN, supra note 161, at 94.
176. Youman v. Hanna, 161 N.W. 797, 806 (N.D. 1917) (Robinson, J., dissenting).
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F. THE NPL's JUSTICE ROBINSON
Justice Robinson was a vivid figure who enjoyed a distinctive career
on the Court. He "was a veteran of the Civil War and was seventy-five
years of age when he took office. He had a full beard and looked like
an Old Testament prophet."1 77 "He was a large man, with flowing
beard and an erect carriage." 178
"In [Justice Robinson's] first year on the court, when he wrote the
amazing total of forty-eight opinions of the court, thirty-one dissents
with opinions, and twenty-nine concurrences with opinions (a total of
one hundred and eight written opinions), only eight contained citations
to case law."1 79 He had a "colorful style," "wrote with abandon,
striking out in all directions, and wrote entertainingly."ISO "[H]e was
well read and had an analytical mind and was well grounded in
law .... "181
He was also well versed in the classics and the Bible, and often
quoted both in his opinions. He decried the writing of long
opinions and citation of a long list of authorities. He used to
take pride in the fact that his opinions rarely exceeded in
length over two legal size pages of typewriter paper.182
Yet, his eccentricities got him in trouble with his colleagues.
Justice Robinson, . . . much to the dismay of his judicial
brethem inaugurated the novel practice of publishing a weekly
"Saturday Night Letter," in which he freely discussed the
doings of the court in much the style of a "Personals" column
of a country weekly. His comments upon the merits and
demerits of his colleagues were often annoying, and his habit
of publicly prejudging cases before the court resulted in
numerous clashes, particularly with [Justice] Bruce. [Justice]
Robinson's rather queer and certainly unjudicial letters were
not infrequently a source of some embarrassment to the
177. Hon. Robert Vogel, Justice Robinson and the Supreme Court of North Dakota, 58 N.D. L.
REV. 83, 84 (1982). The 1919 Legislative Manual, containing "Historical, Statistical, and Political
Information" and "Published Under the Direction of Thomas Hall, Secretary of State," said of Justice
Robinson, at page 558: "Elected as judicial reformer by highest vote ever given in the state, and gives
the press every Saturday evening an account of the court proceedings during the week. He advocates
simplifications of court proceedings and that every appeal should be decided within thirty days after it
is filed."
178. Newton, supra note 5, at 8.
179. Vogel, supra note 177, at 85.
180. Vogel, supra note 177, at 91, 96.
181. Newton, supra note 5, at 8.
182. Newton, supra note 5, at 8.
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League as well, but the old gentleman was not to be dissuaded
from proving to the world that the state now had a truly demo-
cratic court in which pomp and ceremony had presumably
given way to the substance of justice and a sort of neighborly
informality. 8 3
When Justice Robinson felt an oral argument had gone too long,
according to Supreme Court lore, he would put his hat on and turn his
chair around so the speaker could only see the back of it with his hat
above.1 8 4 Other justices have been too courteous to do that, even if they
sometimes thought of it.
At its 1919 annual meeting, the State Bar Association acted on
resolutions, offered by a "committee appointed to take into consider-
ation the question of a pronouncement . . . upon public questions
involving the status of the legal profession in our state and other kindred
questions."185 While the resolutions did not name Justice Robinson,
they clearly censured his eccentric judicial conduct:
We desire to place upon record the condemnation of this
association, of the unethical acts of one of the judges of the
supreme court, in publishing his opinions in the newspapers,
long before the case is decided and before the official opinion
of the court is filed in regular form.186
The proposed resolutions drew a lengthy speech from Justice
Bronson, the only justice present. 187 Although "somewhat impressed
with the temperate manner in which the resolutions have been drawn,"
he protested:
[I]t does hurt you and it hurts the bench when you hear
band[i]ed about the thought, in the words loosely said, that the
183. MOR.AN, supra note 161, at 99.
184. Luella Dunn attributes this anecdote to her predecessor as Clerk, John Henry Newton. For-
mer-Justice Vogel described Justice Robinson's courtroom behavior a little differently: "He is reputed
to have worn his hat regularly in the courtroom and to have walked out of the courtroom in the middle
of arguments if he thought he had heard enough from the lawyer arguing the case." Vogel, supra note
177, at 85 (citing BURDIcK, supra note 139, at 8).
185. Report to the Members of the Bar Association (Aug. 21, 1919), in PRocEEDINGs OF THE BAR
ASSOCIATION OF NORTH DAKOTA 47.
186. See id. at 48-49.
187. According to the 1919 Legislative Manual, Justice Bronson had been appointed to the Court
in December 1918 "to fill the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Chief Justice Bruce," but also
had been, "[iun November 1918, with the endorsement of the Nonpartisan League, and of Organized
Labor, . . . elected Judge of the Supreme Court." See NORTH DAKOTA BLUE BOOK 558 (1919)
(containing 1919 Legislative Manual). Justice Andrew A. Bruce (1911-1918), after serving as dean of
UND Law School from 1902 to 1911, was appointed to the Court by Governor John Burke. See
SKETCH, supra note 2, at 36. He resigned from the Court on December 1, 1918, to return to teaching
law. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 36. In 1922, he went to Northwestern University law School, where
he taught until his death on December 6, 1934. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 36.
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bench of this state are not upholding the ethics of the profes-
sion or pursuing the high ideals well known in American and
English jurisprudence.188
Justice Bronson declined to vote on the resolutions, but they were "duly
adopted" after a "somewhat extended discussion."1 89
Justice Robinson (1917-1922) was defeated for re-election in
1922.190 Justice Grace (1917-1922) retired then.191 Justice Birdzell
(1917-1933) was reelected in 1922 and 1928, but resigned November 1,
1933 to become general counsel for the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.192 Notwithstanding some political overtones, these three
Justices certainly left a colorful legacy for the Court.
G. THE NPL's CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY
Still, the Nonpartisan League left an even more significant heritage
for the Court. The League sponsored a constitutional amendment that
still confines the Court's traditional power to declare legislation unconsti-
tutional.
The amendment came from a raft of constitutional changes in a
single resolution introduced in the 1917 House of Representatives that
was controlled by the Nonpartisan League. The League feared a
Supreme Court, dominated by justices linked to its opponents, might
invalidate important parts of its measures to aid farmers against business
interests seen as antithetical. 193 Among the organic changes introduced
by the League, one was designed to prevent any legislation from being
declared unconstitutional "unless at least four of the judges shall so
decide."194 The omnibus resolution passed the House by a vote of 81 to
28.195
188. See Report to Members of the Bar Association, supra note 183, at 49, 5 l.
189. See Report to Members of the Bar Association, supra note 183, at 52.
190. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 40. Justice Robinson was defeated by Justice Sveinbjorn
Johnson (1923-1926). See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 43. Justice Johnson left the Court in 1926 to
become legal counsel and professor of law at the University of Illinois, ran unsuccessfully for Illinois
Attorney General in 1944, and then practiced law in Chicago. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 43.
191. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 39. Justice William Nuessle, who had practiced at Goodrich,
been state's attorney of McLean County, and served as a district judge for 10 years, was elected to
succeed Justice Grace. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 42.
192. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 38. The 1919 Legislative Manual, says Justice Birdzell,
"[u]pon America's entrance into the World War [I] and the inauguration of the Selective Service
System, . . . was appointed chairman of the District Board for North Dakota, in which capacity he
served until the final disposition of the draft organization, some three months after the signing of the
armistice." NORTH DAKOTA BLUE BOOK 557 (1919) (containing 1919 Legislative Manual).
193. See MORLAN, supra note 161, at 101-08.
194. See MoRLAN, supra note 161, at 103.
195. See MORLAN, supra note 161, at 104.
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While the League controlled the House, the League's opponents
controlled the Senate. The Senate killed the House's omnibus proposal
three days later by a vote of twenty-nine to twenty, although four
non-League senators voted for it.196 But non-League senators soon
offered individual resolutions for a number of the proposed changes.197
Among the separate amendments submitted to voters was the one
controlling how the Court could declare a law unconstitutional.198 At the
general election in November 1918, the people approved the amendment
prohibiting any "legislative enactment or law of the state of North
Dakota be[ing] declared unconstitutional unless at least four of the
judges shall so decide."1 99 Despite later revision of the judicial article in
other details, this limitation remains in the Constitution. 200
In some instances, this limitation has saved a law that a majority of
the Court believed unconstitutional although two of the five justices did
not. In a recent case, a majority of the Court ruled: "Because only three
members of this Court have joined in this opinion, the statutory method
for distributing funding for primary and secondary education in North
Dakota is not declared unconstitutional by a sufficient majority." 201
H. CREATING THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL
Beginning at least in 1924, an active State Bar Association encour-
aged establishment of a judicial council to be "charged with the duty of
ascertaining the state of judicial business, gathering statistical informa-
tion [on] the work of the courts, examining rules of procedure, suggest-
ing changes in administration, studying work of law enforcement offi-
cials and suggesting improvement, equalizing trial work, revising rules,
and considering complaints against courts and their officers." 20 2 In
196. See MORLAN, supra note 161, at 104.
197. See MoRLAN, supra note 161, at 105.
198. See 1917 N.D. Laws ch. 93, at 103. Another memorable change, woman suffrage, also
grew out of the omnibus resolution in the 1917 session:
Success came after the Nonpartisan League put woman suffrage in its platform. In 1917
the legislature gave women the right to vote in local and presidential elections, and in
1919 the legislature ratified the federal woman-suffrage amendment. On November 2,
1920, the women of North Dakota had the full right to vote for the first time.
ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 259; see also 1917 N.D. Laws ch. 254, at 405 (women's suffrage
amendment).
199. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 89 (repealed 1976); 1919 N.D. Laws art. XXV, at 503; 1917 N.D.
Laws ch. 93, at 103.
200. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
201. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. North Dakota, 511 N.W.2d 247, 250 (N.D. 1994). Query,
though, whether this state constitutional constraint would apply to an adjudication that a law
contravenes the United States Constitution, since the Supremacy Clause makes it superior to any state
constitution?
202. I N.D. B. BRS. 7 (Dec. 1924); see also I N.D. B. BRS. 4 (Aug. 1925) (District Judge A.G.
Burr, chair of a Bar Committee, presented a plan "for the establishment, by legislative enactment, of a
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1926, Chief Justice A.M. Christianson called such a meeting of all
Supreme Court and district judges.203
This first judicial assembly took place in Bismarck in May 1926.
The State Bar Association heralded the
great advantage in having a permanent official body organized
to make a continuous study of the organization, rules, methods
and practices of the courts of the state, the work accomplished
and the results produced, to investigate the means adopted for
the improvement of judicial administration [elsewhere], to
devise such changes in procedure as appear suited to our needs
and as may be given effect without legislative action, and to
recommend to the legislative assembly such remedial legisla-
tion as is believed necessary to assure the more efficient
administration of justice. . . . The interchange of ideas alone
should be helpful in making for greater uniformity in practice
of the trial courts and in settling uncertainty as to government
rules.204
The 1927 legislature formally authorized a Judicial Council to assemble
twice a year to evaluate suggestions for improvement of the administra-
tion of justice, to recommend changes in procedures, and to coordinate
continuing judicial education. 205
The 1985 legislature changed the assembly's name to the Judicial
Conference. 206 However, the legislature did not adequately fund the
activities of the Judicial Council for its first half a century until Chief
Justice Erickstad persuaded legislators to do so beginning in 1975.207
By then, the Judicial Council had become instrumental in improving
the judicial system.
I. TEN YEAR TENURE
The 1889 Constitution set six-year terms for Supreme Court
justices. 20 8 One effort to extend the terms to ten years was rejected by
Judicial Council"); II ND. B. B RS. 1 (Feb. 1926). Later in December 1926, Judge Burr was appointed
to the Supreme Court to succeed Justice Sveinbjorn Johnson. SKETCH, supra note 2, at 45.
203. See I1 N.D. B. BRS. I (May 1926).
204. See id.
205. See 1927 N.D. Laws ch. 124, §§ I, 4, 5, 8. at 155 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE
ch. 27-15 (1991 & Supp. 1999)).
206. 1985 N.D. Laws ch. 333, § 2, at 1287.
207. In his 1975 State of the Judiciary message to a joint session of the legislature, Chief Justice
Erickstad repeatedly referred to the need for funds to continue studies begun with funding from other
sources, like the State Emergency Commission, the Combined Law Enforcement Council, State
Highway Department, and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. See STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 58-65 (44th Leg. 1975).
208. See N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 91 (repealed 1976).
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the people in 1908.209 The 1929 legislature, however, proposed an
amendment to extend all Supreme Court terms to ten years beginning
with the 1934 general election. 2 10 At the 1930 primary election, the
people approved the ten-year terms that remain today. 211 The longer
terms significantly aid judicial independence.
J. JUSTICE MORRIS: NAZI WAR CRIMES JUDGE
Like Justice Christianson, some other justices served additional
public interests while on the Court. Justice James Morris gained national
repute and helped develop international law by temporarily leaving the
Court to judge a War Crimes trial in Germany not long after World War
11.212
Justice Morris was born in a sod house outside Bordulac, North
Dakota, but finished his high school, college and law school educations
at Cincinnati, Ohio, before coming back to Carrington, North Dakota to
practice law. 213 After military service in World War I, he returned to his
Carrington law office, served as Foster County States Attorney for four
years, and later moved to Jamestown to practice. 214 After election and
service as North Dakota Attorney General from 1929 through 1932, he
ran for the Supreme Court in 1934 against Justice George Moellring
(1933-1934).215 Justice Morris won the election to begin three decades
on the Court.2 16
In 1947, Justice Morris took a leave of absence for a year to serve at
Nuremberg, 217 Germany, on an American War Crimes Tribunal for the
trial of twenty-three officials of I.G. Farben Industries. 218 Farben, a
209. See LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 447.
210. See 1929 N.D. Laws ch. 98, at 115.
211. See 1931 N.D. Laws art. 46, at 578; see also N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
212. See Hon. James Morris, Major War Crimes Trials in Nurnberg, 25 N.D. B. BRS. 97 (1949).
213. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 47. After his father died and when Morris was 16, his mother
moved back to where "her people" lived in Cincinnati. See Ken Rogers, Dakota Man's Contribution
to Nuremberg's Legacy, BISMARCK TRtB., Dec. 24, 1995, at Ci.
214. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 47.
215. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 46. Justice Moellring had been appointed to replace Justice
Birdzell when he resigned to become general counsel for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 46.
216. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 47.
217. Nuremberg and Numberg are varied spellings of the same place. Getty Research Institute,
Thesaurus of Geographic Names (last updated June 26, 2000) <http://shiva.pub.getty.edu/tgn-
browser>. Nurnberg seems to have been more commonly used in 1948 and 1949; Nuremberg more
common in recent times. See id. Other variants are sometimes used.
218. When Justice Morris left for Germany to sit at the [Nuremberg] trials, most
of the cases were decided by the remaining four Judges instead of calling a
district judge. I recall how eagerly the other justices supported [Justice]
Morris' request for a leave of absence, even though his absence put an
additional burden on them.
Letter from Lu Dunn, retired Clerk, North Dakota Supreme Court, to Herbert Meschke, author (Apr.
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giant industrial cartel with holdings of "more than 880 firms throughout
Europe, Africa, North and South America, [and] east and west Asia,"
manufactured chemicals and munitions for Hitler's war machine. 219
After World War II, the victorious Allies charged twenty four directors
and officers of Farben with War Crimes.
All the Farben officials were charged with crimes against peace by
preparing and waging an aggressive war against other countries and by
conspiring to do so; with war crimes by plundering property and deport-
ing people from occupied countries; and with crimes against humanity
by enslaving, mistreating and murdering civilians conscripted to operate
its factories at concentration camps, including Auschwitz with its deadly
crematoriums. 220 Four Farben officials were also charged with member-
ship in the "SS," an organization declared criminal by the prior Inter-
national Military Tribunal.221
Justice Morris was named a War Crimes judge by President Truman
and assigned by General Lucius D. Clay, American Military Governor in
Germany, to the panel of judges on American Military Tribunal No. VI
for the Farben trial.222 "He [felt] especially fortunate to be assigned to
the Farben case, which he [felt would] be a landmark in international
jurisprudence." 223
One of the lead prosecutors in the case, Josiah E. DuBois, Jr.,224
wrote a book about this trial, The Devil's Chemists. DuBois was an
American lawyer who had seven years prior experience, mostly at the
U.S. Treasury Department, in dealing with Farben through seizure of its
assets in the western hemisphere during the war.225 DuBois's book was
critical of the outcome and of Justice Morris's impact on the trial.226
16, 1999) (on file with co-author). In a September 10, 1947, letter from Nuremberg to her Fortnightly
Club in Bismarck, N.D., Amelia Morris explained part of her husband's arrangement for his absence
from the Court: "Jim receives no salary from the State of North Dakota while on leave from the Court
there, and the salary here, while larger, doesn't go very far." (From copy of five-page letter held by
Lois K. Erickstad, Bismarck, N.D.).
219. JOSIAH E. DuBois, JR., THE DEvIL's CHEMisS 11 (1952).
220. See id. at 345-46; see also Morris, supra note 212, at 99 (defining crimes by quoting Control
Council Law No. 10 enacted by the military governors of the four occupying powers in Germany on
December 20, 1945), 101 (describing the offenses charged against the Farben defendants).
221. See Morris, supra note 212, at 101.
222. See Morris, supra note 212, at 100, 108.
223. Letter from Amelia Morris, wife of Justice James Morris, to Fortnightly Club, Bismarck,
N.D. (Sept. 10, 1947) (on file with Lois K. Erickstad, Bismarck, N.D.).
224. DuBois was Deputy Chief Counsel of an eleven-member prosecution team. See VII TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS-"THE I.G. FARBEN CASE" 6 (U.S.
Gov. Printing Office, 1949-1953) [hereinafter THE I.G. FARBEN CASE]. This 15 volume set, Trials of
War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10,
encompasses 12 cases. Volumes VII and Vill are a selective but incomplete record of case no. 6:
U.S. v. Krauch (I.G. Farben case). The North Dakota Supreme Court Library holds volume 3 and 5-
15 of this set.
225. See DuBois, supra note 219, at 15.
226. According to Joseph Borkin, the author of The Crime and Punishment Farben of LG., as
DuBois left the courtroom after the decision, he declared: "I'll write a book about this if it's the last
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The prosecutor's opening statement outlined the case they hoped to
prove against the Farben officials:
In 1940 the defendants as officers and managers of the huge
I.G. Farben industrial empire, planned the construction of a
fourth synthetic rubber plant which was vitally necessary if the
war was to be long continued. The site selected was Oswiecim,
Poland, known to the Germans as Auschwitz. Here one of the
largest, if not the largest concentration camp had been erected
by Himmler. They desired the use of concentration camp
inmates to provide the labor for building and operating the
plant. Himmler for a price furnished the inmates of his camp
who slaved and died to build the buna rubber factory. It is a
revolting story of brutality, starvation and murder. In 1945
I.G. Farben had more than 100,000 slave laborers assigned to
it. This represents the number used at a given time and does
not take into consideration the tremendous turnover brought
about by death and exchange. I.G. Farben built its own
concentration camp with SS guards and all the usual trappings.
They received their slaves from the notorious Rudolf Hoess,
Commandant of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, who
personally estimated that at least 2,500,000 inmates were
executed in its gas chambers and destroyed in its crematories,
and that another half million died of starvation and disease.
Farben officials were familiar with and acquiesced in the
program. The life span of a slave worker averaged three
months. They included Norwegians, British, Dutch and many
other nationalities. It is estimated that Farben's concentration
camp and the buna plant alone claimed the lives of 25,000
persons. Exhaustion, malnutrition, freezing and atrocious
brutality were the main causes of death. Those sustaining
serious injuries or slow healing incapacities were selected for
gassing. These are only some of the things that I.G. Farben
and other industrialists did. It is for such offenses and
thing I ever do." JOSEPH BORKiN, TIE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF I.G. FARBEN 155 (1978) (citing DuBois,
supra note 219, at [346]). DuBois actually wrote two books, although the second seems identical
except for its title. See DuBois, supra note 219; JosAH E. Duois, JR., GENERALS IN GREYr Suns (1953).
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atrocities that the industrialists have been called upon to defend
themselves in a Tribunal administering international law.227
The prosecutors were not entirely successful in their proof.
From the start of the trial on August 27, 1947, DuBois felt particu-
larly irritated by Justice Morris.
His gray head half a plane above [presiding] Judge Shake and
a full plane above the other two judges (who bent studiously
over the bench), Judge Morris' attention wandered from one
dark-paneled wall to the other. Still, I had seen judges who
took in evidence while they gave every appearance of being
asleep. When on rare occasions the Tribunal had paused to
look over a document in open court, Morris finished before the
others; then his head would snap up and he would look for a
moment as if someone had just seen him sit on a cocklebur. A
justice of the supreme court of North Dakota, Morris was a
judge's judge in many ways, used to reading summaries
prepared by assistants, and probably several years removed
from the slow exasperating drama of trials at this level.228
DuBois complained that Justice Morris repeatedly questioned the pace of
the prosecutors' presentations and the relevancy of much of their
evidence.229
It was a long and ponderous trial.
The trial finally ended on May 12, 1948, after having exhaust-
ed all concerned in 152 trial days. There had been 189
witnesses. The transcript was almost 16,000 pages long. Over
227. Hon. Edward F. Carter, The Nurnberg Trials: A Turning Point in the Enforcement of
International Law, 28 NEB. L. REv. 370, 383-84 (1949) (citation omitted). Carter, an associate Justice
of the Nebraska Supreme Court, served on an American Military Tribunal for a different
"Industrialist" case. He summarized the Farben prosecutor's opening to illustrate the charges in each
of the three so-called "Industrialist cases" where "[tihe indictments ... charge[d] the defendants with
wholesale enslavement of conscripted foreign labor, plunder and murder." Id. at 383 (quoting THE
I.G. FARBEN CASE, supra note 224, at 100-05). He explained the importance of those trials:
The Nurnberg trials may not provide a sufficient deterrent to international crime, but
they have provided more than has existed in the past. It is my hope, and that of the other
Nurnberg judges as well, that, by interpreting, declaring and giving effect to existing
principles of the international law of war, the beginnings of an international enforcement
system of common law crimes has been planted.
Id at 384.
228. DuBois, supra note 219, at 82. Since the North Dakota Supreme Court had no law clerks or
legal staff before 1965, DuBois was wrong to assume Justice Morris was "used to reading summaries
prepared by assistants."
229. See DuBois, supra note 219, at 82, 87, 88, 93, 95, 131, 142, 148, 195, 314-16. In
contemplating DuBois's criticism, one should remember Justice Morris had ample experience as a
prosecutor, both as a states attorney for four years and as Attorney General of North Dakota for four
years. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 47.
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6000 documents and 2800 affidavits had been introduced into
evidence. In addition, there had been a multitude of briefs,
motions, rulings, and other legal instruments incidental to such
a proceeding.
An intellectually divided and emotionally drained court faced
the task of carving from the huge record a legally valid and
historically meaningful decision. On July 29, 1948, almost a
year after the trial began, the court convened to read its opin-
ion, render its verdict, and sentence the guilty.230
The Tribunal majority (presiding Judge Shake, a former Indiana
Supreme Court Justice, and Justice Morris) acquitted all twenty-three
defendants (one was too ill for trial) of complicity in carrying on an
aggressive war;231 acquitted the few defendants accused of membership
in a criminal organization; 232 and acquitted ten defendants of all
crimes. 233 The Tribunal majority found eight guilty only of plundering;
four guilty only of slavery; and found one guilty of both plundering
and slavery. 234 The third judge, Judge Hebert, Law School Dean at
Louisiana State University, announced that he "differed on many
points," and "added that he would file separate opinions later, including
a dissent on the slave-labor count." 235 The Tribunal majority sentenced
those convicted to imprisonment for periods varying from one and
one-half years to eight years. 236
The prosecutors were immediately irate: "The sentences were light
enough to please a chicken thief, or a driver who had irresponsibly run
down a pedestrian." 237 Prosecutor DuBois believed: "It was clear now
that, from the first, the court had been split in two, with Morris and Shake
on one side, Hebert and [alternate Judge] Merrell on the other."238
More than four months later, after all the judges had returned home,
and with help from alternate Judge Merrell, an Indiana lawyer,239 who
230. BoRN, supra note 226, at 149 (footnote omitted).
231. See DuBois, supra note 219, at 339.
232. See MoRRIs, supra note 212, at 102.
233. See MoRius, supra note 212, at 102.
234. See DuBois, supra note 219, at 345-46; see also MORRIs, supra note 212, at 102.
235. DuBois, supra note 219, at 345.
236. See DuBois, supra note 219, at 346. "[T]ime in confinement before and during the
proceedings counted as time served," and "John McCloy, the American high commissioner, pardoned
the last of them in 1951." PETER HAYES, INDUSTRY AND IDEOLOoY: I.G. FARaBE IN THE NAzi ERA 377, xii
(1987).
237. DuBois, supra note 219, at 339.
238. DuBois, supra note 219, at 347.
239. Clarence F. Merrell brought another North Dakota connection to the Farben War Crimes
trial because he began his legal career here. See Bench and Bar: Memorials-Clarence F. Merrell,
30 N.D. L. REV. at 171-72 (1954):
Mr. Merrell was admitted to the North Dakota Bar on December 9, 1912, and practiced
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participated in the trial but not the judgment, Judge Hebert filed a
separate 114-page opinion, concurring and dissenting. 240 Judge Hebert
explained his partial concurrence:
I concur in the acquittals on charges of planning and
preparation of aggressive war. I concur, though realizing that
on the vast volume of credible evidence, a contrary result might
as easily be reached by other triers of the facts who would be
more inclined to draw the inferences usually warranted in
criminal cases. The issues of fact are truly so close as to cause
genuine concern whether or not justice has actually been done.
While concurring in the acquittals, I cannot agree with the
factual conclusions of the Tribunal. I do not agree with the
majority's conclusion that the evidence falls far short.241
In his dissent, Judge Hebert explained he would have convicted
most of the officials of slavery:
Utilization of [slave] labor [by Farben] was approved as a
matter of corporate policy. To permit the corporate instru-
mentality to be used as a cloak to insulate the principal corpo-
rate officers who approved and authorized this course of action
from any criminal responsibility therefor is a leniency in the
application of principles of criminal responsibility which, in
my opinion, is without any sound precedent under the most
elementary concepts of criminal law.... The evidence shows
Farben's willing cooperation in the utilization of forced
foreign workers, prisoners of war and concentration-camp
inmates as a matter of conscious corporate policy.242
Justice Morris summarized the effect of this split decision on the
most controversial charge, slavery:
[T]he members of the tribunal were unable to agree upon the
inferences of guilt to be drawn from the fact of [board of
directors] membership and authority .... [W]e were not able
to agree whether necessity and the lack of opportunity to
exercise moral choice was available as a defense or could only
be considered in mitigation of the use of slave labor. The
result [on the slave-labor count] was the unanimous conviction
at Fargo for about two years, being an associate of the firm of Watson, Young &
Lawrence. News of his death [at Indianapolis, Indiana on February 10, 1954] was
received by Chief Justice Morris with whom he served on a military tribunal forthe trial
of war criminals at Nuernburg, Germany.
240. See THE I.G. FARBEN CASE, supra note 224, at 1211-1325.
241. DuBois, supra note 219, at 354 (quoting Judge Hebert).
242. THE I.G. FARBEN CASE, supra note 224, at 1313-15.
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of five defendants, including four members of the [board of
directors], the unanimous acquittal of three defendants, and the
acquittal of fifteen members [of the board] by a vote of two to
one, Judge Hebert dissenting. 243
The prosecutors thought Justice Morris was preoccupied with the
looming "Russian menace," rather than concerned with the culpability
of Nazi cohorts. 244 DuBois believed the majority was unduly swayed by
this growing fear of Russian Communism: "[W]hy had Judges Shake
and Morris reacted as they did? I concluded that the reason must have
been fear-their own great fear of the trend of events in 1948."245
But DuBois frankly confessed, "while the prosecution couldn't
understand Judge Morris' failure to grasp the evidence, we had our own
doubts." 246 DuBois also said, after the trial, he "grew more tolerant of
the two judges who went to Nurnberg more or less uninitiated. No doubt
they were influenced somewhat by our foreign policy" at that time,
again referring to the sway of Russian Communism.2 47
Despite DuBois's "petty personal criticisms," Justice Morris felt
vindicated by DuBois's description of the trial and its outcome. Justice
Morris explained why in a virtually unpublished letter to DuBois shortly
after his book was published: 248
No longer need I apologize for or explain my part in the
Nurnberg trials. You have, perhaps unwittingly, done me a
great favor by furnishing a written record which, though
erroneous and misleading in many details presents an over-all
picture which I regard as highly complimentary.
I am glad, too, that your book recognizes my appreciation of
the Russian menace ....
By this remark, though, Justice Morris seems to confirm his Farben
decision was affected by the prevalent foreign policy of that time,
containing Russian Communism.
243. See Morris, supra note 212, at 102.
244. See DuBois, supra note 219, at 95, 338.
245. DuBois, supra note 219, at 355.
246. DuBois, supra note 219, at 88.
247. DuBois, supra note 219, at 357.
248. A signed copy of Justice Morris's unpublished letter of March 26, 1953 to DuBois was made
available by being bound into the copy of The Devil's Chemists held by the Bismarck State College
library. The source of the copy is not known, but it was likely furnished for binding by Justice Morris
himself.
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Justice Morris's letter continued with another remark about "not
creating dangerous precedents which would have been an impediment to
the future foreign policy of our country":
I know that you were greatly disappointed in the judgment and
the sentences meted out. It would seem, however, that your
disappointment was not well grounded since the defendants
receiving the longer sentences were released long before those
sentences expired and, as you point out in your book, pardon
had terminated all sentences by 1951. It would seem, there-
fore, that the tribunal was entirely in step with the progress of
history in the making and that we were wise in not creating
dangerous precedents which would have been an impediment
to the future foreign policy of our country .... The interven-
ing years have proved that the Farben judgment was wise and
just. I am indeed proud to have been one of the. majority that
brought about its rendition. Despite petty personal criticism,
your book points out my position and my responsibility with
regard to the decision. For that I am grateful.249
Justice Morris was proud of the Farben decision and its precedential
importance for international criminal law. He believed the trial "will
have some significance in the future development of international
criminal law," even though he urged "codification of an international
criminal law." 250
Unquestionably Justice Morris's vote to convict some corporate
officers of crimes against humanity contributed significantly to develop-
ment of international law, whatever the fate of those guilty might have
been. With war crimes again in today's headlines from events in eastern
Europe, Justice Morris's precedent may have renewed relevance for the
rule of international law in our times.
K. THE FARBEN WAR CRIMES CASE DEBATE
The small disagreement over the outcome of the Farben case
framed by DuBois's 1952 tirade and Justice Morris's nearly private
response smoldered silently for over twenty-five years. But scholarly
histories published in the last two decades have kindled a larger debate.
It is anyone's guess why it took so long to subject the Farben trial to
249. Letter from James Morris to Josiah E. DuBois, Jr. (Mar. 26, 1953) (copy within binding of
The Devil's Chemist at Bismarck State College, Bismarck N.D.).
250. Morris, supra note 212, at 109.
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more scholarly scrutiny. But, for those who want to examine it in more
detail, we briefly review the available literature on the Farben case. 251
The Farben trial got negligible attention in law reviews apart from
Justice Morris's own straight-forward account in 1949, Major War
Crimes Trials in Nurnberg.252 Besides DuBois's 1952 polemic, The
Devils's Chemists, republished in 1953 as Generals in Grey Suits,253 at
least three books and a graduate thesis have sought to assess the
historical meaning of the Farben case.
Thirty years after the trial, Joseph Borkin wrote The Crime and
Punishment of LG. Farben.254  Borkin had an indirect North Dakota
association. In 1934, he went to work for a United States Senate Special
Committee chaired by Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota. The
Committee was investigating the munitions industry. Borkin's first job
there was to investigate a deal between Standard Oil Company, New
Jersey, and Farben. 255
Borkin backed DuBois. His chapter titles illustrate this: "3. I.G.
[Farben] Prepares Hitler for War"; "4. The Marriage of I.G. [Farben]
and Standard Oil under Hitler"; "6. Slave Labor and Mass Murder";
"9. I.G. [Farben] Wins the Peace"; "10. Corporate Camouflage." His
compact twenty-one-page chapter 8, "I.G. [Farben] at Nuremberg," is a
much more succinct account of the trial than DuBois's. Yet Borkin
certainly recognized Justice Morris "voiced his irritation with the
proceedings" when he scolded the prosecutor: "This trial is being
slowed down by a mass of contracts, minutes and letters that seem to
have such slight bearing on any possible concept of proof in this
case."
25 6
Intriguingly, Borkin implies in a foreleaf that General Eisenhower's
postwar experience with Farben gave shape to President Eisenhower's
famous pronouncement on leaving the presidency in 1961:
In the councils of Government, we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential
251. For a fust-person account of life at the Auschwitz camp by one of relatively few survivors
who was a slave-laborer at the buna factory being built by Farben see PiRmo LEvi, SURVIVAL IN
AUSCHWITZ (1985) (republication of a book first published in Italy in 1958, and first translation
published by The Orion Press in 1960).
252. See Morris, supra note 212. Also see Maximilian Koessler, American War Crimes Trials in
Europe, 39 GEO. L.J. 18-112 (1950), for a broad overview of the American War Crimes Trials. It
only passingly mentions the Farben and Industrialist trials, but it contains an extensive discussion of the
procedures used, the legal theories of the prosecutions, and the legal theories of the defendants.
253. See DuBois, supra note 219; DuBois, supra note 226.
254. See BORKIN, supra note 226.
255. See BORKIN, supra note 226, in preface.
256. BORKIN, supra note 226, at 141.
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for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will
persist. We must never let the weight of this combination
endanger our liberties or democratic processes. 257
Borkin followed up on that by describing General Eisenhower's investi-
gation, recommendation, and decision "that [Farben's] strategic position
in the German economy must be broken as 'one means of assuring
world peace."' 258
Nearly a decade later in 1987, Peter Hayes wrote Industry and
Ideology: L.G. Farben in the Nazi Era,259 portraying Farben as
carelessly stumbling into disgrace by "opportunistically and
defensively" associating with Nazi policies and military conquests. 260
From extensive research, Hayes concluded Farben selected Auschwitz for
a manufacturing plant before the possibility of using inmate labor
developed, but that its "decision to occupy the site, however unintended
and unforseeable the consequences, contributed mightily to the camp's
expansion and its eventual evolution into a manufacturer of death." 261
Hayes minimized Farben's plundering of facilities in occupied
countries: "There was no 'rape of the European chemical industry.'
Only in Austria and Czechoslovakia did [Farben's] takeover account for
more than 5% of any subject country's chemical output." 262 By this,
Hayes seems to imply Farben officials were only a "little bit" guilty of
War Crimes. Perhaps that is a possible view of the modest punishment
imposed on them, but Hayes goes on to damn the Farben convicts far
more with his faint justification:
Farben's leaders acted as they thought their calling required.
They disagreed cautiously with the trend of events from time to
time but sooner or later sought to benefit from it. Their sense
of professional duty encouraged them to regard every issue
principally in terms of their special competences and responsi-
bilities, in this case to their fields and stockholders. In obeying
this mandate, they relieved themselves of the obligation to
make moral or social judgments or to examine the overall
consequences of their decisions. 263
257. Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 17, 1961), reprinted in
DwioHT D. EISENHOWER 1890-1969: CHRONOLOGY-DOcUMENTS-B1BuOORAPHICAL AIDs 141, 143 (Robert
I. Vexler ed., 1970).
258. BORrIN, supra note 226, at 157.
259. See HAYES, supra note 236.
260. HAYES, supra note 236, at 218.
261. HAYES, supra note 236, at 351.
262. HAYES, supra note 236, at 216.
263. HAYES, supra note 236. at 382.
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In other words, Hayes said politely, Farben officials acted for prosaic
reasons of profit. Hayes certainly does not excuse them; rather he
smoothly condemns them for unmitigated greed. 264
In 1988, Raymond G. Stokes wrote Divide and Prosper: The Heirs
of LG. Farben Under Allied Authority, 1945-1951. In brief summaries
of the Farben trial,265 Stokes concluded "the results of the trial bore
astonishingly little relation to the alleged crimes," and "[o]ne could
sympathize with chief [sic] prosecutor Josiah DuBois in his bitter assess-
ment of the sentences as 'light enough to please a chicken thief."'2 66
Stokes speculated on why the punishment was so mild "[d]espite
the gravity of the offenses." 267 He discounts Borkin's theory, "in his
book length indictment of the entire history of the firm," "that the
emergence of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet
Union influenced the majority of the court, [because] it is difficult to
imagine the precise mechanism through which this might have taken
place." 268 Stokes believed "[m]ore readily apparent explanations are at
hand [for the short prison sentences], although we will never know for
certain." 269. Stokes felt "the mild punishment fit with the American
judicial tradition of light sentences for 'white-collar crime."' 270 He
thought an "even more compelling" reason was that, "strategically, the
prosecution conducted its case poorly at times," particularly by not
emphasizing the horrors of Auschwitz more. 271
Stokes mainly charted how the Farben cartel was divided by the
Allies after the war to lessen its military-industrial influence, and how the
three separate companies, BASF, Bayer, and Hoechst, were not stunted,
but thrived. Stokes concluded:
The irony is that the same creativity and adaptability that
allowed German industrialists to embrace autarky and to
prepare Hitler's armies with the tools needed for
aggression-qualities often exercised by the very same
men-were responsible for the success of West German
264. "We cannot say that a private citizen shall be placed in the position of being compelled to
determine in the heat of war whether his government is right or wrong, or, if it starts right, when it
turns wrong." HAVES, supra note 236, at 332 (citing Morris, supra note 210) The LG. Farben Case,
supra note 224, at 1126, reported that part of the judgment and included this quote. That Hayes chose
to quote Justice Morris for that item, rather than the judgment itself, is intriguing.
265. See RAYMOND G. STOKES, DIVIDE AND PROSPER: THE HEIRS OF I.G. FARBEN UNDER ALLIED
AumoRrrv, 1945-1951 at 54-55, 151-55 (1988).
266. Id. at 54-55.
267. Id. at 152.
268. Id. at 152-53.
269. Id. at 153.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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chemical manufacturing under the new conditions of the
postwar period.272
In 1994, Mark H. Foster submitted a thesis on the Farben case to
the University of North Dakota in partial fulfillment of requirements for
a graduate degree. 273 Foster drew on a "collection ... of ... relatively
complete Nuremberg trial document[s]" that included "not only a full
set of prosecution documents, but also of the defense documents as
well ."274
Foster's 244-page thesis assayed existing publications on the Far-
ben case. "Authors who have utilized the Nuremberg documentary
record to focus specifically on IG Farben have taken differing views on
the question of the firm's guilt."275 Foster categorized DuBois at "one
extreme," and Hayes at the "other pole." 276 Foster listed an extensive
bibliography of unpublished works, published works, books, and articles
that gives plenty of material for further study.277
Foster concluded that "justice was indeed served in the Farben
Case." 278 He reasoned: "The leadership of IG Farben was never a
willing accessory to the Nazi regime." 279 Noting a few examples of
kindnesses to certain individual employees by some defendants, Foster
concluded "the leaders of IG Farben acted reasonably and fairly to
defend the good name of their firm as well as they felt they could safely
do when impinged upon by a government and revolutionary party gone
mad with racism and pride." 280 "[I]t is entirely possible that they
indeed did act heroically, sacrificing their reputation in order to lessen
actual harm." 281
Bleakly, Foster rationalizes the "relatively light" sentences for
those found guilty of crimes against humanity as "well in the range of
what one might serve on a manslaughter charge after inadvertently
272. Id. at 208-09.
273. Mark H. Foster, IG Farben and the Road to Auschwitz: Failed Ethics In An Early
High-Technology Enterprise (1994) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Dakota) (on file
with the University of North Dakota Chester Fritz Library).
274. Id. at 3 n.2. This collection was assembled by Dr. Howard Russell, who had been a
professor of English Language and Literature at UND during the 1930s, while he served as Secretary
General of the American Military Tribunals at Nuremberg from May 1948 to December 1949. Dr.
Russell placed those unpublished materials at the University of North Dakota, and Foster dedicated his
thesis to him. See id. at i.
275. Id. at 24.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 245-49. But, curiously, Foster's bibliography does not list Justice Morris's law
review article as a source. See id.
278. Id. at 239.
279. Id. at 236.
280. Id. at 240.
281. Id. at 242.
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striking down a pedestrian while speeding or driving under the influ-
ence," 28 2 but he does not compute or weigh the number of "pedes-
trians" wiped out at Auschwitz. Foster thought the sentences were meant
"to deter others, out of sheer fear of the possibility of prison, from
taking risks on the road which can, on rare occasions, result in man-
slaughter." 283 In his view, the convictions did "represent a deterrent
against allowing any outside forces from manipulating a firm into
accepting slave labor on its premises or into participating in a venture
associated in any way with a forced labor camp which could possibly
become the next Auschwitz. '284
The belated and ongoing controversy over Justice Morris's role at
Nuremberg illustrates how judging, often, can be difficult. Still, by his
vote to convict some corporate officers of complicity in crimes against
humanity, North Dakota's Justice Morris demonstrated leadership. His
experience at Nuremberg presaged his influence on the North Dakota
Supreme Court a decade later when he helped bring about
modernization of civil procedure.
L. JUSTICE GRIMSON: PRISON REFoRM
Some justices brought a large history of public service with them to
the Court.285 Justice Grimson was one of those.
At age seventy, Justice Gudmunder Grimson (1949-1958) was
appointed to the Court in September 1949 to succeed retired Justice
Alexander Burr (1926-1949).286 Justice Grimson served as a district
judge from 1926 to 1949, but he had previously won national acclaim as
a crusading lawyer who brought about "reform of prison laws in many
parts of the United States." 287
During the early 1920s, Gudmundur Grimson gained national
attention by virtue of his activities against the penal system in
Florida. In 1922 a neighbor came to Mr. Grimson with some
evidence indicating that his son had been flogged to death in a
Florida lumber camp. Mr. Grimson investigated and found
282. Id. at 239.
283. Id. at 239-40.
284. Id. at 240.
285. Another justice, Justice Paul M. Sand (1974-1984), before becoming a justice, had "served
as assistant staff judge advocate of the U.S. Berlin District, and also headed a War Crimes Team in the
British Zone of the Army of the Rhine in Germany [before his discharge as lieutenant colonel in
1947]. The team's duty was to obtain evidence and data for use at the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trials." Lucille Hendrickson, Justice Sand Dies of Heart Failure, BIsMARcK TRIB., Dec. 9, 1984, at
A1; see also SKETCH, supra note 2, at 60.
286. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 50, 45. Justice Burr retired at the age of 78 "due to disability."
SKETCH, supra note 2, at 45.
287. ROLPSRUD, supra note 157, at 62, 67.
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evidence that a system existed in that state whereby sheriffs
were paid a bounty for delivering to slave camps prisoners who
were without funds to pay their fines. The North Dakota boy
was one of the victims of that system and while his parents had
wired the sheriff the money to pay the fine, the sheriff returned
the money and retained his bounty. The boy fell prey to a
sadistic boss who apparently enjoyed flogging his victims of
excessive labor. The North Dakota boy died under these
floggings. Mr. Grimson's extensive investigation which lasted
more than two years, lead to publicity in a New York news-
paper, action by the Legislature of North Dakota and
eventually action by the authorities in Florida. The result was
that the penal system of Florida and other states which had
similar oppressive procedures, was modified. The sadistic boss
was indicted and convicted although upon a subsequent re-trial
was acquitted, and the boy's family received a substantial
monetary settlement.288
Justice Grimson had also "[s]pearheaded reform in judicial procedures
followed in sentencing juveniles" and had "negotiated air service
between the United States and Iceland and Denmark" in 1932.289
Still, Justice Grimson, who first became a justice at age seventy, was
not the oldest person to serve on the Supreme Court.
M. AGE AND ACTION
In December 1934, the average age of the justices surpassed sixty-
three,290 and the average became even older several times after that. Not
long after Justice Grimson came to the Court in 1949 at age seventy, 291
Justice P.O. Sathre (1937-1938, 1951-1962), who had earlier served on
the Court at age sixty-one for thirteen months, rejoined the Court in
January 1951 at age seventy-five. 292 Thus, by 1954, the average age of
the sitting justices reached seventy years, with three of them over age
288. North Dakota Supreme Court, In Memoriam-Hon. Gudmunder Grimson & Hon. Thomas J.
Burke, 43 N.D. L. REv. 582, 586 (1967). His friend, Clyde Duffy, a former State Senator and notable
Devils Lake practitioner, summarized Justice Grimson's earlier campaign for penal reform. See id at
585.
289. ROLFSRUD, supra note 157, at 67.
290. See SKETCH, supra note 3.
291. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 50.
292. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 48.
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seventy. 293 Age may have affected the work of the Court during this
mid-century interval.
Between 1934 and 1964, the workload of the Court withered with a
depression-dampened economy that, for the Court at least, and perhaps
for much of the state, persisted well past World War 11.294 In the earlier
World War I era, the Supreme Court had several times written over 200
published opinions a year, peaking at 243 in 1919.295 Thereafter, the
number of published decisions gradually dwindled, reaching only
ninety-four in 1934.296 As depression-related conditions continued, the
Court did as few as forty-one opinions in 1944, thirty-eight in 1947, and
forty-five in 1960.297 The output of published opinions did not again
exceed one hundred for four decades until it reached 124 in 1974.298
During that middle third of the century, the age factor may have
affected the pace of the Court's opinions despite the reduced volume.
In the memory of the senior author of this account, the Court in the
1950s and early 1960s sometimes did not produce a written opinion in a
case for over a year after the oral argument. 299 After 1964, however,
293. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 48 (stating that Justice Sathre was born February 7, 1876), 37
(stating that Justice Christianson was bom August 11, 1877), 50 (stating that Justice Grimson was born
November 20, 1878), 47 (stating that Justice Morris was born January 2, 1893), 49 (stating that Justice
Thomas Burke was born October 24, 1896).
294. In 1950, Supreme Court Clerk John Henry Newton reported a contemporaneous slackening
in trial work as well.
There has during the past twenty years been a decided failing off in trial work. In many
counties of the state, up till the late twenties and early thirties, it was no uncommon thing
to have a term continue for as long as six or seven weeks with continuous jury work....
Many factors have combined to produce this lack of trial work. Among others the
Workmen's Compensation Act has eliminated much of the personal injury work which
used to clog the court calendars. So too the Employers' Liability Act has eliminated
many lawsuits ... [by] railway employees; the carrying of liability insurance... and the
settlement by the insurance carriers of claims without suit, even though the liability be
doubtful; the building of overpasses and under passes, thus eliminating the grade crossing
accidents, all are facts that have contributed to the falling off of jury work in the field of
civil actions. Repeal of the national and state prohibitory laws have played their part in
the falling off of criminal practice. . . . Now, even in some of the more populous
counties the terms so far as jury work is concerned, will often be concluded in a matter
of three or four days ....
J.H. Newton, Lecture No. 2 at the University of North Dakota School of Law, at 1-2 (1950) (lecture
notes available in the North Dakota Supreme Court Law Library).
295. Search of West's North Dakota Reporter CD-ROM Cases database (database containing
only North Dakota Supreme Court decisions).
296. See id
297. See id. (search for records containing 1944, 1947, and 1960 in DATE field).
298. See id.
299. "A judge shall perform the duties of office ... diligently." NoRT DAKOTA CODE OF JuICIAL
CoNmucr Canon 3 (2000). Commentary to Canon 3(B)(8) on "Adjudicative Responsibilities" explains:
"Prompt disposition of the court's business requires a judge to devote adequate time to judicial duties,
to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in determining matters under submission, and to insist
that court officials, litigants and their lawyers cooperate with the judge to that end." (emphasis added).
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when an opinion was not completed in a reasonable time by the assigned
justice, the Court often re-assigned the case to another justice to get it
completed without greater delay. 300
Obviously, not all persons over age seventy lose their capacities to
study, think, or write effectively, but common experience certainly
implies that age increases the likelihood of reduced productivity. In
apparent reaction to the perceived adverse effects of aging on the Court,
the 1959 legislature imposed a penalty on any justice of the Supreme
Court (and any district judge, too) who was appointed or elected after
July 1, 1960, and who did not retire before age seventy-three. This
enactment declared a judge who delayed retirement past his
seventy-third birthday would "automatically waive all retirement bene-
fits" and receive only the "judicial retirement assessment" the judge
had personally contributed towards retirement. 301
The justices' ears are still ringing from that legislative cuffing;302 no
justice since 1960 has chosen to stay in office past age seventy-two. The
adverse effects of aging on performance should not affect the Court
again.
In January 1963, a state senator from Devils Lake, Ralph J.
Erickstad, was first elected to the Court at the relatively young age of
forty, 3O3 and the average age of justices dropped below sixty years for
the first time in three decades. By 1981, however, the number of pub-
lished opinions went over 200 again, where it has been every year
since.304
300. See, e.g., State v. Glavkee, 138 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1965) (opinion of the Court by Strutz, J.,
on reassignment); Bismarck Baptist Church v. Wiedemann Indus. Inc., 201 N.W.2d 434 (N.D. 1972)
(opinion of the Court by Strutz, C.J., on reassignment). During that eight-year period, at least 42
opinions were issued "on reassignment" by a full court without a dissent or concurrence, where the
reassignment does not appear to have been made for another possible reason. Search of West's North
Dakota Reporter CD-ROM Cases database (database containing only North Dakota Supreme Court
decisions) (search for records containing "on reassignment"). Some other opinions on reassignment
may reflect divided views on the Court or the belated absence of one or more justices due to
disqualification or vacancy.
301. 1959 N.D. Laws ch. 254, § 1, at 424. Also see continued codification of the age penalty at
section 27-17-01 (1) of the North Dakota Century Code for judges "eligible for retirement hereunder."
(emphasis added). All Supreme Court justices in office today, however, qualify for retirement under
the public employee retirement system (P.E.R.S.) rather than under section 27-17 of the North Dakota
Century Code.
302. A like penalty for failure to retire by age 73 had been imposed on judges and justices under
P.E.R.S., see 1973 N.D. Laws ch. 246, § 12, but was quietly repealed, see 1977 N.D. Laws ch. 499,
§ 17. The main incentive to retire under P.E.R.S. lies in the diminished multiplier after twenty years of
judicial service. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-52-17(4)(b)(1) (1989).
303. See SKETcH, supra note 2, at 54.
304. Search of West's North Dakota Reporter CD-ROM Cases database (database containing
only North Dakota Supreme Court decisions).
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N. PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS
The 1889 judicial article directed the legislature to provide "for the
publication and distribution of the decisions of the supreme court." 305
The Court regularly published the North Dakota Reports beginning in
1891.306
At the August 1953 State Bar convention, President E.T. Conmy
reported that Chief Justice James Morris had "reminded" him
that a serious problem exists in the publication of our North
Dakota Reports. The expense of publication has greatly
increased and sales have greatly decreased. Sale decrease is
probably due to the fact that most lawyers now buy only the
Northwestern Reporter. It is the opinion of some, not of all by
any manner or means, that publication of the North Dakota
Reports should be discontinued altogether.30 7
President Conmy suggested appointing a committee "to study this
problem and make its definite recommendations as soon as possible for
the consideration of the Supreme Court." 308
In 1954, chair Carroll E. Day, reporting for the State Bar Associa-
tion's Judiciary Committee, recommended the Bar ask the legislature to
give the Supreme Court "much wider discretion in the publication of the
reports or in discontinuing such publication." 309 He explained:
For some reason only about 10 percent of North Dakota
lawyers purchase North Dakota Reports.
305. N.D. CONST. art IV, § 93 (repealed 1976).
306. 1 N.D. (1891). As authorized by the 1889 North Dakota Constitution, section 93, the Court
regularly appointed a Reporter to aid in publication of the reports. They have been:
1889-1890, Edgar W. Camp (b.1860-d.1943);
1891-1893, R.D. Hoskins (b. 1861-d.1946);
1894-1902, John M. Cochrane (b.1859-d.1909);
1903-1903, R.M. Carothers (b. 1859-d._ ;
1903-1911, F.W. Ames (b.1851-d.1925);
1912-1918, H.A. Libby (b.1859-d. 1943);
1919-1923, Joseph Coghlan;
1923-1955, Edwin J. Taylor (b.1869-d.1956);
1956-1957, Wallace M. Ferguson;
1957-1960, Thomas W. Nielsen;
1960-1961, Theodore W. Camrud;
1962-1990, Elmer J. DeWald.
See NORTH DAKorA CENTENNIAL BLUE BOOK, 1889-1989, at 465 (1989).
307. Report of 1953 Annual Convention of the State Bar Association, 29 N.D. L. Rav. 377, 429
(1953) [hereinafter 1953 Annual Convention].
308. Id. at 429-30.
309. Report of 1954 Annual Convention of the State Bar Association, 30 N.D. L. Rav. 333, 407
(1954) [hereinafter 1954 Annual Convention].
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[They] no longer include reference to the briefs and publica-
tion is necessarily delayed many months after the published
opinions are available in the reporter system .... Vol. 78 will
cost approximately $7,500. Under the circumstances this
expense in the opinion of the Committee is not justified.310
The 1955 legislature proposed to amend Sec. 93 of the 1889 N.D.
Constitution to read: "The decisions of the supreme court shall be
published or recorded in the manner and form prescribed by the legisla-
tive assembly." 311 The people rejected that amendment at the 1956
primary election in one of those occasional cascades of rejections of
ballot measures. 312
Still, the Court had actually suspended publication of the North
Dakota Reports after September 30, 1953,313 but the Court did not get
around to saying so publicly or to designating the popular North West-
ern Reporter, published by West Publishing Co., as the official reporter
until December 19, 1980, when the Court did so both prospectively and
retroactively. 314 By 1980, of course, a 1976 amendment of the judicial
article had wholly eliminated any constitutional duty to publish its
opinions. 315
0. PROLOGUES TO PROGRESS
Those few organic changes of significance in the first half of this
century, (increasing the size of the Court, extending the length of elected
terms on the Court, and limiting its constitutional powers), plus creation
of the Judicial Council, were prologues to the extensive modernization of
the Court and judicial system that took place in the last half of this
century.
III. MODERNIZING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
After drifting through much of this century with few real changes,
the North Dakota Supreme Court began modernizing the state's judicial
system shortly after mid-century, but it went slowly even then. Modern-
ization came largely with two parallel and progressive developments:
Procedural rules were reformed by the Court, rather than by the legisla-
310. Id.
311. 1955 N.D. Laws ch. 362, at 643.
312, 1957 N.D. Laws, at 783.
313. The last decision reported in the North Dakota Reporter was Gust v. Wilson, 79 N.D. 865
(1953), which was decided September 30, 1953.
314. See Order Designating Official Report (N.D. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 1980) (on file with North
Dakota Supreme Court) (retroactive to Sept. 30, 1953).
315. See N.D. CONST. art IV, 93, repealed by 1977 N.D. Laws Ch. 599, at 1378-80.
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ture, and the judicial system became unified with a single-level trial court
statewide and governed by the Supreme Court headed by an elected
administrative Chief Justice.
A. REFORMATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES
1. 1868: Origins of Civil Rules
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Code of Civil Procedure,
sometimes called the Practice Code and codified in the North Dakota
Revised Code of 1943, had long whiskers. These procedural statutes
went back to one of the Field codes actually adopted in New York state
in 1848,316 through the Dakota Territorial legislature's adoption of the
Field code of civil procedure in 1868.317 It carried over to our state
because the transition schedule for the 1889 N.D. Constitution directed:
"All laws now in force ... not repugnant to this Constitution . . . remain
in force until they expire by their own limitations or be altered or
repealed." 3 18
Much of the territorial practice code remained in force and survived
later state statutory revisions, including major ones in 1895, 1913, and
1943. It was still the current civil procedure after the North Dakota
Revised Code of 1943 was completed. 319 By the middle of the twentieth
century, most of the practice procedure in use in this state was over a
century old.
2. 1926: Reform Desirable
Procedural reform by the Court was urged by the State Bar Associa-
tion as early as 1926. That year, a report of a State Bar Association of
North Dakota committee on "work . . . during the last three years"
quoted from a national article about rule-making to advance one impor-
tant reason for creating a judicial council:
To be required to run to the Legislature, however, for every
needed change, so as to conform rules and methods to needs,
would be not only dil[a]tory, confusing, and uncertain of
results, but would be confession that the profession, which
above all others, is the expert in this field is incompetent to take
316. See Bonde v. Stem, 14 N.W.2d 249, 251-52 (N.D. 1944); Hon. James Morris, Some
Historical Origins of Statutory Law and Judicial Decisions in North Dakota, in ESSAYS IN LEOAL HISTORY
iN HONOR OF FELix FRANKFuRTER 101, 103 (1966).
317. See id.
318. N.D. CONST. sched., § 2 (repealed 1978).
319. See N.D. REv. CODE titles 27-32 (1943).
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charge of the situation, as well as conceding to the Legislature
part of the functions of the Judicial Department.320
3. 1941: Reform Authorized
The Supreme Court, though, seemed deterred from making its own
rules by the constitutional restraint on the Court's control over other
courts that was delegated only "under such regulations and limitations
as may be prescribed by law." 32 1
The 1919 legislature authorized the Supreme Court to make rules
of pleading, practice and procedure. 322 But the Court only sparingly
used the power. Before 1957, those procedural rules that the Court
published in the North Dakota Reports merely supplemented statutory
procedures for appeals. 323 Eventually, though, the 1941 legislature
expressly authorized the Court to alter or amend procedural statutes and
established a process to publish public notice and to hold a hearing on
any proposed "new rule." 324
The Court was in no hurry to change procedures. It did not move
on procedural reform until years after mid-century. One scholar later
tried to explain this disinclination:
Explanations for this reluctance to move are not difficult to
suggest. For one thing, in the hands of the Court the Field
Code of Civil Procedure ha[d] served this state extremely well,
and a sense of tradition and stability ha[d] come to surround it.
Most of the problems connected with it ha[d] been passed
upon by the Court and the judges of the state [were] all thor-
oughly familiar with its principles. It is also possible that the
members of the Court felt they were being asked to undertake
an essentially legislative task; a majority of the justices felt that
320. Report of Annual Meeting of the State Bar Association of North Dakota on September 9-10,
1926, 3 N.D. B. BRS. 133-34 (1926). It is noteworthy that A.G. Burr chaired and reported for the
committee. See id. at 134. On December 1, 1926, Alexander G. Burr, a district judge since 1908, was
appointed to the Supreme Court by Governor Sorlie to succeed Justice Sveinbjorn Johnson who
resigned to become legal counsel and professor of law for the University of Illinois. See SKETCH,
supra note 2, at 43, 45.
321. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 86 (repealed 1976). This language is verbatim from the model
constitution suggested for the 1889 Constitutional Convention by Professor Thayer. According to the
annotations with Peddrick's Model Draft #2, art. XIII, § 8, it came from "Ark., Colo., Mon., VI, 2."
See Meschke & Spears, supra note 54, at 415, 454-60, 486-87. Much of what Prof. Thayer
recommended for the judicial article seems to have been drawn from the constitution prepared for
Montana's statehood. See Meschke & Spears, supra note 54, at 380.
322. See 1919 N.D. Laws ch. 167, § 6, at 284 (codified as amended at N.D. CENr. CODE
§ 27-02-08 (1998)).
323. See N.D. vols. 3, 6, 10, 23, 29, 41, 76.
324. See 1941 N.D. Laws ch. 238, at 389-91 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-02-09 (1998)).
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way, it will be remembered, when the Legislative Assembly
placed the Committee on Code Revision under their jurisdic-
tion .... [I]t is not at all surprising that a Court with a fine
tradition of procedural effectiveness should feel no sense of
urgency when asked to depart from a settled path.3 25
But the Court did eventually veer from the "settled path" of the past
towards modernity.
In 1953, the North Dakota Senate Judiciary Committee sponsored
an amendment of the 1941 rule-making statute to make a few minor
modifications in the process and to shift from a generally published
notice to one mailed to all judges and lawyers with "a copy of the
proposed new rule." 3 2 6 That modest move opened the way for
modernizing civil practice.
4. 1953: Revision Begins
During 1953, the Judicial Council authorized a committee of Judge
Eugene A. Burdick of Williston, practitioner Norman Tenneson of
Fargo, and practitioner Frank F. Jestrab of Williston to prepare proposed
rules of civil procedure modeled on the existing Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 327 The 1953 annual meeting of the State Bar Association
authorized appointment of a like committee to similarly study use of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 328 State Bar Association President
Vernon Johnson of Wahpeton appointed a nine-member committee,
chaired by practitioner Roy A. Ilvedson of Minot, consisting of seven
practitioners, Judge Eugene Burdick, and Justice James Morris.329
The two committees began coordinating their work in January
1954.330 On May 10, k9 54 , the Judicial Council approved a committee
recommendation that a draft be made with a joint committee from the
State Bar Association. 331 The Chief Justice appointed five members of
the proposed Joint Committee: Judge Eugene A. Burdick; Judge A.J.
Gronna of Minot; Frank F. Jestrab; Norman Tenneson; and Law School
Dean O.H. Thormodsgard. 332
325. Charles Liebert Crum, The Proposed North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 N.D. L.
REV. 88, 91-92 (1956).
326. 1953 N.D. Laws ch. 201, § 1, at 322-23 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-02-11, repealed
by 1981 N.D. Laws ch. 317, § 1, at 855).
327. See 1954 Annual Convention, supra note 309, at 345.
328. See 1953 Annual Convention, supra note 307, at 395-96.
329. See 1954 Annual Convention, supra note 309, at 345, 348.
330. See 1954 Annual Convention, supra note 309, at 345.
331. See 1954 Annual Convention, supra note 309, at 346-48.
332. See 1954 Annual Convention, supra note 309, at 348.
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At the 1954 annual meeting of the State Bar Association, chair
Ilvedson, speaking for "The Rules of Civil Procedure Committee,"
recommended the Bar join in forming the Joint Committee to complete
the draft of new rules and submit it to the Supreme Court for hearing
and adoption. 333 Ilvedson reported the recommendation had "been
approved by all members of the committee," except that "Hon. James
Morris is not sure it should be adopted by the [Court] [or] ruled on by
the legislature." 334 During discussion, Ilvedson clarified by reading
Justice Morris's letter explaining, "whether it is advisable to proceed
through the Supreme Court or through the Legislature has not been
definitely determined." 335 Bar president Johnson ruled, "it is a proper
matter for consideration whether we would rather have the Supreme
Court in its rule making power adopt the rules or whether we would
submit it to the legislat[ure]." E.T. Conmy of Fargo urged: "I think
we went to a lot of trouble to get power in the Supreme Court and as far
as I'm concerned the Supreme Court is by far a better body to pass on
rules than the legislature. It is the most competent body to do it. . .*"336
A future justice, Alvin C. Strutz of Bismarck, echoed Conmy's senti-
ments, no one advocated going through the legislature, and the recom-
mendations of the Bar's Committee were adopted.337
Besides the five members of the Joint Rules Committee appointed
by the Chief Justice from the Judicial Council, the new Bar president,
John Zuger, appointed six members: E.T. Conmy of Fargo; Senator
Carroll E. Day of Grand Forks; Senator Clyde Duffy of Devils Lake;
Roy A. Ilvedson of Minot; H.A. Mackoff of Dickinson; and Herbert G.
Nilles of Fargo.338 Frank F. Jestrab became chair of the Joint Committee
on Rules of Civil Procedure. 339 This committee was clearly the earliest
predecessor of the current Joint Procedure Committee.
The presence of State Senator Carroll E. Day on the committee may
have recognized his prior legislative role as a catalyst for reforming the
rules. He had been chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee that
sponsored the 1953 amendment of the statutory process for adopting
new rules to require a copy of any proposed rule to be noticed to each
judge and lawyer.340 A distinguished practicing lawyer, 341 Senator Day
333. See 1954 Annual Convention, supra note 309, at 347-48.
334. 1954 Annual Convention, supra note 309, at 348.
335. 1954 Annual Convention, supra note 309, at 349.
336. 1954 Annual Convention, supra note 309, at 349.
337. See 1954 Annual Convention, supra note 309, at 349.
338. North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Procedure in the District Courts, at xiii
(West 1957) [hereinafter Hardcover 1957 Rules].
339. See id.
340. See STATE OF NoRTH DAKOrA, SENAT AND HOUSE Rum Am CoMMrrras, at 23-S.R. (1953).
341. Senator Day had been a lecturer at the Law School on practice and procedure from 1936 to
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was killed in an airplane crash on March 3, 1956, before fruition of his
efforts. 342
Judge Burdick and Frank Jestrab, both located in Williston, did most
of the preliminary drafting. 343 Judge Burdick was not only the principal
draftsman of the 1957 Civil Rules but also, as we will see, he later became
the chief draftsman of many other new rules and revisions.
5. 1957: New Civil Rules
The Joint Committee submitted its draft to the Court on December
15, 1954.344 In an addendum to the petition, Senator Clyde Duffy said
he signed it "because [he] believe[d] an excellent job ha[d] been done
of integrating the federal rules into North Dakota law and practice," but
he was "not prepared to recommend the substitution of the federal rules
for the rules heretofore prevailing in this state." 345 Chair Jestrab was
hopeful "that the court [would] move promptly," since "[i]t would be
helpful to the profession .. *"346
The proposed rules were noticed to judges and lawyers.347 The
Court held the hearing on June 1-2, 1955,348 where retired Justice
William Nuessle (1923-1950)349 vigorously resisted the new rules. 350
Alvin C. Strutz, who was later appointed to the Court, reversed his
support for new rules voiced at the 1954 annual meeting of the Bar, and
wrote to oppose them:
If these proposed rules are adopted, then all of the decisions
which we have in North Dakota touching upon the Statutes or
rules of our Courts, are of no further benefit to us and we must
start all over again interpreting the new rules. We do not
believe that conditions require such a sweeping change .... 351
1948, while practicing in Grand Forks. See Crum, supra note 79, at 20, 23, 33 (1959).
342. See Bench and Bar, 32 N.D. L. REV. 281, 286-87 (1956).
343. Interview with retired Judge Burdick (Summer 1999).
344. See Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at xiii.
345. See Addendum to Petition to Amend Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure (on file with the
office of the clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court, File 7514).
346. See Justice Morris's copy of letter from Frank F. Jestrab to Roland Heringer,
Vice-President, North Dakota Bar Association (Dec. 30, 1954) (copy of letter on file with the office
of the clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court, File 7514).
347. See Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at xv. West Publishing Company printed 800
pamphlet copies of the proposal "as a public service" for use in notifying judges and lawyers. Letter
from West Publishing Company to J.H. Newton, Clerk, North Dakota Supreme Court (Apr. 1, 1955)
(on file with the office of the clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court, File 7514).
348. See Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at xviii.
349. See SKETch, supra note 2, at 42.
350. Interview with retired Judge Burdick (Summer 1999).
351. Letter from Alvin C. Strutz to Hon. Thomas J. Burke, Chief Justice, North Dakota Supreme
Court (May 18, 1955) (on file with the office of the clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court, File
7514).
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Several other written objections, including one by a district judge, argued
the statutes authorizing the Court to make rules and to supersede incon-
sistent statutes were "an unconstitutional and improper delegation of
legislative power to the Supreme Court. -*"352
On June 18, 1955, the Joint Committee, "[p]ursuant to leave
granted," filed a supplemental petition suggesting changes to a number
of the proposed rules, evidently responding to questions and suggestions
at the hearing. 353 Late in 1955, Chief Justice Thomas Burke still as-
sumed "[i]t [was] going to take considerable time for the Court to go
over these rules." 354 It did.
Two years later, despite the opposition from past and future justices,
the Court unanimously adopted the new rules on April 25, 1957, effec-
tive July 1, 1957.355 The Court "made such amendments and changes
therein as in the judgment of the Court are desirable to accomplish
the[ir] purposes .. *"356 By then, the statutory rotation system had
replaced Chief Justice Burke with Chief Justice G. Grimson, 357 who
demonstrated leadership.
North Dakota thus became the thirteenth state to follow the federal
pattern, 358 in the vanguard of the long procession of states that followed
suit. After being frozen in place for nearly a century, the Court's glacial
pace of modernization began to move with this watershed event.
6. Connections and Contrasts
The new rules were more compact than the existing statutory
procedure. They contained seventy-nine separate rules but superceded
183 statutes, "thereby eliminating a very considerable amount of excess
wordage as well as simplifying much statutory language." 359 While the
1957 Civil Rules embraced simplification, a cynic might suggest that
352. Win. R. Reichert & W.F. Reichert, Objections to Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure (on file
with the office of the clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court, File 7514).
353. Petition to Amend Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure (June 17, 1955) (on file with the office
of the clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court, File 7514).
354. Letter from J.H. Newton, Clerk, North Dakota Supreme Court on November 23, 1955, to the
senior writer of this article when he was a brash young associate in a Minot law firm. Mr. Newton's
letter responded to a telephone inquiry about status of the proposed rules. Mr. Newton's letter
elaborated: "Judge Burke... states that at the present time no time has been set for final consideration
of these rules. A large list of accumulated cases awaits decision of the Court and each month brings
additional matters for the Court's consideration."
355. See Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at xviii.
356. See Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at xviii.
357. Besides Chief Justice Grimson, the members of that Court were Justices Thomas Burke,
Nels Johnson, James Morris, and P.O. Sathre. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 8.
358. See Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at vii.
359. Crum, supra note 325, at 93.
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purpose was not always respected in the outpouring of rules from the
Court that followed later.
How much did this turning point alter the practice landscape?
The 1957 Civil Rules were the existing Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure "adapted, insofar as practicable, to state practice." 360 They
marked "the first comprehensive change in civil procedure in North
Dakota since the adoption of the Field Code by the Territorial
Legislature in May of 1862."361 They were designed to be "a modern,
integrated, cohesive body of procedure," "there [was] much that [was]
new," but "much of the old remain[ed]." 362
The "old" included parts of the federal rules previously imported
into North Dakota statutes after the federal rules had appeared in 1938.
For example, the pretrial-conference device had come into the state
Code, "acting on the recommendation of a committee under the leader-
ship of Mr. Justice Grimson."363 Also, because the federal rules "bene-
fitted substantially from Field Code principles in their original drafting,"
the new rules did "not represent a departure from the procedural
heritage of this state so much as an enrichment of it."364
Yet, the 1957 Civil Rules contained much that was in fact new here,
even if commonplace in today's practice.
Third-party practice, broader joinder of claims and parties,
deposition and discovery, summary judgment, and the demand
for jury trials [were] among the new. Demurrers [had] been
abolished, artificial restriction on joinder [had] been eliminated
and motion practice [had] been made more elastic and func-
tional. None of these things [were] experimental. They [had]
been tested and approved by a productive experience in the
Federal Courts and the state courts which [had] adopted the
Federal Rules. 365
The "new" material thus made available more modern and useful
procedures.
The historical significance of adoption of the 1957 Civil Rules,
however, lies more in how it was done, by the Court, than in the scope of
the changes.
360. See Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at vii.
361. Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at vii. In the foreword, joint committee chairman
Jestrab was a little off on his Dakota Territorial legislative date; it was 1868. See Bonde v. Stem, 14
N.W.2d 249, 251 (N.D. 1944); Morris. supra note 316.
362. Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at vii.
363. Crunm, supra note 325, at 92. Ten other sections of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943
had incorporated items from the federal rules. See Crum, supra note 325, at 92 n.16.
364. Crum, supra note 325, at 93.
365. Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at vii.
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7. Revision of Rules Continues
Having implemented its own comprehensive practice rules for the
first time, the Court seemed poised to make reformation of rules the
ongoing process it ought to be. But it took yet another decade for the
next stage to get going.
At a Judicial Council meeting in June 1967, Chief Justice Obert C.
Teigen suggested a committee be created jointly with the State Bar
Association to develop new rules of criminal procedure. 366 The Council
set up the committee. That study and others were undertaken, sometimes
by separate committees for different sets of rules.
Continuing the course of the Joint Committee for the 1957 Civil
Rules, the 1967 committee for criminal rules, first chaired by then Justice
Erickstad, eventually evolved into a "Special Procedure Committee"
(1976), and then a "Joint Procedure Committee of the Judicial Council
and State Bar Association" (1977). Finally, it became the "Joint
Procedure Committee" (1980) known today. 367
Judge Burdick was on the committee for criminal rules, too, and he
continued on all the successive joint committees until retiring from the
Joint Procedure Committee in 1991.368 Besides the 1957 Civil Rules,
Judge Burdick was the principal draftsman of the first North Dakota
Rules of Court (1962-63), the first pattern jury instructions (1964-66),
and the revised pattern jury instructions (1984-86).369 His careful
craftsmanship remains visible in many of our current rules and in the
comments published with them.
If Judge Burdick became the master draftsman of rules and revi-
sions, Justice Erickstad became the master navigator of modernization
for the courts. As soon as Justice Erickstad became the Chief Justice in
mid-1973, he urgently championed comprehensive written rules for
governing the whole of the judicial system.
From that point on, the Court's rule-making thrived. The Court
adopted and published procedural rules for criminal practice (1973),
evidence (1977), appellate practice (1979), and rules of court (1981);
366. See Judicial Council Minutes 124 (June 22, 1967) (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court
Administrator's Office).
367. See Records of Joint Procedure Committee (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court Law
Library).
368. See Resume of Hon. Eugene A. Burdick, available at <home I.gte.netleburdick/biography.
htm>.
369. See id. Judge Burdick also became one of North Dakota's Commissioners for Uniform
State Laws in 1959, and attained leadership positions in that national organization: Chair of the
executive committee (1969-71), president (1971-73), and then chair of its committee on style for over
25 years since 1974. See id.
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also rules of conduct for judges and lawyers, including a code of judicial
ethics (1977), rules for judicial discipline (1977), standards for continu-
ing professional education of lawyers (1977), and standards for lawyers'
disciplinary sanctions (1988); as well as rules of professional responsibil-
ity for lawyers (1977), procedures for lawyer discipline and disability
(1977), disciplinary board procedures (1977), and procedures for
admission to law practice (1980).370 Once published, the rules were
frequently revised on recommendations from the continuing Joint
Procedure Committee chaired by Justices Robert Vogel from 1973 to
1975; Paul M. Sand from 1975 to 1984; H.F. Gierke III from 1985 to
1991; Beryl J. Levine from 1992 to 1996; and Dale Sandstrom from
1996 to present. 371 But the process was constantly encouraged by Chief
Justice Erickstad.
With Chief Justice Erickstad's guidance, the Court also began the
use of written Administrative Orders (O.A.s) and Administrative Rules
(A.R.s). In October 1974, the Court's first Administrative Order desig-
nated, for each of the six judicial districts, a presiding district judge who
had responsibility for assigning cases to, and requiring reports from, all
other judges within that district.372 The seven presiding judges later
began meeting as a Council of Presiding Judges, with one named by the
Chief Justice as a Chief Presiding Judge, to set policies for the trial
courts. 373 In 1992, the Administrative Rules were amended to authorize
the trial judges to elect their own presiding judge in each district, and
later the Chief Justice became the presiding officer of the Council of
Presiding Judges. 374
The Joint Procedure Committee continues to study rules and
regularly recommends revisions that the Supreme Court usually adopts,
sometimes with changes the Court chooses to make. By continuing this
process of regular revision of existing rules, the Supreme Court keeps
the system up to date.
370. See NORTH DAKOTA RuLEs OF COURT (West 1981 & later editions).
371. See Joint Procedure Committee Minutes (Dec. 19, 1973; Apr. 28, 1975; Mar. 28-29, 1985;
Oct. 29-30, 1992; Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court Law Library).
372. See Lois Katherine Erickstad, Administration of the North Dakota Judicial System 16 (June
1983) (unpublished Public Administration graduate thesis, University of North Dakota) (citing Admin.
Order No. 1 (1974)).
373. See N.D. Sup. CT. ADMIN. R. 2 (approved September 7, 1976). In 1992, North Dakota
Supreme Court Administrative Rule 2 was amended to allow trial judges to elect the presiding judge
for their district, instead of an appointment by the Chief Justice. See also N.D. SuP. CT. ADMIN. R. 22
(governing the Council of Presiding Judges).
374. See N.D. Sup. CT. ADMIN. R. 22(2)(c) (effective September 13, 1995).
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8. Publishing Rules
The eruption of rules during the 1970s brought from the Court a
separate loose-leaf notebook for each set to every practitioner's desk.
This accumulation provoked some grumbling from practitioners who
preferred the familiar and simpler past to a proliferation of new rules.
Before long, West Publishing Company solved the accumulation
difficulty by publishing an annual pamphlet, beginning in 1981, that
collected all the administrative and procedural rules in a single
reference. 375 West continues to publish an annual rulebook and, in
1990, Michie Publishing Co., now Lexis Law Publishing, publisher of the
North Dakota Century Code, began to publish an annual Code supple-
ment containing the rules and annotations to related cases. 376 Thus,
every practicing lawyer can (and should) have a rulebook at his or her
fingertips to consult conveniently. 377
9. Appellate "Trial Anew" Repealed
One of the more remarkable reforms was repeal of the statutory
procedure for a "trial anew" in appeals from non-jury cases to the
Supreme Court. Curiously, even after the Court's power to supersede
procedural statutes had been enacted in 1941378 and exercised effective-
ly in 1957, this important reform came by legislative action, not by
Supreme Court action.
The "trial anew" review, sometimes called "trial de novo," did not
come directly from the Field code as had most of our civil procedures.
The concept originated in ancient Roman law. 379 "In the hearing in the
higher court new facts and new proofs could be adduced and new points
and objections urged without limit. There was a complete rehearing of
the cause de novo." 380 In the middle ages, the ecclesiastical courts of
Europe borrowed this Roman scope of appellate review. 381 France and
other civil law countries inherited the procedure this way. 382 De novo
review reached the English ecclesiastical courts, too, where American
equity practice came from.383
375. See NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF COURT (West 1981 & later editions).
376. See Court Rules, N.D. CENT. CODE (1991 & later editions).
377. Also, all rules are accessible without cost through the North Dakota Supreme Court's web
site at <http://www.court.state.nd.us>.
378. 1941 N.D. Laws ch. 238, at 389-91.
379. See RoscoE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE iN CivEL CASES 6-9 (1941).
380. Id at 8.
381. See id. at 9-11.
382. See id. at 11-14.
383. See id. at 67-71.
An appeal is a process of civil law origin. In England it was in a great measure confined
to equity, ecclesiastical, and admiralty jurisdictions, where trial by jury was unknown.
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As appellate review developed in this country during the nineteenth
century, since "an appeal in equity was a hearing of the case de novo, a
party was not precluded from taking a ground in the higher court which
he had not suggested below." 38 4 An equitable decree "was open to
review on the facts, no less than on the law." 38 5
"Trial anew" came to North Dakota after statehood, but early in its
history, when lawyer Seth Newman sponsored Chapter 82 of the 1893
North Dakota Laws in his single session as a legislator. Newman had
been born, studied law, and admitted to practice in 1860 in the state of
New York. 386 He practiced for a time in Iowa before coming to Fargo,
North Dakota in 1879.387 He was politically active here, served a term as
mayor of Fargo, a term as Fargo City Attorney, and in the 1893
legislature. 388
Newman was highly regarded by his peers, unanimously elected as
the first president of the State Bar Association in 1899, and twice
re-elected for one year terms. 389 Indeed, the original organizational
meeting of the Bar Association of North Dakota grew out of "an infor-
mal meeting of the members of the bar" at the Grand Forks courthouse,
who assembled "at the request of Honorable Seth Newman, representing
the... Fargo Bar Association .... " 390 The Bar Association's memorial
characterized him as "the Nestor of the legal profession of North
Dakota," 391 an admiring comparison to the "wisest and oldest of the
Greeks in the Trojan War." 392 Newman surely was among North
Dakota's "oldest and wisest" lawyers of his time.
Newman's biography in the early records of the State Bar Associa-
tion gave him credit for the statute on "trial anew" review:
Mr. Newman was the author of the law changing the method of
trial of equity causes, . . . under which equity causes are
reviewed on appeal on the merits and final judgment rendered
instead of being reviewed on error and new trial granted.393
As originally used, it removed the entire cause to the superior court, subjecting both law
and fact to retrial.
Christianson v. Farmers' Warehouse Ass'n, 5 N.D. 438, 445, 67 N.W. 300, 302 (1896).
384. PouND, supra note 379, at 298.
385. PouND, supra note 379, at 300.
386. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NORTH DAKOTA BAR ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEARS 1904-1905 AND
1905-1906, at 90-91 (W.H. Thomas compiler & ed., 1907) [hereinafter PRocEEDINoS 1904-1906].
387. See id.
388. See id. at 91.
389. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NORTH DAKOTA BAR ASSOCIATION FROM SEPTEMBER 19, 1899, TO
SEPTEMBER 21, 1904, at 7, 9 (W.H. Thomas compiler & ed., 1905) [hereinafter PROcEEDINGs
1899-1904].
390. See id at 11.
391. PROCEEDINoS 1904-1906, supra note 386, at 89.
392. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 960 (1967).
393. PROCEmnGS 1899-1904, supra note 389, at 9.
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The 1893 legislative enactment required "trial anew" review by the
Supreme Court in virtually all non-jury civil cases. 394
As early as 1916, this extensive review had been criticized by one
North Dakota historian as "inconsistent and conflict[ing] with . . .
appel[l]ate jurisdiction" because it converted the Supreme Court into "a
trial court" compelled to "wade through a voluminous record, contain-
ing usually a tangled mass of relevant and irrelevant testimony which the
court below was powerless to exclude." 395 Historian Lounsberry de-
clared this "innovation" "should be relegated to the 'scrap heap' and
[all] cases be reviewed the same . .. " 396 "Trial anew" appellate review
was an archaic and clumsy device.
Going into the twentieth century, notions of appellate review began
changing.
[T]he rules with respect to review of findings of fact by juries,
the pressure of work in appellate courts in the last half of the
nineteenth century, and a feeling that the primary work of
those courts was to find and declare the law, led many [other
state] courts to [hold] that a reviewing court would give a
finding of fact by a judge or chancellor the force of a [jury]
verdict.397
Different state courts variously modified this form of review, but Dean
Pound tells us: "More generally it was [held] that [a] finding would not
be disturbed unless it was clearly wrong." 398 By 1941, there had "been
a steady progress [the last forty years] to get away from consequences of
regarding a proceeding for review as a new proceeding .... "399
Dean Pound gave "trial anew" the most damning criticism: "To
pile one oral trial or hearing upon another is expensive and wasteful....
New trials ought to be avoided whenever the materials of assured
application of law to facts fully and fairly ascertained have been
provided at the first trial."400
But "trial anew" review was not modified when the Court adopted
the 1957 Civil Rules from the federal pattern even though Federal Rule
52(a) stated the modem standard for review: "Findings of fact shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
394. See 1893 N.D. Laws ch. 82, at 198-99; see also N.D. REV. CODE § 28-2732 (1943).
395. LOUNSBERRY, supra note 1, at 449.
396. LouNsBERY, supra note 1. at 449.
397. PouND, supra note 379, at 300.
398. PouND, supra note 379, at 301.
399. PouND, supra note 379, at 375.
400. PouND, supra note 379, at 5.
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witnesses." 401 In 1954, the Joint Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure
for North Dakota proposed the "clearly erroneous" standard in its
recommended Rule 52(a), but did not put section 28-2732 of the 1943
North Dakota Revised Code (the Newman Law), into the proposed
appendix of statutes superseded. 402 However, in their supplementary
petition shortly after the hearing, the Joint Committee proposed an ap-
pendix of Special Statutory Proceedings to be excepted from the rules
under Rule 81, "insofar as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the
procedure and practice provided by these rules." 403 That proposed
appendix excepted section "28-2732 ...Trial De Novo in Supreme
Court." 404 Still, the Committee did not suggest changing the recom-
mended Rule 52(a) language that directed "[flindings of fact shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous." 405
In adopting the proposed Civil Rules in 1957, the Court evidently
saw the ambiguity and remodeled Rule 52(a). The Court deleted the
"clearly erroneous" standard, as well as the instruction to consider "the
special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses who appeared personally before it."406 The Court then did not
supersede the "trial anew" statute, but rather listed it in Table A as an
excepted Special Statutory Proceeding under Rule 81(a). 407 The ancient
"trial anew" review thus survived the 1957 movement to modernize
rules of practice.
Former Justice William S. Murray (1966), ruminating on his short
career on the Court,408 despaired of changing "trial anew" review:
"This 'Newman Law' places the North Dakota Supreme Court, in a
sense, in the role of a jury . . . . It is unlikely that it will ever be
repealed." 409
In 1970, Justice Erickstad urged repeal of the "trial de novo"
statute as one way to overcome congestion and delay, recognizing that
"delay in the rendering of decisions has perhaps been the greatest
401. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a).
402. See Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure For the District Courts of North Dakota (on file with
the office of the clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court, File 7514).
403. See Petition to Amend Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure (June 17, 1955) (on file with the
office of the clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court, File 7514).
404. Id
405. Id.
406. See Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at 68.
407. See Hardcover 1957 Rules, supra note 338, at 107.
408. Justice Murray served only nine months when he was defeated for election to the position
after being appointed by Governor William Guy to replace Justice Thomas Burke, who died in office
on March 20, 1966. See SKErcH, supra note 2, at 56, 49. Justice William Paulson (1966-1983) was
elected to the position that Justice Murray left. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 57.
409. Hon. William S. Murray, Through the Looking Glass or How to Be a Judge in Ten Easy
Lessons, 43 N.D. L. REv. 423,425 (1967).
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criticism .. directed at the supreme court .... ,"410 "[T]o try anew the
questions of fact is very time-consuming and frustrating," he
argued.4 11 Even after "trial anew" review was repealed in 1971, one
scholar advocated amending the judicial article to prevent the legislature
from ever reinstating it!412
More than a decade after the reformation of civil procedure in
1957, on April 17, 1970, the Judicial Council approved a draft bill "to
repeal the statute providing for trial de novo" and agreed to submit the
proposed bill to the legislature.4 13 Again on January 11, 1971, the
Judicial Council approved a draft bill "to repeal section 28-27-32" for
submission to the legislature. 414 Both motions were made by Judge
Burdick.
Senators Robert Chesrown of Linton, Howard Freed of Dickinson,
and Donald Holand of Fargo, all lawyers, sponsored Senate Bill 2252 to
repeal "trial anew" review and to delete a reference to it from another
section on appellate procedure.4 5 The bill was supported at the 1971
Senate hearing by district Judge Adam Gefreh of Linton ("N.Dak. is the
only state that has such a trial de novo statute"), and Justice Strutz
("justice would be done if a court appeal would be treated [like] a jury
case"), and opposed only by attorney Fred Saefke of Bismarck ("the
present law is the best protection litigants have"). 4 16 The Senate
Judiciary Committee unanimously endorsed the bill, and the North
Dakota Senate passed it without a single vote against it.417
The measure had a more difficult course in the North Dakota House
of Representatives. Again, the bill was supported by Judge Gefreh and
Justice Strutz, as well as by Judge Burdick ("loads the court
unnecessarily") and attorney Hugh McCutcheon of Minot ("Appellate
410. Hon. Ralph J. Erickstad, Thoughts on Ways of Expediting the Work of Our Supreme Court,
46 N.D. L. REv. 409 (1970).
411. See id. at 411-12.
412. Richard R. Kuhns, Revising A State Judicial Article: Issues for the North Dakota
Constitutional Convention, 48 N.D. L. REV. 219, 233 n.66 (1972):
It would ... be desirable for the constitution to eliminate the possibility for de novo
supreme court review of the entire record of a case.... Since the legislature apparently
has the power to provide for a de novo supreme court review, [under article IV, section
86 of the North Dakota Constitution], and since it has exercised this power in the past,
[under section 28-27-32 of the North Dakota Century Code] (repealed 1971), it would be
appropriate for the constitution to state explicitly that the supreme court's appellate
jurisdiction does not include de novo review. (citation omitted)
413. See Judicial Council Minutes 164 (Apr. 17, 1970) (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court
Administrator's Office).
414. See Judicial Council Minutes 173 (Jan. 11, 1971) (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court
Administrator's Office).
415. S.B. 2252, 42d Leg. (N.D. 1971).
416. Minutes of 1971 Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 3, 1971).
417. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 425 (42d Leg. 1975).
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court should not become trial court."). 418 But the measure drew serious
opposition from other lawyers: Wm. R. Pearce of Bismarck ("This is a
step backward"); Fred Saefke again; and Al Wolf of Bismarck ("May
cut down on the work of the supreme court but people of N.Dak. are
entitled to this.")419
On the motion of longtime Representative Earl Rundle, the House
Judiciary Committee voted 8 to 4 to recommend the bill be indefinitely
postponed. 420 When the Committee recommendation reached the floor
of the House, however, committee member Representative Donald Moore
moved to place S.B. 2252 on the calendar instead, and his motion
prevailed.421 On March 3, 1971, S.B. 2252 passed the House by a 60 to
35 vote. 422 "Newman's Law" was repealed, and appellate review was
finally ready for a modem procedural standard.423
In August 1971, the Court amended NDRCivP 52(a) to incorporate
the "clearly erroneous" standard for reviewing a trial court's findings
of fact. 424 It is well accepted today that factual findings by an appellate
court from a complex written record are generally less reliable than ones
made by a trial judge from direct observations of all participants at the
trial while the record was developed, unless the findings are clearly
erroneous .425
Even though the "trial anew" concept is largely gone from our
appellate practice, a few remnants remain in our Code. 426 Still, the
replacement of trial-de-novo review with the modem standard more
deferential to the fact-finding efforts of the trial court was an important
step in modernizing our judicial system in the last third of this century.
10. Favored Appellate Finality Forgotten?
In the process of repealing "trial anew" review, however, another
feature of Newman's law was left out of the discussions, apparently
418. Minutes of House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 1, 1971).
419. Id.
420. See id
421. See STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HousE 1073 (42d Leg. 1975).
422. See id. at 1101-02.
423. See 1971 N.D. Laws ch. 311, § 2, at 720, repealing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-27-32.
424. Letter from Gerhard Raedeke, Staff Attorney, Joint Procedure Committee, to Herbert L.
Meschke (Mar. 24, 1999) (on file with author) (citing minutes of a March 29-30, 1979 committee
meeting that recommended deletion of this sentence from the Explanatory Note: "In 1971, the rule
was amended by the addition of the scope of review by the Supreme Court of findings of fact of a trial
court, in compliance with the federal rule.").
425. "In all systems the history of appellate procedure shows the importance of separating
ascertainment of the facts, as a process, from ascertainment of the applicable law and application of
the ascertained law to the facts." POUND, supra note 379, at 4.
426. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56(1) (1991) (on review of juvenile court decisions);
Anderson v. K.S., 500 N.W.2d 603, 605 (N.D. 1993).
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inadvertently, and has been nearly overlooked. Newman's Law also
directed the reviewing Court, in appeals from "all actions tried by the
district court without a jury," to "render final judgment therein, accord-
ing to the justice of the case." 427 In early applications of Newman's law,
the N.D. Supreme Court valued this feature.
The statute ... requires us to render final judgment, and thus,
by its mandate, forever terminate the particular litigation....
[T]o the legislative mind it doubtless suggested a means of
terminating litigation in a manner that should at once possess
the strongest probability of absolute justice with the least
expenditure of time and money. It avoids the delay and
expense of a second trial, and the risk of further errors that
might necessitate a second appeal. If these legislative objects
can really be accomplished, the value and propriety of the
statute cannot be doubted.428
Dean Pound, in his classic 1941 work for the National Conference
of Judicial Councils, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, reviewed
twentieth-century improvements and reported "there ha[d] been a
steady progress toward winding up controversies in one proceeding and
with a minimum of retrial and successive appeal." 429 In his concluding
chapter, "Toward an Effective System of Review," Dean Pound recom-
mended "courts of review should be empowered and required to make a
complete final disposition of the whole proceeding brought before
them." 430
The North Dakota Supreme Court has been hesitant and uncertain
in using the principle favoring appellate finality where possible.4 31 The
427. 1893 N.D. Laws, ch. 82, at 198-99; N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-27-32 (1970), repealed by 1971
N.D. Laws, ch. 311, at 720.
428. Christianson v. Farmers' Warehouse Ass'n, 5 N.D. 438, 445, 67 N.W. 300, 302 (1896)
(reversing the trial court's decision and remanding for entry of a final judgment of foreclosure for the
appellants); see also Taylor v. Taylor, 5 N.D. 58, 65, 63 N.W. 893, 895 (1895) (reversing a trial
court's decision denying a divorce for condonation and remanding with thorough-going directions for
entry of final judgment to give the appellant-spouse custody of two children, grant her title to specified
property, and order the respondent-spouse to pay specified child support).
429. PouND, supra note 379, at 373.
430. PouND, supra note 379, at 387. "[Alppeal upon appeal ought not to be allowed. One trial
and one appeal in one case should be regarded as the normal course of litigation." PouND, supra note
379, at 392.
431. For a recent example, see Goff v. Goff, 1999 ND 95, 593 N.W.2d 768, where Justices
Kapsner and Neumann voted to reverse a trial court decision denying a custodial parent permission to
relocate to another state with the children, concluding the trial court's findings "were clearly
erroneous because they were based on an erroneous interpretation of the law" but, instead of making
a final disposition, voted to "remand for the trial court's determination on [the custodial parent's]
motion for relocation applying a proper (legal] analysis .. ..I" d. at 773. Justice Maring concurred
that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous but dissented from the remand for extensive
further proceedings. See id. She wanted to "remand with instructions the trial court enter a judgment
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Court should carefully consider the expansive language in rule 35(b) of
the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure as adopted in 1979
from a statute that originated from 1887 territorial legislation. 432
Appellate Rule 35(b) describes broadly the power of the Court on review
in civil cases.
The last sentence of rule 35(b) of North Dakota Rules of Appellate
Procedure twice emphasizes "final judgment," while the second and
third sentences of that subsection condition a remand for "some
issue ... [that] has not been tried, or if tried has not been determined by
the trial court" on whether "it is necessary or desirable to proper
disposition of the case on appeal." 433 The direction in the fourth
sentence of rule 35(b), ("In all cases the supreme court shall remit its
final judgment or decision to the court from which the appeal was taken
to be enforced accordingly . . . ."), should be read to embody and
continue the most worthwhile, but overlooked, feature of the Newman
permitting the move and establishing an appropriate visitation schedule for the two minor children and
their [other parent]," the only real loose end left to wrap up. See id. at 774. Because the fifth justice,
Justice Sandstrom, would have affirmed and dissented entirely for that reason, Chief Justice
VandeWalle, who largely agreed with Justice Maring, reluctantly concurred "in the result reached by
Justice Kapsner to reverse and remand to permit the trial court to apply the proper [legal]
analysis .... " See id. at 773, 774. The Chief Justice explained he did so because, otherwise, there
would not be the required constitutional "'concurrence of a majority of the judges."' See id. The
potential effect of rule 35(b) of North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure evidently was neither
cited to nor considered by the Court.
432. The Explanatory Note to North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure rule 35(b) says:
"Subdivision (b) is a restatement of former § 28-27-29." North Dakota Century Code section
28-27-29 originated in section 25 of an enactment of the 1887 session of Dakota Territory's
legislature. That twenty-seven section act provided "the Method of Appeals to the Supreme Court of
the Territory of Dakota." 1887 Dakota Laws ch. 20, § 25, at 61. The state's 1891 legislative assembly
adopted a very similar enactment "Regulating Appeals In Civil Actions," consisting of 29 sections.
1891 N.D. Laws ch. 120, at 304-11. It contained virtually identical wording in section 26. That
language became section 5628 of the 1895 Revised Codes of North Dakota, entitled "Power of Court.
Rehearing. What clerk transmits," and then became section 7844 of the 1913 Compiled Laws of
North Dakota. The first and fourth sentences of North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure 35(b)
are nearly verbatim from these enactments.
The 1927 legislative assembly amended this "Power of Court" section to add two sentences
authorizing the Court to remand, "without relinquishing jurisdiction of the appeal," for determination
of an issue that "has not been tried, or if tried has not been determined," if "it is necessary or desirable
to a proper disposition on appeal." 1927 N.D. Laws ch. 214, § 1, at 369-70. Those two sentences
became sentences two and three of North Dakota Century Code section 28-27-29 on "Power of
Supreme Court on Appeal," and then later became sentences two and three of North Dakota Rules of
Appellate Procedure rule 35(b).
The "necessary or desirable" standard for directing remand "without relinquishing
jurisdiction," in conjunction with the emphasis in the concluding sentence of Rule 35(b) on entering a
"final judgment" on remand, implies a strong presumption in favor of finality in an appellate
disposition whenever possible. For nearly 80 years, these provisions were so interpreted and applied
in conjunction with the direction of Newman's law to "render final judgment" in all appeals from
non-jury judgments "according to the justice of the case." That long tradition should continue to shape
today's interpretation of the "final judgment" language in North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure
rule 35(b).
433. Note that the second sentence of North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure rule 35(b)
contemplates a remand to determine a "necessary" issue would be "without relinquishing jurisdiction
of the appeal."
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law reflected in the "final judgment" language in Rule 35(b) and its
statutory predecessors.
The Court should seek to carry on that traditional appellate objec-
tive of final disposition in reviewing final judgments after a full trial in
non-jury cases. Doing so would fulfill the basic goal of all procedure
stated in Rule 1 of North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure "to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
11. The Largest Advance
Reformation of procedural rules by the Court itself was the first real
step since statehood towards modernizing the judicial system.
B. COURT UNIFICATION
The other major development in modernizing the judicial system
was trial court unification.
The characteristics of a unified system were advocated to the
legislature as early as 1975 by Chief Justice Erickstad by quoting the
American Bar Association's Standards of Judicial Administration.
Simplified here, those standards called for a judicial system with (a)
uniform jurisdiction; (b) simple jurisdictional divisions; (c) uniform
dispensation of justice through systemized rules of administration and
procedure, continuing judicial conferences and education, and consistent
policy administration; (d) clearly vested policy-making authority; and
(e) clearly established administrative authority. 434 A few years later,
praising the people's 1976 approval of the new judicial article
authorizing a unified judicial system, Chief Justice Erickstad explained:
"A unified judicial system is intended to be a single provider of court
services. A unified system is one that is accountable for quality services
delivered in an efficient and effective manner." 435 Those precepts
clearly guided Chief Justice Erickstad's enormous efforts to improve the
entire system.
1. 1961: Abolishing Justices of the Peace
Changing the structure of the trial courts actually began earlier
when the 1959 legislature abolished justices of the peace. 436 Justices of
the peace had been instituted in the 1889 Constitution, which also
434. See Chief Justice Erickstad's State of the Judiciary Address, STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 63 (44th Leg. 1975).
435. Chief Justice Erickstad's State of the Judiciary Address, S TATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL
OF THE HOUSE 94 (46th Leg. 1975).
436. See 1959 N.D. Laws ch. 268, § 1, at 437.
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empowered the legislature to abolish the positions. 437 Justices of the
peace had limited jurisdiction, were rarely law trained, and were paid
from the fees they collected, a practice the United States Supreme Court
had condemned as unconstitutional three decades before.438
Effective July 1, 1961, the legislature replaced justices of the peace
with several categories of law-trained county judges, including county
justices and county judges with increased jurisdiction. 439
2. 1967: Electing the Chief Justice
Another major step in unification was the legislature's change of
the method for selecting the Chief Justice from a regular rotation among
all the justices to an election by all the judges in the system.
The 1889 Constitution directed that the Supreme Court "judge
having the shortest term to serve, not holding his office by election or
appointment to fill a vacancy, shall be chief justice .... -440 When the
Court was expanded from three to five members by a constitutional
amendment in 1908, three judges had to be elected in 1910 for identical
six-year terms. Anticipating these three justices would have identically
short terms between 1914 and 1916, the 1909 legislature directed the
Chief then be selected by the justices from among themselves, but that
law otherwise left the rotation system in place.441
Later, all justices' terms were extended from six years to ten years
and also staggered by a 1930 constitutional amendment implemented
with the 1934 general election. 442 The rotation method of selecting the
Chief Justice worked again and remained in place.443
After an interim study on amending the judicial article, the Legisla-
tive Research Committee (LRC) recommended the 1965 legislature
amend the relevant section of the Constitution to say: "The Chief Justice
shall be selected as provided by law." 4 4 4 The LRC Report also
submitted a companion bill to authorize the Judicial Council to select the
Chief Justice because the Committee "believed that these individuals
would have better knowledge of the qualifications of the judges for this
position." 445 The membership of the Judicial Council comprised "all
437. See N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 112 (repealed 1976).
438. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 531 (1927).
439. See 1959 N.D. Laws ch. 268 §§ 2-5, at 437-39. See generally James P. White, The New
North Dakota County Justice Court, 36 N.D. L. REv. 246 (1960).
440. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 92 (repealed 1976).
441. See 1909 N.D. Laws ch. 71, at 63; LoUNSBERatY, supra note 1, at 447.
442. See 1931 N.D. Laws art. 46, at 578.
443. See N.D. REv. CODE § 27-0201 (1943).
444. 1965 REPORT OF ThE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATVE RESEARCH COMMITTEE 45.
445. See id. at 48; see also 1965 N.D. Laws ch. 225, at 435-41.
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of the active and retired supreme and district court judges; one county
judge; the attorney general; the dean of the School of Law; and five
members of the State Bar Association." 446
When the proposed 1965 amendment to the Constitution failed, 447
the next interim LRC Report recommended the 1967 legislature
authorize the Judicial Council to "appoint" the Chief Justice. The 1967
report explained why:
When the position revolves every two years, there is a lack of
experience and the possibility exists that the duties of such
office are not carried out or performed in the most skillful
manner. The Committee believes that if the position is made
more permanent a more effective administration will occur.4 8
Without explaining how that fit with the constitutional direction to
rotate the position among the justices, the 1967 legislature authorized the
judges of the supreme and district court to appoint the Chief Justice
"from the members of the supreme court . . . ."449
In October 1967, the judges selected Justice Obert C. Teigen to be
Chief Justice. 450 In 1971, the judges named Alvin C. Strutz Chief Justice
(1959-1973) in his place.451 After Chief Justice Strutz died in office in
June 1973, the judges elected Chief Justice Ralph J. Erickstad. 452 He was
regularly reelected every five years thereafter until he retired at the end
of 1992 with nearly twenty years as Chief Justice. 453
446. 1965 REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGisLA'vE RESEARcH CommrrrEE 48.
447. S. Con. Res. "F"', 1965 N.D. Laws ch. 481 at 473-74, defeated in 1966 general election,
1967 N.D. Laws, ch. 512 at 1214-15.
448. 1967 REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEONSLATIVE REsEARcH CommwrrrEa 35.
449. 1967 N.D. Laws, ch. 245, § 1, at 508 (codified as amended at N.D. Camr CODE § 27-02-01).
The law is now clearly constitutional because, after the 1976 amendment, the judicial article now
directs one of the five justices "shall be designated chief justice in the manner provided by law." N.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 2.
450. See Judicial Council Minutes 129 (Oct. 20, 1967) (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court
Law Library). Justice Teigen was appointed to the Court to succeed Justice Grimson, who resigned in
December 1958. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 52. Teigen had practiced law at Devils Lake, had been
Ramsey County State's Attorney for eight years, and had been district judge from 1954. See SKETCH,
supra note 2, at 52. After his retirement in 1974, Justice Teigen became an Administrative Law Judge
with the Social Security Administration until ill health forced his resignation from that position in
February 1978. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 52.
451. See Minutes of Joint Meeting of the Supreme and District Court Judges (Oct. 23, 1970) (on
file with North Dakota Supreme Court Administrator's Office) (showing Justice Strutz elected,
effective January 1, 1971). Justice Strutz was appointed in April 1959 to replace Justice Nels Johnson
(1954-1958), who died in office. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 51, 53.
452. See Minutes of Meeting of Supreme and District Court Judges 1 (June 20, 1973) (on file
with North Dakota Supreme Court Administrator's Office).
453. See Judicial Council Minutes 4 (Nov. 23-24, 1987) (on file with North Dakota Supreme
Court Administrator's Office); Minutes of Meeting of Supreme and District Court Judges (June 14,
1977 & Nov. 23, 1982) (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court Administrator's Office).
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The modernizing move of electing the Chief Justice was made by
the legislature, not the Court, much like procedural reform was begun.
These legislative measures set the stage for amendment of the judicial
article that implicitly approved the goal of improving the judicial system
and enabled the Supreme Court to proceed with more modernization on
its own.
3. 1972: Futile Efforts
The eventual amendment of the judicial article in the North Dakota
Constitution grew out of legislative studies on general constitutional
revision that began in the 1960s led by State Senator William R. Reichert
of Dickinson, a lawyer. 454 During 1963 and 1964, an interim LRC
committee studied ways to improve the judicial article and recommended
a proposal to submit to the people. 455 All proposed constitutional
measures, "while receiving very substantial support, were narrowly
defeated," which the 1965-1966 LRC found "heartening." 456 The
1967 legislature therefore continued to seek substantial revision of the
judicial article, but it was again rejected.4 57
The 1969 legislature submitted the question of calling a Constitu-
tional Convention "for the purpose of revising the Constitution of the
State" to a popular vote, and the people voted for a Convention. 458 As
directed by a companion 1969 act, 459 ninety-eight delegates were elected
at the 1970 general election, and they convened at Bismarck on April 6,
1971.460
The Judicial Council quickly met and, on a motion by Judge
Burdick, decided to draft a new judicial article "for the purpose of
cooperating with the Constitutional Convention ... ."461 At a later
meeting in 1971, the Judicial Council agreed to propose six points to the
Convention for the new judicial article: (1) a Court of seven justices; (2)
454. Senator Reichert chaired the Constitutional Revision subcommittees of the Legislative
Research Committee for 1963-1964 and 1965-1966. See 1965 REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMrrTEE 2; 1967 REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEISLATIVE RESEARCH
Commn-rEE 11.
455. See 1965 REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGiSLATiVE RESEARCH CommrrE 45-54.
456. 1967 REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATtVE RESEARCH COMMrrrEE 11; S. Con. Res. "P",
1965 N.D. Laws, ch. 481, at 973-74, defeated at the 1966 general election, 1967 N.D. Laws ch. 512,
at 1214-15
457. See S. Con. Res. "UU", 1967 N.D. Laws, ch. 517, at 1230-34, defeated at the 1968 primary
election, 1969 N.D. Laws ch. 585, at 1244-48.
458. See H. Con. Res. 16, 1969 N.D. Laws, ch. 595, at 1278-79; approved at the 1970 primary
election, 1971 N.D. Laws ch. 617, at 1333.
459. 1969 N.D. Laws ch. 462, at 991-95.
460. NORTH DAKOTA CONSTrITIJIONAL CONVENTION, INTERIM REPORT vi (1972).
461. See Judicial Council Minutes 177 (Apr. 16, 1971) (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court
Adminstrator's Office).
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panels of three to decide "routine" cases; (3) "strong supervisory and
disciplinary powers over lower courts" in the Supreme Court; (4)
continue nonpartisan elections; (5) place authority in the Court to
"redistrict the state"; and (6) make retirement at age seventy
mandatory.462 Later at the same meeting, the Council studied at length a
"working draft prepared by the staff of the North Dakota Constitutional
Convention for the Committee on Judicial Functions and Political
Subdivisions," and the Judicial Council recommended numerous
technical changes.4 63
The Convention's committee on "Judicial Functions and Political
Subdivisions" recommended a draft article for the "Judicial Depart-
ment" that called for a five member Supreme Court, a unified judicial
system, with power to "make rules for the government of all courts and
for the procedures applicable therein." 46 4 Including this new article, the
Constitutional Convention recommended a complete remake of the 1889
Constitution in 1972,465 but several controversial features led the people
at a special election on April 28, 1972 to roundly defeat the proposed
revision.466 Wholesale revision of the Constitution was out.
4. 1976: A New Judicial Article
Before 1972 ended, the Judicial Council began studying a proposed
new judicial article, prepared by the ubiquitous Judge Burdick, to ask the
1973 legislature to submit for a separate vote. 467 Still, it took awhile.
Nothing of much importance came out of the 1973 session. 468
Overriding Chief Justice Erickstad's plea for even more study, 469
the 1975 legislature adopted a resolution jointly sponsored by Represen-
tative William Kretchmar (a lawyer from Ashley who had also been a
Constitutional Convention delegate) that salvaged the judicial article
proposed by the Convention, modified it somewhat, and submitted it for
462. See Judicial Council Minutes 183 (Oct. 15, 1971) (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court
Adminstrator's Office).
463. See id. at 186-89.
464. NORTh DAKOTA CONSTrrtTMONAL CONVEMNON, INTERIM REPORT 67 (1972).
465. See 1973 N.D. Sess. ch. 529, at 1389-1418.
466. See id. at 1418 (stating that the provision was disapproved 64,073 to 107,643).
467. See Judicial Council Minutes 207-08 (Dec. 19, 1972) (on file with North Dakota Supreme
Court Administrator's Office).
468. See 1973 North Dakota Laws ch. 533, at 1422, House Concurrent Resolution No. 3017,
proposed an addition to the judicial article to authorize the legislature to "provide for the retirement,
discipline and removal of judges of the supreme court and district court[s]," besides use of
impeachment. The people approved this overwhelmingly at the 1974 general election. See 1975 N.D.
Laws ch. 606, at 1582. This authorization was also carried forward in the 1976 judicial article
amendment. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
469. See Erickstad, supra note 372, at 27.
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a separate vote. 470  Chief Justice Erickstad actively and publicly
promoted passage of this proposal. 471 At the 1976 primary election,
after more than a decade of repeated efforts, the people approved a new
judicial article.472
The new article vested the judicial power of the state in a unified
judicial system headed by a five-member Supreme Court with an admin-
istrative Chief Justice selected "in the manner provided by law." 473
Length of residence was eliminated from the qualifications for a seat on
the Court, 474 and the Court was given complete power over procedure
"to be followed by all the courts of this state." 4 75 Finally, the judicial
system could be renovated to fit modem expectations.
5. 1981: Unifying the Courts
The 1977 legislature, in a resolution sponsored by Senator Frank
Wenstrom of Williston (who had presided over the 1972 Constitutional
Convention), 476 called for a moratorium on structural changes to the
judicial system while an interim study was made of "the state's entire
judicial system" for the 1979 legislative session. 477 The interim Legisla-
tive Committee headed by Senator Howard Freed, a lawyer from Dickin-
son, and a Judicial Council committee worked jointly to propose legisla-
tion for the 1979 session. Lawyer Richard McGee from Minot headed a
Citizen's Advisory Committee that participated in the study. 47s The
proposal called for state funding of a single-jurisdiction trial court
organized by districts.479
Chief Justice Erickstad urged the 1979 session to implement the
unified system with state funding in five phases: (1) statewide trial courts;
(2) juvenile court personnel; (3) clerks of court; (4) jurors and indigent
470. See 1975 N.D. Laws ch. 615, at 1598; Erickstad, supra note 372, at 27.
471. See Erickstad, supra note 372, at 27-28; see also Judicial Council Minutes 7 (June 19, 1975)
(on file with North Dakota Supreme Court Administrator's Office); Judicial Council Minutes 2 (Nov.
24, 1975) (on file with North Dakota Supreme Court Administrator's Office).
472. See 1977 N.D. Laws ch. 599, at 1378-80.
473. N.D. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-3.
474. "Supreme court justices and district court judges shall be citizens of the United States and
residents of this state, shall be learned in the law, and shall possess any additional qualifications
prescribed by law." N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 10. The three year residency requirement for a position
on the Supreme Court is gone.
475. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3: "The supreme court shall have authority to promulgate rules of
procedure, including appellate procedure, to be followed by all the courts of this state; and, unless
otherwise provided by law, to promulgate rules and regulations for the admission to practice, conduct,
disciplining, and disbarment of attorneys at law." This plain language gives the Court complete power
over all procedure.
476. See NORTH DAKOrA CONSrIUTIONAL CoNVENTION, INTERIM REPORT vii (1972).
477. 1977 N.D. Laws, S. Con. Res. No. 4021, at 1546; see also Erickstad, supra note 372, at 29.
478. See id. at 29-30.
479. See id.; 1979 REPORT OF ThE NORTh DAKOTA LEIsLATvaE REsE.ARc CoMMrrr.E 105-12.
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defense; and (5) incentives to improve trial court facilities.48 0 When the
appropriations bill to fund statewide district courts was defeated in the
Senate, "basically through opposition of the State Association of Coun-
ties," the 1979 legislature decided to study unifying the system for
another two years. 481 Structural unification was delayed yet again.
The 1981 legislature began unifying the trial courts by appropriat-
ing state funds for district judges, jurors, indigent defense, and juvenile
court48 2 and, effective January 1, 1983, by replacing the multi-formed
county courts with a single-level county court with uniform jurisdiction
and law-trained judges throughout the state. 483 Practice and procedure
for county courts was made the same as for district courts, with direct
appeals from the county courts on the record to the Supreme Court. 484
While a number of county judges served more than one rural county,
and some urban counties had more than one county judge, each had the
same substantive jurisdiction.485
Substantial restructuring of the system had finally happened more
than two decades after the first attempts to do so.
6. 1981: Judicial Nominating Committee
Since statehood, all interim judicial vacancies had been filled by
appointment of the Governor at his sole discretion.486 For some time,
the State Bar Association often informally made recommendations on
the qualifications of known candidates to assist the Governor in filling a
vacancy.48 7
The 1976 judicial article sought to formalize this nominating
procedure. It directed a judicial nominating committee be established
by law, and required the Governor to fill a vacancy from a list of
480. Chief Justice Erickstad's State of the Judiciary Address, STATE OF NORTH DAKOrA, JOURNAL
OF THE HOUSE 95-96 (46th Leg. 1975).
481. Erickstad, supra note 372, at 31-32; 1979 N.D. Laws, S. Con. Res. 4089, at 1963.
482. See 1981 N.D. Laws ch. 36, at 61-62. Clerks of court and courthouse facilities were left for
continued funding by the counties.
483. See 1981 N.D. Laws ch. 319, at 857-72, codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-07.1, repealed by
1991 N.D. Laws ch. 326, § 203, at 974-1044.
484. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-07.1-21, repealed by 1991 N.D. Laws ch. 326, § 203 at
974-1044.
485. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-07.1-17, repealed by 1991 N.D. Laws ch. 326, § 203 at
974-1044. Twenty-six new county court judgeships resulted. "[Forty-two] counties joined fourteen
multi-county agreements to share county court services. Of these, there [were] four two-county
judgeships, six three-county judgeships, and four four-county judgeships." Erickstad, supra note 372,
at 34.
486. See N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 98 (repealed 1976).
487. In 1922, State Bar Association President Tracy R. Bangs suggested the Association poll its
members "in a fair and impartial manner without politics entering into these recommendations" on
judicial candidates for election. ANNuAL MEETNG OF THE BAR ASSOClAnON 47 (Sept. 14-15, 1922).
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candidates nominated by the committee, unless the Governor chose to
call a special election for the position. 488
The legislature was in no hurry. Not until 1979 did it act. Then it
passed House Bill 1067 creating a nine-person committee, with three
members to be appointed by each of the Chief Justice, president of the
State Bar Association, and the speaker of the House of Represent-
atives.489 Governor Arthur A. Link vetoed it.490
The Governor explained the 1977 legislature had failed to establish
the committee as the Constitution directed, but that he had carried out
"the intent of the Constitution by creating judicial nominating commit-
tees by executive act when vacancies occurred in the offices of a district
judge and a supreme court justice." 49 1 Governor Link's reference to
filling a Supreme Court vacancy was his appointment of then First
Assistant Attorney General Gerald W. VandeWalle (elected Chief Justice
in 1993) on August 15, 1978, to replace Justice Robert Vogel, who had
resigned to move to Grand Forks to teach and practice law. 492 Governor
Link declared H.B. 1067 "not acceptable because the Governor has
been excluded from the bill as an appointing authority for members of
the nominating committee." 493
Finally, in 1981, the legislature got it right by establishing a
six-person committee to recommend candidates for judicial vacancies.
Two members of the committee are appointed by each of the Governor,
the Chief Justice, and the president of the State Bar Association, and each
official also appoints an additional temporary member from the affected
judicial district to nominate candidates for a district-judgeship
vacancy. 494
Since 1981, appointments from a committee-recommended list of
qualified candidates have been made by successive Governors Allen I.
Olson,495 George Sinner, 496 and Edward T. Schafer.497 But the Novem-
488. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13.
489. See 1979 N.D. Laws ch. 659, at 1630.
490. See Veto Message, 1979 N.D. Laws, at 1628-29.
491. Id. at 1629.
492. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 58, 62.
493. Veto Message, 1979 N.D. Laws, at 1629.
494. See 1981 N.D. Laws ch. 330, at 942-44 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 27-25-01 TO 27-25-09)
495. Governor Olson appointed Justice H.F. "Sparky" Gierke III (1983-1992) to the position left
by the retirement of Justice William Paulson (1967-1983). See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 57, 63. while
on the Court, Justice Gierke served as the first Vietnam Era State Commander of the N.D. American
Legion, 1983-84. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 63. In that organization he also attained national
leadership positions: as National Vice-Commander of the American Legion, 1985-86, and the first
Vietnam Era National Commander of the American Legion, 1988-89. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 63.
496. Governor Sinner appointed Justice Beryl J. Levine (1985-1996) to the position left by the
death of Justice Paul M. Sand (1975-1984), see SKETCH, supra note 2, at 60, 64; Justice Herbert L.
Meschke (1985-1998) to the position left by retirement of Justice Vernon R. Pederson (1975-1985),
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ber 1984 election of Governor Sinner over sitting Governor Olson
precipitated conflict over appointments to fill two vacancies that came
soon after the election.
7. 1985: Dueling Governors
In early 1985, the Judicial Nominating Committee wisely side-
stepped a dispute between the two Governors over filling two sudden
vacancies.
Soon after the November 1984 general election, Justice Vernon R.
Pederson announced his retirement effective January 7, 1985.498 As the
Committee began accepting applications for nomination to that post,
Justice Paul M. Sand died on December 8, 1984.499 The Judicial
Nominating Committee invited applications and scheduled its meeting to
interview applicants for both positions on Thursday, January 3, 1985.500
Governor Sinner filed his oath of office on December 31, 1984, and
asserted his term began on January 1, 1985. Governor Olson, who had
filed his oath of office four years before on Monday, January 6, 1981,
claimed his term of office extended to the first Monday in January of
1985, the seventh day of the month, since the Secretary of State's
Certificate of Election declared Sinner elected Governor for a four-year
term "commencing on the first Monday in January 1985."501
On January 2, 1985, the newly elected Attorney General, Nicholas
Spaeth, asked the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction to
decide which one was truly Governor that week.502 With the Committee
expected to report its nominations on January 3 or 4, the Court sched-
uled an immediate hearing for the morning of Friday, January 4 to
resolve the dispute over which governor had the constitutional authority
to fill both vacancies on the Supreme Court. 503 Justices Pederson,
VandeWalle, and Gierke disqualified themselves, and four presiding
see SKETCH, supra note 2, at 61, 65; and Justice J. Philip Johnson (1974 and 1992) to the position left by
Justice Gierke, who resigned in 1992 to accept a presidential appointment to the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals. Along with Justice Sathre, Justice Johnson shares the distinction of having served on the
Court two different times, rather than continuously. For a second time, Justice Johnson was defeated
for election after serving less than a year, and again returned to law practice in Fargo.
497. Governor Schafer appointed Justice Mary Muehlen Mating (1996-present) to the position
left by Justice Levine's retirement; and Justice Carol Ronning Kapsner (1998-present) to the position
left by Justice Meschke's retirement.
498. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 61.
499. See SKErcH, supra note 2, at 60.
500. See Kevin Whalen, Court Candidates Trimmed to 8, BISMARCK TmiB., Jan. 4, 1985, at Al.
501. North Dakota v. Olson, 359 N.W.2d 876, 877-78 (N.D. 1985).
502. See id. at 877.
503. See Greg Sellnow, Spaeth Asks Justices for Fast Decision, BISMARCK TRUB., Jan. 4, 1985, at
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district judges were called to sit temporarily on the Supreme Court with
Chief Justice Erickstad to decide the case. 504
On the morning of January 4, the Nominating Committee, chaired
by Owen Anderson, a professor at the North Dakota Law School, deliv-
ered a list of eight candidates for the Court to both Governors Olson and
Sinner. Since the statutes authorized two to seven nominees for each
vacancy, and allowed combined lists for multiple vacancies, 5 0 5 the
Committee recommended eight candidates: 5 0 6 J. Philip Johnson of
Fargo;50 7 Ward Kirby of Dickinson; Beryl J. Levine of Fargo; James
Maxson of Minot; Herbert L. Meschke of Minot; Vern Neff of Williston;
District Judge William Neumann of Rugby;S08 and Rolf Sletten of
Bismarck.
During the day on January 4, the Supreme Court held the hearing
and issued a unanimous opinion. 509 The Court ruled "the term of office
for which Olson was elected in 1980 commenced on January 1, 1981,
and terminated on December 31, 1984," and that "George A. Sinner is
currently, and has been since the first moment of January 1, 1985, the
Governor of the State of North Dakota."510 On January 17, 1985,
Governor Sinner appointed Justices Levine and Meschke, and they took
office in early February. 5 11
8. Election and Selection
Two members of the current Court, Justices William Neumann and
Dale Sandstrom, were elected in 1992 without having gone through the
Nominating Committee procedure for those positions. 5 12 Two members
of the current Court were appointed by Governor Schafer from candi-
date lists recommended by the Nominating Committee. He appointed
Justice Mary Muehlen Maring to replace Justice Levine who retired in
1996. Justice Maring was elected in 1996 to complete that term, and in
1998 reelected to a ten year term. To replace Justice Meschke, who
504. See Olson, 359 N.W.2d at 884.
505. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-25-02(4), 27-25-03 (1991).
506. See Whalen, supra note 500, at Al.
507. Johnson had served six months on the Court before, when he had been appointed by
Governor William Guy in 1974 to fill the seat vacated by Justice Obert Teigen, but had been defeated
for election. See SKErcH, supra note 2, at 59.
508. Neumann was later elected to the Court in 1992.
509. See Olson, 359 N.W.2d at 884.
510. Id.
511. See SKETCH, supra note 2, at 64-65.
512. Justice Neumann replaced Chief Justice Erickstad who retired. Justice Sandstrom won the
position occupied by Justice Johnson. But Justice Neumann had been nominated by the committee in
1985 for other vacancies. See discussion, supra note 508.
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retired in 1998, Governor Schafer appointed Justice Carol Ronning
Kapsner.513
Under the law establishing the Nominating Committee, its duty is to
seek out and recommend "the most highly qualified" judicial candi-
dates after inquiring into their "legal knowledge and ability, judicial
temperament, experience, and moral character . *..."514 Since the
formal inception of the Nominating Committee procedure, six of eight
new justices have been selected from lists of candidates recommended by
the Committee. The process has worked well.
9. Reporting to its Constituencies
Chief Justice Alvin C. Strutz started the important practice of
communicating directly to the legislature.SiS His "brief report" to a
joint legislative assembly in 1973 remarked on the role of the judiciary
as the third branch of government, deplored "the low salaries being paid
to our judges," and warned about the increasing workload for the
judicial system.5 16
Chief Justice Erickstad augmented and continued the legislative
message as a major means of communicating with the coordinate legisla-
tive branch of government. He made a "State of the Judiciary" address
to a joint legislative assembly in 1975 and to each succeeding biennial
session during his tenure.517 His messages became extensive reports on
the condition of the judicial system, on efforts to find solutions to its
problems, and on legislation recommended as desirable. Chief Justice
VandeWalle has continued the practice.5 18
While occasionally a Chief Justice or Justice had addressed the State
Bar Association as far back as the turn of the century,519 it was Chief
513. Under a 1998 amendment to the judicial article, "[a]n appointment must continue for at least
two years", and "the judge shall continue in the position until the next general election immediately
following the service of at least two years." N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13(2), as added by an amendment
approved June 9, 1998 (1999 N.D. Laws ch. 566, at 2103-04).
514. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-25-05 (1991).
515. See STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 66-68 (43d Leg. 1973).
516. Id.
517. See STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 58-65 (44th Leg. 1975); 89-98 (45th
Leg. 1977); 93-99 (46th Leg. 1979); 129-36 (47th Leg. 1981); 123-29 (48th Leg. 1983); 118-28 (49th
Leg. 1985); 159-70 (50th Leg. 1987); 76-83 (51st Leg. 1989); 87-92 (52d Leg. 1991).
518. See STATE oFNORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 92-95 (53d Leg. 1993); 77-84 (54th
Leg. 1995); 66-69 (55th Leg. 1997); 57-63 (56th Leg. 1999).
519. Former Chief Justice Bartholomew addressed "[b]oth branches of the general assembly and
a large concourse of lawyers and citizens assembled at the capitol in Bismarck," on February 4, 1901,
to commemorate Justice John Marshall Day. PROCEEDINGs 1899-1904, supra note 389, at 38-46. He
made one particularly striking statement: "An active, accurate, studious bar will not long tolerate an
inefficient court." PRocEEDINGs 1899-1904, supra note 389, at 46.
Justice Bronson reported to the Bar Association's annual meeting at Minot on August 22, 1919,
on legislation affecting the Court, the currency of the Court's docket, and administration of the courts.
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Justice Erickstad who began and annualized the practice of formally
reporting to the State Bar Association in 1975.520 Chief Justice
VandeWalle has continued this equally important practice of regularly
reporting to the Court's principal constituency. 521
Direct and regular communications with the legislature and the legal
profession became important instruments for modernizing the Court and
the judicial system. They will continue to be instrumental in those
ongoing relationships.
10. Erickstad Era Progress
Many people helped modernize the system. Early on, leaders and
members of the State Bar Association and some Justices spurred and
pursued progressive changes. Still, looking back, one can see the
meaningful changes came slowly, with much difficulty, and with great
effort by key persons on and off the Court.
Modernization was largely accomplished by the Court obtaining
complete power to make and revise rules and through implementing the
constitutional change to unify the system. The contributions of one
person in particular to these parallel developments stand out. The bulk
of the progress took place during the three decades that Justice Ralph J.
Erickstad served on the Court, and mostly during his leadership decades
as Chief Justice.
Justice Erickstad backed rule-making efforts from the day he joined
the Court in January 1963. He was instrumental in the second signifi-
cant rule-making stage, formation of the committee to write new criminal
rules in 1967. He served on that committee for the six years it took to
write those rules. He chaired the criminal rules committee for nearly all
of its work. Then, as Chief Justice, Erickstad presided over adoption of
the rest of the new rules, as well as their ensuing improvements, refine-
ments, and revisions.
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE B AR ASSOCIATION 54-57 (Aug. 21-22, 1919). Chief Justice Birdzell addressed
the Bar's annual meeting in Minot on September 14, 1922, on the subject of "The Constitution and
Modem Police." ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION 51 (Sept. 14-15, 1922). In 1931, Chief
Justice A.M. Christianson "gave an able address on the work of the North Dakota Judicial Council" to
the Bar's annual meeting at Jamestown, August 18-20, 1931: "All the members of the Supreme Court.
. . were in attendance and participated actively in the discussion." The Annual Meeting of the State
Bar Association of North Dakota, III DAKOTA LAW REVIEW 421-22 (1931).
520. 52 N.D. L. REV. 236 (1975). Later addresses may be found at: 53 N.D. L. REv. 133 (1976);
54 N.D. L. REV. 139 (1977); 55 N.D. L. REV. 133 (1978); 56 N.D. L. REV. 133 (1979); 57 N.D. L. REV.
116 (1980); 58 N.D. L. REV. 150 (1981); 59 N.D. L. REV. 126 (1982); 60 N.D. L. REV. 174 (1983); 61
N.D. L. REV. 147 (1984); 62 N.D. L. REV. 117 (1985); 62 N.D. L. REV. 302 (1986); 63 N.D. L. REV.
434 (1987); 64 N.D. L. REV. 468 (1988); 65 N.D. L. REV. 270 (1989); 66 N.D. L. REV. 80 (1990); 67
N.D. L. REV. 403 (1991); 68 N.D. L. REV. 831 (1992).
521. 69 N.D. L. REV. 705 (1993); 70 N.D. L. REV. 748 (1994); 71 N.D. L. REV. 912 (1995); 72
N.D. L. REV. 864 (1996); 73 N.D. L. REV. 611 (1997); 74 N.D. L. REV. 642 (1998); 75 N.D. L. REV.
710 (1999).
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Justice Erickstad was on the Court when legislative studies of
constitutional revision began in 1963. Even more, when the proposed
wholesale revision of the constitution, with its modem judicial article, was
defeated in 1972, Chief Justice Erickstad became a forceful figure in
rescuing the judicial article, in influencing the legislature to submit it to
the people separately, and in campaigning publicly to approve it. When
the people did approve the new judicial article that he championed, his
patient efforts with the legislature gradually brought about implementa-
tion of the kind of unified judicial system that had been long sought by
many.
Still, Chief Justice Erickstad did more than make rules and unify a
jumbled system. He began, championed, and fostered many other
worthwhile improvements during his stewardship of the judicial branch.
Chief Justice Erickstad presided over equipping the court to do more
work and to do it more efficiently; opening the Court and the judicial
system to greater public accessibility; and elevating the statures of the
Court, its members, and the trial court judges.
During the Erickstad Era, the Court took a number of steps to better
equip itself and the system: The Court obtained funding for and
recruited law clerks, 522 and sought funding for law clerks for the trial
courts. 523 The Court developed the constitutional position of State Court
Administrator, and staffed that office. 524 The Court hired a Central
522. In 1953, the president of the State Bar Association, E.T. Conmy, reported: "IThe
Association could not for the coming year wholly finance the salary of a Supreme Court Law Clerk as
was done last year," but had agreed to contribute $1,500 towards "half-time help from a Law Clerk
selected and it is hoped that the legislature will make a sufficient appropriation so that the Court will
have the services soon of a full-time clerk." Annual Convention of SBAND at Fargo on August 6-8,
1953, 29 N.D. L. Rev. 377, 427 (1953). Apart from that brief, futile effort, there is no record or
memory of regular law clerks before 1965.
After Justice Erickstad arrived at the Court, he advocated law clerks:
[T]he clerkship program should be placed high in priority. In 1963, the North Dakota
Supreme Court had no clerkship program and there was very little interest in such a
program by the members of that court .... In 1965, our court appeared before the
Legislature requesting appropriation for five clerks; but, perhaps because of the newness
of the program, the Legislature decided to start on a more modest basis and thus gave us
two clerks. We have had appropriations for two clerks ever since. It is this writer's
personal view that the work of the court could be greatly expedited if the Legislature
would provide each interested judge with a clerk. In other words, the clerkship program
would be much more successful if it were on a basis of one to one, rather than two to
five.
Hon. Ralph J. Erickstad, Thoughts on Ways of Expediting the Work of Our Supreme Court, 46 N.D. L.
REV. 409, 410-11 (1970). See Appendix B for a year by year list of law clerks who have served the
Justices.
523. Currently seven law clerks assist the district court judges throughout the state.
524. There have been three State Court Administrators: Calvin Rolfson (1971-1975), William
Bohn (1975-1991), and Keith Nelson (1992-present), according to records in the Court
Administrator's office.
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Legal Staff of lawyers to assist justices in preparing opinions, 525 and
hired law-trained, professional librarians to assist in obtaining law-related
materials and researching the law. 526 The Court improved and increased
judicial education.5 27 The Court fostered computerization of the judicial
system for research, record-keeping, and communication.5 28 The Court
established a commission to continuously study, prepare and publish
pattern jury instructions.5 29
During the Erickstad Era, the Court took steps to make the judicial
processes more open to public access and scrutiny: The Court estab-
lished docket currency standards for both itself and the trial courts. 530
The Court allowed cameras into courtrooms, first at the Court and then
extended that full media access to the trial courts, too.531 The Court
authorized collection of interest on lawyers' trust accounts to fund civil
legal services for the poor, public education on the legal system, and
improvement of the administration of justice.5 32 The Court created a
broad-based committee on state and tribal court relations, 533 that bridged
525. Central Legal Staff began in 1979 with permanent employment of L. David Gunkel, who
had been a law clerk in 1977-78, to assist the Court with appeals, motions, and petitions. See Chief
Justice Ralph J. Erickstad, State of the Judiciary, at the Joint Session of the 47th Legislative Assembly
(January 7, 1981), at 24 (condensed version appears in STATE OF NoRT DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE
HOUSE 129-36 (47th Leg. 1981). In July 1983, David Lee, who had been a law clerk in 1974-75, was
added. In August 1983, Don Rysavy and Dennis Dockter, who had been law clerks previously, both
joined the staff. In 1985, Jim Harris, a former law clerk and staff lawyer for the Joint Procedure
Committee for three years, joined the staff for appellate work. Gary Raedeke, while serving as staff
attorney for the Joint Procedure Committee, also assists with appellate work.
The following have served as staff attorneys for the Joint Procedure Committee and its
predecessors: Jon Nelson, Duane Houdek, Joel Gilbertson, Keith Magnusson, David Lee, Jim Harris,
DeNae Kautzmann, Keithe Nelson, and Gerhard Raedeke.
526. Joanne Dugan, hired in 1993, was the first librarian trained in law and library
administration. She was succeeded in 1995 by Ted Smith. The law librarian, and other library staff,
assist not only court personnel, but also government officials, attorneys and public patrons conducting
legal research.
527. The Court secured a grant from the State Justice Institute to begin an annual in-state Judicial
Training Institute in 1991, instead of sending judges to the National Judicial College at Reno so much.
528. Chief Justice Ralph J. Ericksatd, State of the Judiciary, Joint Session of the 48th Legislative
Assembly (January 5, 1983), at 8 (condensed version appears in STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA JOURNAL OF
THE HOUSE 123-39 (48th Leg. 1983): "We are presently installing a computer as part of a pilot case
management program here in the South Central Judicial District, under Presiding Judge Benny Graff."
Access to computer-assisted legal research was implemented in 1989 for any trial judge who desired
it. Today every justice and trial judge has a computer, at least one, if not a laptop as well.
529. N.D. Sup. CT. ADMrN. R. 23 (effective July 1, 1987).
530. N.D. Sup. CT. ADMIN. R. 12 (effective July 1, 1980).
531. N.D. Sup. CT. ADMIN. R. 21 (effective July 1, 1984 and amended to extend to trial courts
effective September 1, 1988).
532. N.D. Sup. CT. ADMIN. R. 24 (effective July 1, 1987); N.D. Sup. CT. ADMIN. R. 24.1 (adopted
May 25, 1988); N.D. Sup. CT. ADMIN. R. 24.2 (adopted May 25, 1988).
533. Administrative Rule 37 was effective May 18, 1994, after Chief Justice Erickstad retired,
but resulted from ground work laid by him while on the Court. He has chaired the committee
continuously since its creation.
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a chasm between two cultures in this state and that led directly to adop-
tion of a rule for recognition of tribal court orders and judgments. 534
Each of these progressive steps helped the status of the Court and
judges, but Chief Justice Erickstad instigated other significant steps to
improve the status of our courts. On his initiative, the Court began to
hold public ceremonies to invest new judges and justices, focusing
attention on the gravity of undertaking new public responsibilities. 535
The Court obtained authorization for, got funding for, and built a new
judicial wing on the state capitol building. 536 This new judicial wing not
only modernized the physical facilities of the Court, it also gave the
Court more space for necessary staff to adequately administer the
growing judicial system. Perhaps of equal importance, the new judicial
wing brought symbolic balance in placing the judicial branch on the
same physical plane in the capitol and in its own wing comparable to the
other coordinate branches, executive and legislative. The judiciary thus
became a visibly recognized coordinate component of government.
Our listing of other modernizing improvements is necessarily
incomplete, but it illustrates the impressive extent of modernization that
Chief Justice Erickstad accomplished during his leadership of the
judicial system.
11. The Moving Force
How did Chief Justice Erickstad achieve so much? He did it by
long hours and hard work, on low pay and with dedication, and by
graciously and patiently seeking out people to help improve the judicial
system.
Before election to the Court, Chief Justice Erickstad had been a
State Senator from Devils Lake. He communicated well with other
legislators. He did so both privately by inviting legislative leaders of
534. See N.D. R. Cr. § 7.2.
535. Justice Robert Vogel's investiture ceremony was held in the Chambers of the House of
Representatives at the North Dakota State Capitol in Bismarck on Wednesday, September 5, 1973.
Since then, a similar ceremony has been held to invest each new justice, soon after each one took
office.
536. See 1977 N.D. Laws ch. 139, at 314-16, "Construction of State Office Building,"
authorizing the board of university and school land to invest up to 8 million dollars to build an office
building on the capitol grounds that would "conform substantially to the architecture of existing capitol
buildings ... ." Id. § 2. Section 8 "allocated a minimum of twenty-one thousand usable square feet
within the office building" to the Supreme Court, and directed the building "be designed in a manner
which will allow for future expansion of the building for additional supreme court space if necessary."
The 1979 session authorized another $2.5 million for unspecified "additional square feet of floor
space, and other fixtures, equipment, and improvements for the judicial wing and state office
building." 1979 N.D. Laws ch. 203, § 1, at 446. The judicial wing on the east side of the capitol
building was completed, and the Supreme Court moved into it, in 1981. Dedication ceremonies were
held December 15, 1981.
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both parties to his home to visit, and publicly by carefully prepared
messages, communications, and committee presentations. He reached
out to citizens, lawyers, and legislators to join court-related committees
that were constantly encouraged to study distinct problems, to assess
alternatives for solution, and to recommend actions that Chief Justice
Erickstad then insisted be respectfully considered and promptly acted on
by the Court.
Chief Justice Erickstad enlisted people from all over the state to
improve the system. He became a consensus builder. And he then saw
to it that the product of Court committees became beneficial laws, orders,
and rules to run the judicial system.
Chief Justice Erickstad once explained his philosophy of public
participation in a message to the legislature:
[These] standards are the product of an open and cooperative
effort of judges, attorneys, and members of the public ....
The public was represented on the committee and it was invited
to participate, not only in hearings before the committee, but
also before our Court prior to the adoption of the standards.
We are committed to encouraging broad public interest and
participation in improving court services, and we are very
pleased with the contributions which these committees have
made. The new open Supreme Court rulemaking process ...
is working well, considering its innovative nature. Experience
with it, and further study of it by our Court Service Administra-
tion Committee will, no doubt, result in some amendments to it.
It has moved us forward in our rulemaking area of
endeavor.537
This broad public participation did indeed move the Court forward in
modernizing judicial services during Chief Justice Erickstad's
stewardship.538
537. See Chief Justice Erickstad's State of the Judiciary Address, STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 134 (47th Leg. 1981).
538. To illustrate this reliance on committee work, the forepart of Chief Justice Erickstad's
printed 1989 State of the Judiciary message to the legislature, at vii, listed 17 advisory boards,
commissions, and committees for the Supreme Court: Council of Presiding Judges, chaired by Chief
Presiding Judge Benny Graff, Bismarck; Judicial Planning Committee, chaired by Justice Beryl J.
Levine, Fargo; Joint Procedure Committee, chaired by Justice H.F. "Sparky" Gierke, Bismarck;
Attorney Standards Committee, chaired by Ven C. Neff, Williston; Judiciary Standards Committee,
chaired by Jane C. Voglewede, Fargo; Court Services Administration Committee, chaired by William
A. Strutz, Bismarck; Personnel Advisory Board, chaired by William G. Bohn, Court Administrator,
Bismarck; N.D. Legal Council for Indigents Commission, chaired by Judge Gail Hagerty, Bismarck;
Coordinating Committee on Computer Installation and Programming, chaired by Justice Gierke,
Bismarck; Advisory Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, chaired by Justice Gierke, Bismarck;
Civil Legal Services to Indigents Committee, chaired by Judge Joel D. Medd, Grand Forks; Joint
Committee on Civil Legal Services to the Poor, chaired by Melvin Webster, Bismarck; Constitutional
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Often certain persons make things happen in history. Chief Justice
Erickstad was one of those. He brought the institutions of the Supreme
Court and the judicial system fully into the twentieth century. 539 More
than any other single person, Chief Justice Erickstad must be credited
with modernizing the North Dakota Supreme Court and the judicial
system it serves.
IV. PREPARING FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A. INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
In January 1975, Chief Justice Erickstad warned the legislature that
a steadily increasing number of appeals "may possibly require the
creation of an Intermediate Court of Appeals," noting that twenty-seven
states had established such a court "to relieve the pressures on the
supreme court." 540 The number of appeals did increase substantially.
Celebration Committee, chaired by Justice Herbert L. Meschke, Minot; North Dakota Pattern Jury
Instruction Committee, chaired by Judge Allen L. Schmalenberger, Dickinson; State Bar Board,
chaired by John D. Kelly, Fargo; Disciplinary Board, chaired by Michael L. Halpern, Glen Ullin;
Judicial Conduct Commission, chaired by Janet Maxson, Minot.
His 1989 message also listed eight committees of the Judicial Conference: Program Planning
Committee, chaired by Judge Jonal H. Uglem, Hillsboro; Committee on Legislation, chaired by Justice
Meschke; Committee on Salary and Retirement, chaired by Justice Gierke; Committee on Courts of
Limited Jurisdiction, chaired by Judge Harold B. Herseth, Jamestown; Committee on Judicial Training,
chaired by Judge Larry M. Hatch, Linton; Committee on Juvenile Court Procedures, chaired by Judge
Norman J. Backes, Fargo; Committee on Judicial Immunity, chaired by Judge Kirk Smith, Grand Forks;
Judicial Ethics Advisory Service Study Committee, chaired by Judge Lee A. Christofferson, Devils
Lake. See id. at vi.
539. Chief Justice Erickstad became a nationally recognized figure in his field, too.
He served five years as a member of the Executive Council of the National Conference
of Chief Justices and is past president of the Conference of Chief Justices and past
president of the National Center for State Courts. On July 2, 1987, he was appointed by
President Reagan as a member of the board of directors of the State Justice Institute,
serving until June 1990.
Fifty Year Members Reflect on Their Careers, GAVEL (Journal of N.D. State Bar Ass'n), April/May
1999, at 8.
In November 1987, he received the North Dakota National Leadership
Award of Excellence from Governor George Sinner, and in June 1988,
was presented with the Distinguished Service Award by the State Bar
Association of North Dakota. In May 1989, he received the Distinguished
Service Award from the National Center for State Courts for his
contributions to improve court administration both nationally and in the state
of North Dakota. On December 3, 1992, he received from the American
Judicature Society its Herbert Harley Award for "his exceptional
contributions to the improvement of the administration of justice" in the
state and the nation.
Id. at 9.
540. Chief Justice Erickstad's State of the Judiciary Address, STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JouRNAL
OF THE HouSE 61 (44th Leg. 1975). Even earlier, Chief Justice Erickstad had advocated study of an
intermediate appellate court. "[Another] way suggested for avoiding congestion and delay is in the
creation of an Intermediate Appellate Court. This should be recommended for study now so that it
might, if feasible, become a reality later." Erickstad, supra note 410, at 413.
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By 1981 the Court was writing over 200 opinions per year, as it has done
every year since. 541
The 1983 legislature endorsed a resolution, sponsored by Represen-
tatives Tish Kelly of Fargo and William Kretschmar of Ashley and by
Senators Rolland Redlin of Minot and Frank Wenstrom of Williston, for
an interim study of "the present and projected North Dakota Supreme
Court caseload and methods for the appropriate structure and adminis-
tration of appellate court services in the interest of justice." 542 In May
1983, the LRC declined the study and instead suggested the judicial
system do it. 543 The Court Services Administration Committee of the
Supreme Court created a subcommittee to study Future Appellate Court
Services, and Representative William Kretschmar agreed to chair it.544
In November 1984, the Judicial Council supported an intermediate
appellate court, and Chief Justice Erickstad's 1985 State of the Judiciary
message to the legislature lobbied vigorously for it.545 In January 1985,
the Court's Future Appellate Court Services Study Subcommittee
recommended creation of an intermediate appellate court. 546 A parallel
committee of the State Bar Association indecisively "acknowledged the
existence of the workload problem, but urged ...all other possible
solutions be attempted prior to the creation of an intermediate appellate
court." 547 Not surprisingly, the 1985 legislature then gave the Court no
safety valve for the relentless buildup of work.
In 1987, the legislature finally authorized a court of appeals to ease
the Supreme Court's workload.548 Whenever the Supreme Court decides
over 250 cases in a year, the Court may establish panels of three from
among retired judges and active trial judges to hear specific cases
referred by the Court.549
The Court has established a screening process. One of the clerk's
staff (often the clerk), a staff lawyer, and one of the justices (in rotation)
recommend cases for reference to the appeals panel whenever the Court
decides it needs help with its caseload. From the inception of the court
541. Search of West's North Dakota Reporter CD-ROM Cases database (database containing
only North Dakota Supreme Court decisions).
542. Chief Justice Ralph J. Ericksatd, State of the Judiciary, Joint Session of the 49th Legis. (Jan.
5, 1985), at 4 (condensed version appears in STATE OF NORTh DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 118-28
(49th Leg. 1985).
543. See id.
544. See id.
545. See id. at 5-6.
546. See STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 163 (50th Leg. 1987).
547. Id. at 163-64
548. See 1987 N.D. Laws ch. 374, at 931-34; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-02.1.
549. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-02.1-02(1).
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of appeals in 1987, only sixty-five cases have been referred to, heard by,
and decided by panels of this temporary court of appeals.550
But this legislation came with a sunset clause that has been continu-
ously extended, most recently in 1999 to expire at the end of the year
2003.551 This intermediate appellate division has been carefully used by
the Court, has functioned well, and has been especially necessary when
the Court has been temporarily short-handed from an illness or vacancy.
Out of respect for the separation of powers, the legislative branch
ought to permanently authorize temporary panels for the intermediate
court of appeals. Alternatively, since it only involves assignment of
existing judicial personnel, the Court should implement it by rule under
its constitutional power to govern appellate procedure "to be followed
by all of the courts of this state. .. "552 An intermediate appellate
division will be a critical tool for the twenty-first century to cope with
additional surges of appeals that are likely.
B. TRIAL COURT CONSOLIDATION
Further implementing the unified system, the 1991 legislature
abolished county courts, merged county and district judgeships into a
single trial court, and sought greater efficiency. 553 The measure directed
the gradual reduction of trial court-judgeships to begin in 1995, decreas-
ing from fifty-three judges in 1991 to forty-two by January 1, 2001 .554
In December 1997, at the Court's request, the National Center for
State Courts (NCSC), after study of weighted caseloads, reported that
measuring the then-existing number of forty-six trial judgeships and 6.8
referees (including part-timers) against the caseload indicated a quantita-
tive surplus of 3.84 judicial bodies. There are nagging worries, however,
about the extent of the judicial reductions dictated by the legislature
(although never recommended by the Supreme Court) because the
NCSC study did not "quantify" significant intangibles and varying
factors, like accidental deaths or severe disabilities, long absences or
vacancies, and caseload surges in particular localities.555
550. Search of West's North Dakota Reporter CD-ROM Cases database (database containing
only North Dakota Supreme Court decisions). The Court, though often petitioned for review, has only
reviewed and reversed a single case decided by the Court of Appeals. See McAdam v. Dynes, 442
N.W.2d 914 (1989).
551. See 1999 N.D. Laws ch. 277, at 1171.
552. N.D. CoNsT. art. VI, § 3.
553. See 1991 N.D. Laws., ch. 326, at 974-1044; see also N.D. Cair. CODE § 27-05-02.1.
554. See 1991 N.D. Laws ch. 326, § 86, at 1006-07; 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 316, § 1, at 1108-10;
1993 N.D. Laws ch. 317, § 1, at 111-12.
555. See Matter of Judicial Vacancy, 1998 ND 25, 574 N.W.2d 199, 200-03 (Meschke, J. &
Maring J., dissenting).
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With helpful guidance from Justice William Neumann, a former trial
judge, the Supreme Court has carried out the orderly reduction of the
number of judgeships through gradual attrition from deaths, resigna-
tions, and decisions not to seek reelection. Only a single judgeship
remains to be vacated before the end of 2000 to reach the dictated
efficiency of forty-two trial court judges.556
Chief Justice VandeWalle explained the effect of unifying the court
system to the 1999 legislature: "[T]oday we have only one level of trial
courts instead of the three that previously existed. The result was a
change from a system of literally hundreds of part-time and full-time
judges, to a point where, by [century's] end, we will have [42] full-time
law trained trial judges." 557 This unified system has streamlined admin-
istration while making the system responsive to another perceived public
need, that of reducing governmental expenditures for the justice
system.558
But without any significant decrease in workloads in sight, most trial
courts are already clearly overloaded. It remains to be seen whether this
dictated "efficiency" is worth the associated costs to the public from
justice delayed.
C. COMPUTER PUBLICATIONS
To facilitate wider access to its opinions, the Supreme Court in 1997
adopted a generic numbering system (e.g., 1999 ND 1) for its opinions.
The Court now requires use of the generic cite in all trial and appellate
briefs.559
556. In September 1999, the Court conducted consultations with trial judges and lawyers of each
of five judicial districts with judgeships up for election in 2000 to aid in deciding which judgeship to
eliminate. See Notice of Consultation (N.D. Sup. Ct. July 28, 1999) (Sup. Ct. No. 990224) (on file with
North Dakota Supreme Court). On December 2, 1999, the Court issued its Order abolishing judgeship
number five in the Southwest Judicial District with chambers in Bowman, effective at the end of 2000.
See 1999 ND 226, 603 N.W.2d 57,
557. Chief Justice VandeWalle's State of the Judiciary Address, STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,
JOURNAL OF TH HOUSE 58 (56th Leg. 1999).
558. A prior attempt to complete unification by integrating the clerks of court into the unified
system was ineffective. See N.D. CENr. CODE § 11-17-11 (1995) (repealed 1999) (giving counties the
option to "transfer responsibility for funding for the clerk of district court to the state"). But, the 1999
legislature authorized integration while assuring continued court services in every county, beginning
April 1, 2001. See 1999 N.D. Laws ch. 278, at 1172-1210. A movement by clerks from some of the
smaller counties to refer that measure to a popular vote failed to gamer enough petition signatures to
file with the Secretary of State. See News from the North Dakota Supreme Court <httpJ/www.court.
state.nd.us/Court/News/M7_1999.htm>.
The primary duty of clerks of court is to keep judicial records orderly and securely. These
largely clerical positions have little or no policy responsibilities anymore, if they ever did. The
positions should not be elective, but auxiliary to the judicial system.
559. N.D.R. CT. § 11.6.
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By installing an Internet web site in 1996,560 the Court again entered
the publishing field. Now, by posting its opinions on the web site the
same day they are issued, the Court makes new opinions more quickly
available to the legal profession.
The Court's web site came principally through Justice Dale
Sandstrom's efforts for the Court. This advance gives the public and
practitioners easy and inexpensive access not only to all court opinions
issued since 1991, but also to daily news about Court-related activities, a
helpful directory of licensed lawyers, and extensive links for legal
research.
The American Association of Law Libraries acclaimed the Court's
web site as the best judicial web site in the nation.56 1 In 1999, the N.D.
Court's website was named the number one judicial website worldwide
by CTC6, a worldwide court technology conference of 3,000 participants
sponsored by the National Center for the State Courts. 562
D. A CENTURY OF ADVANCES
The first woman to serve on the Court, Beryl J. Levine of Fargo, was
appointed by Governor George Sinner in 1985. Since she retired in
1996, Governor Schafer appointed two more women to fill vacancies on
the Court, Justice Mary Muehlen Maring from Fargo and Justice Carol
Ronning Kapsner from Bismarck, both of who were active private
practitioners. 563
560. 'See North Dakota Supreme Court News <http://www.court.state.nd.us/court/news/NEWl.
HTM>.
561. See American Association of Law Libraries <http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avplaw/lawlib/
aa~lwg/bestjud.htm>
562. See Results for the CTC6 Top Ten (or so) Web Site Competition <http:/CTC6.ncsc.dni.usl
sites/topten.html>
563. The Court has taken a number of steps to squelch gender bias in the judicial system. By
Administrative Order 7, see Admin. Order 7, reprinted in 72 N.D. L. REv. [1343] (1996), on March 5,
1997, the Court created a Gender Fairness Implementation Committee, chaired by Justice Maring, to
evaluate, implement, and monitor the work of a prior Commission on Gender Fairness in Courts,
chaired by Justice Levine, whose final report was published in 72 N.D. L. Rev. [1113] (1996). Acting
on recommendations of the Gender Fairness Committee, the Court has referred a number of specific
recommendations to other appropriate committees to implement. Chief Justice VandeWalle, State of
the Judiciary Message to Annual Meeting of State Bar Association of North Dakota 12 (June 9-11,
1999). The Joint Committee on Attorney Standards, acting on one of these referrals, has
recommended amending Rule 8.4 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct, to specify it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "manifest, by words or conduct in connection with a judicial
or administrative proceeding, bias or prejudice, including bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, or sexual orientation, against parties, witnesses, counsel or
others, except when those words or conduct are legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, or sexual orientation is an issue in the proceedings .. " Increased civility in the
profession is a valid administrative goal, while leaving unimpaired the constitutional freedoms of
speech and association. The proposed amendments to Rule 8.4 were sent back to the committee by the
Court in October 1999, and the outcome is not yet known.
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Those two, along with Justice William Neumann, a former practitio-
ner and trial judge from Bottineau; Justice Dale Sandstrom, a former
assistant attorney general and public official from Bismarck; and Chief
Justice Gerald VandeWalle, 564 a former assistant attorney general, make
up the current Supreme Court. They are the beneficiaries of over a
century of efforts to advance and improve the judicial branch of govern-
ment and, as stewards of the system's future, they are reasonably well
prepared to carry a sound system forward into the twenty-first century.
V. CONCLUSION
These glimpses of the history of the North Dakota Supreme Court
and judicial system show how difficult it was to improve those institu-
tions during the twentieth century. However, with the substantial mod-
ernization and unification achieved during the last third of this century,
the Supreme Court seems well positioned to maintain a just and stable
legal climate in North Dakota far into the twenty-first century. Still:
"Just as freedom and justice are not free, justice is not easily attainable,
nor is it enduring without continuous effort and personal dedication on
the part of those who serve the justice system and those who would
uphold and preserve it."565
The Court's future will certainly be favorably affected by the
advances made in the twentieth century, but the Court will need more of
the kind of continuous effort and personal dedication exhibited by
leaders like former Chief Justice Ralph J. Erickstad to uphold and
preserve it.
564. Chief Justice VandeWalle has also become a national leader. On August 5, 1999, he was
unanimously named president-elect of the National Conference of Chief Justices at the Conference's
50th anniversary meeting held at Williamsburg, Virginia. He became president of the Conference of
Chief Justices in August 2000.
565. Chief Justice Erickstad's State of the Judiciary Address, STAI OF NORTH DAKoTm, JOURNAL
OF Thm HOUSE 92 (52d Leg. 1991).
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GuY C. H. CoRLISs
JOSEPH BARTHOLOMEW
ALFRED WALLIN
NEWTON C. YOUNG
DAVID MORGAN
JOHN M. COCHRANE
EDWARD ENGERUD
JOHN KNAUF
CHARLES FISK
BURLEIGH F. SPALDING
SIDNEY E. ELLSWORTH
JOHN CARMODY
EVAN B. Goss
EDWARD T. BURKE
ANDREW A. BRUCE
ADOLPH M. CHRISTIANSON
LUTHER E. BIRDZELL
RICHARD GRACE
JAMES ROBINSON
HARRISON A. BRONSON
WILIAM NUESSLE
SVEINBJORN JOHNSON
JOHN BURKE
ALEXANDER BURR
GEORGE MOELLRING
JAMES MORRIS
P.O. SATHRE
THOMAS J. BURKE
GUDMUNDER GRIMSON
NELS JOHNSON
ALVIN C. STRUTZ
OBERT C. TEIGEN
RALPH J. ERICKSTAD
HARVEY B. KNUDSON
OCTOBER 1889
OCTOBER 1889
OCTOBER 1889
AUGUST 1898
JANUARY 1901
JANUARY 1903
AUGUST 1904
AUGUST 1, 1906
JANUARY 1907
JANUARY 31, 1907
JANUARY 31, 1907
JANUARY 15,1909
JANUARY 15,1909
JANUARY 1911
JANUARY 1911
OCTOBER 1911
JANUARY 1915
JANUARY 1917
JANUARY 1917
JANUARY 1917
DECEMBER 1918
JANUARY 1923
JANUARY 1923
DECEMBER 1, 1926
DECEMBER 1, 1926
DECEMBER 1, 1933
JANUARY 1935
DECEMBER 1937
JANUARY 1951
JANUARY 1939
SEPTEMBER 19,194
APRIL 1954
JANUARY 1959
JANUARY 1959
JANUARY 1963
JANUARY 1965
AUGUST 15, 1898
DECEMBER 31, 1900
DECEMBER 31, 1902
JULY 1906
AUGUST 31, 1911
JULY 20, 1904
JANUARY 10, 1907
DECEMBER 1906
JANUARY 10, 1907
DECEMBER 31, 1916
DECEMBER 31, 1914
DECEMBER 31, 1910
DECEMBER 31, 1910
DECEMBER 31, 1916
DECEMBER 31, 1916
DECEMBER 1, 1918
FEBRUARY 11, 1954
NOVEMBER 1, 1933
DECEMBER 31, 1922
DECEMBER 31, 1922
DECEMBER 31, 1924
DECEMBER 31, 1950
DECEMBER 1, 1926
MAY 14, 1937
SEPTEMBER 19, 1949
DECEMBER 1934
DECEMBER 31, 1964
DECEMBER 31, 1938
DECEMBER 31, 1962
MARCH 20, 1966
.9 DECEMBER 1958
DECEMBER 1958
JUNE 16, 1973
JUNE 1974
DECEMBER 31, 1992
JANUARY 1975
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WILLIAM S. MURRAY
WILLIAM PAULSON
ROBERT VOGEL
J. PHILIP JOHNSON
PAUL M. SAND
VERNON R. PEDERSON
GERALD W. VANDEWALLE
H.F. GIERKE III
BERYL J. LEVINE
HERBERT L. MESCHKE
WILLIAM A. NUEMANN
DALE V. SANDSTROM
MARY MUEHLEN MARING
CAROL RONNING KAPSNER
APRIL 1, 1966
JANUARY 1967
JUNE 27, 1973
JULY 1974
FEBRUARY 11, 1992
JANUARY 6, 1975
JANUARY 6, 1975
AUGUST 15, 1978
OCTOBER 1, 1983
FEBRUARY 1, 1985
FEBRUARY 1, 1985
JANUARY 1, 1993
JANUARY 1, 1993
MARCH 1996
NOVEMBER 1998
DECEMBER 31, 1966
OCTOBER 1, 1983
AUGUST 15, 1978
JANUARY 1975
DECEMBER 31, 1992
DECEMBER 8, 1984
DECEMBER 8, 1984
PRESENT
NOVEMBER 20, 1991
MARCH 1, 1996
OCTOBER 1, 1998
PRESENT
PRESENT
PRESENT
PRESENT
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1965-66 PETER A. QUIST
FRANK E. Wo-LETZ
1966-67 JEROME L. LARSON
EDWIN M. ODLAND
JOHN D. OLSRUD
1967-68 GARYLLE B. STEWART
JOHN A. GRAHAM
1968-69 DENNIS A. SCHNEIDER
DAVID L. PETERSON
1969-70 DAVID M. AXTMANN
William G. Engelter
1970-71 ROBERT O. WEFALD
ROBERT W. WIRTZ
1971-72 ROBERT W. HOLTE
MERVIN D. NORDENG
1972-73 JOHN P. BAILEY
MARVIN M. HAGER
ROBERT E. LANE
TOMAS B. TUDOR
1973-74 MIKE HINMAN
GREGORY R. SCHWANDT
MARK STENEHJEM
ROBERT E. LANE
JON 0. NELSON
1974-75 JON 0. NELSON
DUANE HOUDEK
DAVID 0. LEE
ALAN J. LARIVEE
ROLF P. SLETrEN
1975-76 LAWRENCE DoPsON
CHRISTINE HOGAN
DUANE LILLEHAUG
DAVID SOGARD
KEITH WOLBERG
1976-77 LARRY M. BAER
JANE C. HEINLEY
ILLONA A. JEFFCOAT-
STACCO
KEITH JONES
DENNIS O'TOOLE
1977-78 PATRICIA L. BOSSERT
L. DAVID GUNKEL
BRLAN D. NEUGEBAUER
BLAINE L. NORDWALL
MARGARET A. RUSSELL
1978-79 JOHN M. KONECK
DANIEL S. KUNTZ
BRUCE D. QUICK
KATmYN SAUGSTAD
ALFSON
SCOTT J. SCHNEIDER
1979-80 SCOTT E. BOEHM
GERRi L. GILuNt
TWOMEY
DANIEL L. HOVLAND
PAUL K. SANDNESS
PATRICK J. WARD
1980-81 JIM HARRIS
JERRY EVENSON
KENT REIERSON
DENNIS BITZ
ROBIN SJAASTAD
1981-82 CRAIG R. CAMPBELL
TOM A. DICKSON
JOHN R. KENNELLY
DON L. RYSAVY
JEREL SCHIMMELPFENNIG
CEANN WIKENHEISER
JIM HARRIS
1982-83 Jo NOACK
CYNTHIA NORLAND
JIM HARRIS
LORNA BROWN
NORMAN ANDERSON
DENNIS DOCKTER
DAVE REICH
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1983-84 TOBY ANDERSON
ScoTr GRAHAM
BRUCE T. LEVI
KATHRYN URBONYA
Joy L. WEZELMAN
1984-85 CAROLE J. HUSEBY
BRUCE T. LEVI
MICHAEL P. MASUDA
JOHN R. SHOEMAKER
Joy L. WEZELMAN
1985-86 LYNN M. BOUGHEY
ANNA M. FRISSELL
MICHAEL P. MASUDA
CHRISTIAN A. PREUS
JoY L. WEZELMAN
1986-87 ERIK ASKEGAARD
ScoTT BREHM
DAVID E. CLINTON
DELORES DILLMANN
ROBERT STROUP II
1987-88 JEAN V. FAULCONBRIDGE
DAVID J. HOUGE
TODD D. KRANDA
LARRY D. ORVIK
NANCY J. SOONPAA
1988-89 KATHRYN HINDS
KATHLEEN DETTMANN
TODD D. KRANDA
BOBBIE RASMUSSON
MICHAEL WANGER
1989-90 DAVID HAGLER
JULIE EVANS
ELAINE AYRES
MALCOLM PIPPIN
MARK MAICHEL
1990-91 JON JENSEN
SUSAN ROARK WALDRON
DENAE KAUTZMANN
GENE OLSON
ScoTr LANDA
1991-92 TAG ANDERSON
JOE BIALKE
I.ESiE BAKKEN OLVER
GENE OLSON
DEE DEE RUUD
1992-93 THOMAS G. HOLUM
LANCE E. ISAAC
MICHAEL S. JAHNER
CINDA L. SMITH
CARY R. STEPHENSON
1993-94 JENNIFER S. CLARK
JAMES C. FLEMING
DOUGLAS L. HOLLOWAY
KATHRYN RAND
MONTE L. ROGNEBY
1994-95 STEVE BALABAN
GERALD (JUD) DELOSS
SHARI M. GIANARELLI
DOUG W. NESHEIM
TIM J. WAHLIN
1995-96 MICHAEL A. BOSH
JON P. BURGESS
ANGELA ELSPERGER LORD
MICHAEL J. HABURG
TRACY L. KOLB
1996-97 ALANA BASSIN
TRACY MOLICK
MICHAEL SCHAFF
MARGARET SCHNEIDER
JAMES SMITH
1997-98 AARON DORRHEIM
BRENDA FoYT
JOEL FREMSTAD
LISA McEvERs
DANIEL TRAYNOR
1998-99 JENNIFER mASON DICK
KARl STONELAKE-HOPKINS
PAUL ODEGAARD
ANTHORY WEILER
CLINT BOGDEN
1999-2000
2000-2001
DELVIN LOSING
REID A. BRADY
JESSICA PALMER
LEAH KOPSENG COGHLAN
MICHAEL DILLINGER
MARYBETH HEGSTAD
CONSTANCE N. HOFLAND
NOEL EVANS
MARK A. FRIESE
JENNIFER M. KLEMErSRUD
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